Izonov V.V. Preparation of the Russian army on the eve of the First World War
// Military Historical Journal, 2004, No. 10, p. 34-39.
OCR, proofreading: Yuri Bakhurin (a.k.a. Sonnenmensch), e-mail: [email protected]
The issues of preparing the Russian army for war have always attracted the attention of researchers studying the military history of Russia. Of course, in one article there is no opportunity to consider the chosen problem in its entirety, therefore the author is limited to the features of the combat training of units and formations, including the professional and job training of officers of the Russian army, on the eve of the First World War.
Combat training was carried out according to a specific plan, which provided for the division of the academic year into two periods: winter and summer. The latter were subdivided into smaller ones. To ensure the uniformity of education, uniform programs were developed and special instructions were issued (1). The training of soldiers arriving on active duty took place in several stages. At the first stage, which lasted four months, the program of the young soldier was mastered. The inculcation of professional skills began with solitary training, which included drill and physical training, mastery of weapons (fire training, bayonet and hand-to-hand combat), performing the duties of a single fighter in peacetime (carrying out internal and guard duty) and in combat (serving on patrol, field on guard, the actions of an observer, a messenger, etc.). In subsequent years, the soldiers repeated what they had learned earlier.
The orders required “when training the lower ranks, whether young, old-timers, training and other teams, adhere to the system of display and conversations” (2). The main task was “educating a soldier in devotion to the king and his duty, developing strict discipline in him, training -34- the action of weapons and the development of physical forces that contribute to the transfer of all the hardships of service "(3).
The classes of young soldiers were held separately from the old-timers (4). They were led by a company commander, sometimes by one of the junior officers. Unfortunately, before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. in the guidelines for the training of soldiers, the duties of junior officers were not defined, so they commanded platoons and half companies only in combat exercises, and in relation to recruits they did “only what they order” (5). Only during the military reforms of 1905-1912. the responsibility of junior officers increased sharply, and they were directly involved in the process of training and education of their subordinates. Now the junior officers in the units were directly involved in the training of privates and non-commissioned officers. This was demanded by the Minister of War.
For the period of winter classes, the company commander chose "teachers of young soldiers" from among non-commissioned officers or old-timers at the rate of one for 6-10 recruits. "Uncles" had to have many qualities, among which: "calmness, impartiality, kindness, disinterestedness, observation" (6). The “teachers of young soldiers” were to teach the recruit to take care of his health, wean him from bad habits, make sure that the soldier received all kinds of allowances, etc.
Some company commanders considered it necessary to select two teachers for each recruit: one would only teach regulations and deal with the soldier during class hours, and the other would follow the soldier’s every step in his free time. When choosing “teachers of young soldiers”, the officers were recommended that “one of them should be a “foreigner” who could be entrusted with his countrymen” (7). This, of course, greatly facilitated the solitary training of soldiers of non-Russian nationality. Sections of the training course for recruits "were distributed among teachers depending on their abilities and moral data" (8).
Subsequently, during the First World War, special teams of "teachers of young soldiers" were formed in some spare parts. They were tasked with organizing classes so that “soldiers could be put into service six weeks after the start of their training, and no later than two months later” (9).
During the military reforms of 1905-1912. decisive measures were taken to improve physical education in the troops. To achieve the physical development of military personnel, training sessions (in gymnastics and fencing) and physical training began to be carried out systematically. In the winter period of training, classes were held daily throughout the entire service in all branches of the military, and in the summer, “when people already have a lot of physical labor,” they were engaged daily “only if possible” (10). The duration of daily classes was from half an hour to an hour.
In the winter period of training, regardless of the individual training of a soldier, it was considered necessary to maintain the combat readiness of entire units, “for which it is necessary to carry out walks, rides, exercises and maneuvers and maneuvers with live fire” (11). Thus, the servicemen of the special troops received the practice and the opportunity to "develop practical dexterity and the best cases of technical work of personnel serving field spark stations attached to large military formations" (12). As you can see, such a system of combat training in the Russian army made it possible to systematically train a single soldier for only four months.
The second stage of training included joint actions as part of a squad, platoon, company and battalion. Combat training in the summer was carried out in two stages. The first was childbirth classes.
troops: in the infantry in a company - 6-8 weeks, in a battalion - 4 weeks, classes in the regiments - 2 weeks (13). The leadership of the military department demanded that the main attention in training be given to the conscious assimilation by the military of the knowledge, skills and abilities they have acquired, to the development of their ingenuity, endurance, stamina and dexterity. For example, the commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district, cavalry general A. V. Samsonov (14), in order to improve health, physical development and dexterity necessary for combat operations, demanded that gymnastic games be organized in the camps as often as possible with prizes in the summer, although would be inexpensive” (15).
A significant place in the system of troop training in the summer was occupied by fire training. It was believed that the infantry should prepare the attack itself with the fire of their hand weapons, so a good shooter was brought up from each soldier. Shooting training was carried out at different distances and for a variety of targets: single and group, stationary, emerging and moving. Targets were designated targets of different sizes and imitated lying soldiers, artillery pieces, attacking infantry, cavalry, etc. They taught single, salvo and group fire, shooting at all distances up to 1400 steps, and up to 400 steps they taught to hit any target with one or two shots. The officers were required “during preparatory exercises for shooting and shooting itself, to conduct training in such a way that the lower ranks were familiar with all types of shooting and from behind shelters” (16). So, during the First World War in the battle near Gumbinen, the 17th German Corps suffered 50 percent. casualties solely from heavy rifle fire from the 27th Infantry Division. Eyewitnesses surveying the battlefield found a mass of German soldiers and officers hit by rifle bullets in the head and chest (17).
The second stage of summer classes also included "total collection of all three types of weapons" and was divided into four weeks (18). For a number of reasons, far from all military units took part in training troops in joint operations.
Depending on climatic conditions, the commanders of the troops of the military districts themselves determined the timing of the transition from winter to summer exercises, as well as the time for rest of the troops.
Since the 90s XIX century in some military districts began to conduct winter mobile camp gatherings of units of various branches of the armed forces. The academic year ended with the so-called big maneuvers. Tactical exercises and maneuvers acquired a particularly great importance in the combat training of troops in connection with the transition to a system of personnel army, when a contingent of untrained recruits began to pour into formations and units every year. Under these conditions, it was possible to form units and formations, to achieve their constant readiness only through regular exercises and maneuvers. The duration of battalion maneuvers was 1-2 days, regimental maneuvers - 4-10 days. No more than 10 percent were allocated for theoretical studies. the total amount of time allocated for maneuvers (19).
In addition to combined arms, sanitary, fortress, landing (together with the fleet) exercises and maneuvers were practiced, at which special training tasks were worked out in more detail. In 1908, amphibious maneuvers were carried out by the military units of the Odessa Military District and the naval forces of the Black Sea in order to "benefit both the ground forces and the fleet, show its personnel how to act when all the combat forces of the Black Sea Theater carry out a landing operation" (20) . In 1913, large maneuvers were carried out there, followed by landings in Odessa, Sevastopol and Batumi (21). Such maneuvers entered the practice of army training and took place annually.
The commanders of the troops of the military districts taught units and formations on maneuvers "only the requirements of a decisive offensive" (22). Maneuvers were also carried out in which the troops of one or two or three military districts took part. Of the most massive, we should mention the maneuvers of 1897 near Bialystok, 1899 in the Warsaw military district on the river. Bzura and 1902 near Kursk, where the troops of four military districts participated. In 1903, major maneuvers were held in the St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Vilna and Kiev military districts. In 1912, the last major maneuvers took place in the three western border districts and the Irkutsk military district. 24 1/2 infantry divisions and 2 rifle brigades took part in the maneuvers{
23
}
.
There were many serious flaws in the practice of maneuvering at that time. “An attack against a well-organized defensive position is hopeless” (24) - this was the opinion of the highest command of the Russian army, based on the experience of the Russo-Japanese campaign, when such positions had to be attacked without numerical superiority and without the support of heavy artillery. During the maneuvers "after the assault on the defense" the pursuit of the enemy was not carried out.
There were other reasons that caused great damage to the normal course of combat training of troops. Let's consider the main ones. At a meeting of officers of the General Staff of the Warsaw Military District, the speaker, Captain I. Lyutinsky (25), noted that “before the last war (26), little attention was paid to the combat training of the lower ranks, and even less to the training of a single soldier” (27).
In the final report of the commission formed at the headquarters of the 2nd Army, which fought in Manchuria, the reasons for the unsatisfactory training of soldiers were revealed, among which: “1) the low cultural level of the contingent (a huge percentage of illiterates); 2) incorrect training of a soldier” (28).
In fact, continuous training was carried out during the course of training for young soldiers and the first camp gathering. The rest of the time was occupied by heavy guard and internal service and work in the regimental economy. And often the load was excessive. For example, the commander of the troops of the Odessa military district, cavalry general A.V. Kaulbars (29), when personally checking the guards in Nikolaev, made sure that in many cases the infantry of the garrison guarded the empty buildings of various departments.
In addition, in a report on the inspection of the troops in 1907, the inspector general of the infantry noted that "you cannot expect proper training of young soldiers if company commanders and officers are late for classes or under various pretexts and do not appear at all ...".
Significant harm to the training of soldiers was caused by a large number of illiterates who were drafted into the troops. “Endowed by nature, as well as by the historical warehouse of the socio-economic life of Russian life, with the richest spiritual and physical forces, our soldier,” it was noted in military literature, “to the deepest misfortune of our motherland -35-, is doomed by fate to yield to others in terms of mental outlook and educational preparation” (30). In 1913, about a third of those called up for military service were illiterate. When the First World War and general mobilization began, it turned out that in Russia 61 percent. conscripts were illiterate, while in Germany - 0.04%, in England - 1%, in France - 3.4%, in the USA - 3.8%, in Italy - 30% (31).
The limited financial capabilities of the military department did not allow for the period under review to place troops in the barracks, which undoubtedly worsened the combat training of subunits and units. Since 1887, the construction of barracks was entrusted to the “military construction commissions”, which acted on the basis of the “Regulations on the construction of barracks by order of the military authorities in an economic way” approved on January 17 of the same year (32). Despite the enormous difficulties, the military construction commissions partially solved the problem of building barracks. At the same time, this was detrimental to the combat training of the troops.
Accommodation conditions left much to be desired. Often it was impossible to conduct proper training and education of troops in an unsatisfactory hygienic condition (33).
In 1910, 4,752,682 rubles were allocated to the military department for the construction of barracks that met all the requirements in European Russia and the Caucasus, 1,241,686 rubles in Finland, and 9,114,920 rubles in the Siberian districts (34). in the military department, according to the residual principle, it did not allow, by the beginning of the First World War, to deploy troops in comfortable military camps, and to train personnel on prepared training fields and training grounds.
An even more negative influence on the course of combat training of troops was exerted by the so-called free work. “We have always been poor in money, and therefore absolutely insufficient funds were allocated for a huge army,” wrote the Minister of War, Lieutenant General A.F. Rediger (35). “Therefore, the army had to serve itself and even, in free work, it itself earned money for its own food and petty needs of a soldier” (36).
Free labor was introduced in
Russian army Peter I in 1723. Ordinary and non-commissioned officers were allowed to be hired at the places of deployment of military units, while “headquarters, chief officers, non-commissioned officers for such work, if they themselves did not wish, were not forced to repair at all” (37). With long periods of service, free work spread very widely, since with a fairly simple system of training the lower ranks, it was believed that they would not cause damage to the combat training of troops. As a rule, the commander of a unit or subdivision, and sometimes the sergeant major, looked in advance for any work at a private or state-owned enterprise or construction.
In defense of free work, isolated voices were heard, proving that these works make it possible to maintain a soldier’s connection with the land, with the countryside, with production, etc.
An active opponent of free work was the commander-in-chief of the guards and the St. Petersburg military district, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich (38), by whose order free work in the district in 1900 was “stopped once and for all” (39). In 1906, due to the reduction in the terms of service, the improvement in the material situation of the troops, the increase in the lower ranks of the monetary content and the increased demands on the combat training of the troops, free work was banned everywhere (40).
Huge damage to combat training was caused by the so-called housekeeping. Rearmament of the army, modernization of artillery at the end XIX - early XX century required great expenditures. The troops were forced to support themselves. It was necessary to build premises, dress and content the troops in an economic way "without expenses from the treasury."
Regimental bakeries, shoe shops, saddlers, carpentry and carpentry artels began to take "all the forces of the troops and all the attention of the commanders" (41). The whole service, in particular company commanders, began to consist in all kinds of purchases, checking various reports. “Precious time,” the newspaper wrote, “is spent on maintaining laced, numbered and government-printed books of the most diverse nature” (42). All the thoughts and aspirations of the commanders were directed to the economic part. For example, the commander of the 36th Siberian Rifle Regiment, Colonel Bykov, simultaneously received gratitude "for the location regiment, contained perfectly and in perfect order "and a remark" for the unsatisfactory preparation of training regiment "(43).
Let us note one more point that left a certain imprint on the army - the strengthening of its police functions. Right at the end XIX - early XX century, during the reign of Nicholas II (44) the participation of troops in the suppression of popular uprisings has become massive. The military newspapers wrote: "The barracks are empty, the troops live in villages, in factories, in factories, military commanders have become governors" (45).
Commanding troops in cities to assist the police, protect railways, government agencies, etc. hindered the organization and conduct of combat training.
Cavalry inspector Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (46) in the report on the activities of the inspection for 1905 and 1906. emphasized that “in many regiments it was not possible to properly prepare recruits ... and in general to conduct classes correctly and systematically, as was done before business trips” (47).
In addition, many soldiers were on business trips. Batteries were appointed from combatant companies not only for their battalion, regiment, but also for officers, generals and military officials of various higher headquarters and departments up to and including the military district. In 1906, there were 40,000 batmen in the army (48). Even after the introduction of the new regulation on batmen, about half of this number remained. Of course, the separation of soldiers from study lowered the level of combat readiness.
The issue of professional and official training of the officers of the Russian army remained unresolved until the beginning of the First World War. The Instruction for training officers published in 1882, which was a tactical training program for command personnel and existed without changes until 1904, no longer met the requirements of combat practice. There was an opinion among the officers that “theoretical training does not in the least help to understand the wartime situation, since during the war the spiritual sides of a person are inevitably unbalanced, due to which much of what is well known in peacetime is lost sight of at first sight. step into the field "(49).
In addition, the officers of the Russian army were not distinguished by good physical fitness. -36-
The War Department was tasked with eliminating these shortcomings. By the beginning of the First World War, something in this direction had been done. At the direction of the Minister of War, the Committee for the Education of Troops set up "a commission to develop measures to provide our army with officers and commanders in accordance with the requirements of this service" (50). The commission came to a unanimous opinion on the need to develop a new legislative act that would regulate and direct the training of officers in the troops.
By 1909, the Committee on the Education of the Troops prepared a draft of a new instruction for officer classes and submitted it for consideration to the military department. After consideration by the Military Council, the Minister of War approved the document. According to the new instruction, the training of unit officers consisted of three main sections: “military-scientific classes, exercises in military units and special tactical exercises (this also included a war game)” (51).
The commanders of military units for each academic year planned classes with officers for the winter and summer periods. All responsibility for the organization and conduct of classes rested with the unit commander. They took place mainly during the hours of classes with the lower ranks and lasted no more than 3 hours a day. In winter, they were held once a week, and in summer, only at private gatherings, no more than 1 time in 2 weeks (52).
The military-scientific training of officers, the expansion of their military knowledge, familiarity with military literature, the tactical and technical characteristics of new equipment and weapons were organized to one degree or another in each unit. In accordance with the possibilities and the availability of funds, military literature was subscribed to each library of the regiment, and magazines and newspapers were issued to officer meetings. At the same time, it should be noted that the libraries were poorly replenished with literature.
Military conversations (messages or lectures) were held, as a rule, at the headquarters of military units and not only junior officers were involved in them, but also chiefs of all degrees, both in the interests of developing the case and in order to maintain their authority. Topics for conversations were chosen “the most vital, most closely related to issues of education and
education of subordinates, tactical training of various branches of the military" (53).
Officers of the General Staff, military engineers and representatives of the field and fortress artillery were involved in the conversations. Particularly interesting were the reports of officers who had combat experience. Military conversations were bound to end with an exchange of opinions on the stated problem (54). This form of conducting classes contributed to the improvement of the professional training of officers.
The next stage in the training of officers was tactical exercises. Usually they were fought battalion-by-battalion under the leadership of battalion commanders. In the classroom, the officers practiced "in solving problems according to the Combat and Field Regulations, in reading maps and plans, in solving tactical problems on the plans and in the field, carried out various kinds of reconnaissance, compiled a description of maneuvers and tactical exercises and reports" (55).
Great importance was attached to the assessment of the terrain in tactical and engineering terms. After all, “from the assessment it should be clear why the solver of the problem settled on this solution, and not on another” (56). In addition, officers were involved in field trips and military games.
Whenever possible, officers of all branches of the garrison were invited to the classes. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that “through the entire war, although not sharply, one can see a separate peaceful and educational life of all three types of weapons, which during the war is expressed in the fragmentation of the actions of each of them and misunderstanding of each other. Where it would be necessary to strike with one fist, each type of weapon works separately” (57). Officers who had combat experience believed that the joint training of officers of all branches of the military made it possible to establish close mutual contacts.
The commanders of brigades, individual military units, and chiefs of staff of divisions were annually involved in a military game of a tactical nature under the leadership of commanders of army corps for a period of 3 to 7 days. Senior officers gathered in places indicated by the corps commander, or at division headquarters under the leadership of division chiefs.
The chiefs of the combat arms of divisions and corps were now also involved in the military game. They participated in it under the leadership of the commanders of the troops of the military districts or more senior commanders.
Prior to the First World War, the headquarters of the Kiev military district usually hosted a military game twice during each winter period for officers of the General Staff, who were called to the headquarters of the district in two lines (58). The leader was the Quartermaster General{
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. In the course of the war game, the actions of the troops of the district and the arriving units of other districts were indicated in accordance with the strategic deployment plan developed in case of war.
Along with the military game, serf and military-sanitary games were often held (60). The command of the fortresses considered it desirable “that the officers of the fortress sapper companies be involved in the fortress game, where it is played together with other officers of the fortress garrison” (61).
Fundamentally new content was filled with field trips of officers, which had the goal of: “a) to prepare senior commanders for resolving strategic tasks mainly in the proposed theater of war; b) to approve in combat commanders the ability to quickly assess the tactical position and terrain properties; c) to provide generals, officers and doctors with practice at the disposal of troops in the field, without diverting the troops from their studies for this ”(62).
Field trips were divided into divisional, fortress, corps and district. To improve the training of senior officers of cavalry units and special troops in divisions, special cavalry trips were carried out. Field trips, as a rule, ended with a two-way maneuver.
Corps, divisional and special cavalry field trips were carried out annually, serf trips at different times of the year, and district trips, as far as possible, by order of the commander of the troops with the permission of the Minister of War. At the same time, when organizing field trips, commanders of various levels took into account the regional conditions for conducting classes.
An important direction in solving the problem of professional training of officer cadres was special training in the troops. For example, in the 1908/09 academic year, in the fortress aeronautic departments, 37 percent of 50 percent of the serfs took part in special classes. officers in the Ivangorod fortress, up to 77 percent. in the educational aeronautical park, in the fortress aeronautical companies, from 60 percent. officers in the Warsaw Fortress, up to 62.5 percent. in Vladivostok, in field aeronautical battalions, from 49.2 percent. officers in the 1st East Siberian, up to 82.2 percent. in the 3rd East Siberian (63). At special classes in aeronautical units, officers raised and lowered balloons and balloons, carried out free flights, delivered secret packages in balloons, flew over cities, photographed railways, fortresses, carried out meteorological observations, etc. (64) During the school year, officers made 55 flights, including 5 night and 6 winter flights.
The officers of the spark telegraph companies in special classes worked out the issues of laying station instruments on a gig for infantry, cavalry and artillery, tuned the stations to a certain wavelength, improved some mechanisms of the spark telegraph system, etc. (65)
The Minister of War demanded that officers become acquainted with military progress in large armies, study in practice with their units all the new methods of using military equipment (66).
The trend towards a qualitative improvement in vocational training among the troops, which took place during the period under study, was associated with the implementation of certain activities of the War Ministry. On the eve of the First World War, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Military District in his most submissive report noted: “... I can testify to the improvement in the quality and intensity of the work of the officers, which, of course, should be explained by the increase in service requirements and the improvement in the financial situation of the officers” (67). In addition to the above occupations, officers improved their knowledge by participating as chiefs of various degrees in commissions for monitoring occupations in subunits and military units.
Along with the training of junior officers, the military department for the first time tried to take measures to improve the military knowledge of senior and senior officers. In order to exchange experience on various issues
of operational art and tactics, lectures, reports, and conversations were held every year at the headquarters of the military districts (68).
For practical familiarization with the latest artillery systems, division chiefs, brigade commanders, and chiefs of staff of corps and divisions were sent once every four years for three weeks to army training grounds (69).
Despite the measures taken, combined-arms commanders did not effectively use the capabilities of artillery in exercises and maneuvers. “Army commanders forget about artillery,” an artillery officer wrote in a military magazine, “when they have to direct the actions of a detachment from all types of weapons” (70).
There were no other schools and courses to improve the professional training of regimental commanders, divisional commanders and corps commanders. And even among the officers there was an opinion that “in our army it is enough to get a regiment or a higher command position in order to completely secure oneself from any further requirements in theoretical training in military sciences. Since that time, everything has been reduced only to practice, and if someone does not do it voluntarily, then he can even become completely stupid, and it is all the easier because it seems to be not forbidden by our charters” (71).
As you can see, the professional training of senior officers from the regiment commander to the corps commander remained very limited. The senior command staff met the First World War without sufficient practice in command and control of troops in combat conditions.
How prepared Russia was for war in terms of combat readiness was testified by a Russian and Soviet military historian A. M . Zaionchkovsky (72): “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training ...” (73).
This weak point did not hide from the keen, cold gaze of a potential enemy. Describing the armies of their future opponents, the German General Staff noticed the low quality of the training of our military formations. “Therefore, in a collision with the Russians,” the annual memorandum stated in 1913, “the German command can dare to maneuver that it would not allow itself against another equal enemy” (74).
The Russian army had to retrain during the war.
Notes
(1) See: Beskrovny L.G.
Essays on the source study of the military history of Russia. M., 1957.
(2) Combat officer. Jan 13, 1909
(3) Instruction for the training of the lower ranks of the infantry. SPb., 1907. S. 3.
(4) See: Arekhov K.A.
The program of classes with young and old-timers. Mogilev-Podolsky, 1907. S. 4.
(5) Military voice. 1906. May 19.
(6) Izmailovich V .
How to Train Young Soldiers: Tips for an Uncle Teacher. SPb., 1902. S. 2.
(7) Butovsky N.
On the methods of training and education of a modern soldier: Practical notes of a company commander. SPb., 1908. T. 1. S. 19.
(8) The practice of military education. Feb. 1, 1908
(9) Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 329. Op. 1.D. 53.L.45.
(10) Manual for training troops in gymnastics. SPb., 1910. S. 10.
(11) Combat officer. 1910. 28 Oct.
(12) Archive of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps (VIMAIV and VS). Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/277. D. 2668. L. 36.
(13) See: Regulations on the training of troops of all types of weapons. SPb., 1908.
(14) Samsonov Alexander Vasilievich (1859-1914) - general from the cavalry. Member of the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese (1904-1905) wars. In 1909-1914. - Commander of the Turkestan Military District. At the beginning of the First World War, he commanded the 2nd Army of the North-Western Front.
(15) Order to the troops of the Turkestan military district No. 310 of 1909
(16) Order to the troops of the Turkestan military district No. 265 of 1908
(17) See: Zaionchkovsky A . M .
World War. M., 1939.
(18) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 820. L. 24.
(19) See: Circular of the General Staff No. 63 of 1909.
(20) Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA VMF). F. 609. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 4 rev.
(21) See: ibid. F. 418. Op. 1. (T. 2). D. 784.
(22) Order on the troops of the Moscow Military District No. 625 of 1907
(23) The Most Submissive Report on the Actions -38- of the Military Ministry for 1912, St. Petersburg, 1916. P. 15.
(24) Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 505. L. 248.
(25) Lyutinsky I. –
Captain of the General Staff, on the eve of the First World War he served in the Warsaw Military District.
(26) This refers to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
(27) Lyutinsky I.
Consistency in combat training. Warsaw, 1913. S. 1.
(28) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 714. L. 675.
(29) Kaulbars Alexander Vasilievich (1844-1929) - cavalry general. Member of the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese (1904-1905), World War I (1914-1918) wars. In 1905-1909. - Commander of the Odessa Military District.
(30) Grulev M.
The evils of the day of our army. Brest-Litovsk, 1911. S. 74.
(31) Chernetsovsky Yu.M.
Russia and the Soviet Union in world politics XX V. SPb., 1993. Part 1. S. 81.
(32) Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). F. 1394. Op. 1.D.41.L. 115.
(33) RGVIA. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 3.
(34) Ibid. D. 106. L. 30v.
(35) Rediger Alexander Fedorovich (1854-1920) - General of Infantry. Member of the Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878). In 1905-1909. - Minister of War.
(36) RGVIA. F. 280. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 100.
(37) Military Encyclopedia / Ed. V.F. Novitsky and others. St. Petersburg, 1911. T. 7. S. 30.
(38) Romanov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1847-1909) - Grand Duke, General of Infantry. Member of the Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878). In 1884-1905. - Commander of the Guards and the St. Petersburg Military District.
(39) Order on the troops of the guard and the St. Petersburg military district No. 20 of 1900
(40) War Department Order No. 23 of 1906
(41) Military newspaper. 1906. June 8.
(42) New time. 1908. 20 Dec.
(43) Order to the troops of the Amur Military District No. 187 of 1911
(44) Nicholas II (Romanov Nikolai Alexandrovich) (1869-1918) - the last Russian emperor (1894-1917). Since 1915 - Supreme Commander.
(45) Military voice. 1906. May 4.
(46) Romanov Nikolai Nikolaevich (Junior) (1856-1929) - Grand Duke, cavalry general. Member of the Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878). With the outbreak of the First World War, he was appointed Supreme Commander. In 1915-1917. - Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front.
(47) RGVIA. F. 858. D. 811. L. 42.
(48) Army. 1906. 1 Nov.
(49) Scout. 1903. No. 664
(50) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 713. L. 106-108.
(51) Ibid. D. 830. L. 329.
(52) Ibid. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 830. L. 329.
(53) Ibid. F. 1606. Op. 2. D. 666. L. 26.
(54) Ibid. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 713. L. 23v.
(55) Archive VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/554. D. 2645. L. 78-80v.
(56) Ibid. Op. 22/575. D. 2666. L. 42.
(57) Tarasov M .
Our officer schools // Vestn. Officer Rifle School. 1906. No. 151. S. 80-81.
(58) Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Dragomirov on the combat training of officers. M., 1944. S. 16.
(59) Quartermaster General - Chief of Staff Operations.
(60) War Department Order No. 511 of 1911
(61) Archive VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/555. D. 2646. L. 80v.
(62) Instructions for officer studies. SPb., 1909. S. 37.
(63) Archive VIMAIV and VS. Eng. doc. f. Op. 22/460. D. 2462. L. 5-6v.
(64) Ibid. L. 10-29.
(65) Ibid. L. 81-95.
(66) RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 654. L. 10.
(67) Ibid. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 689. L. 8.
(68) RGVIA. F. 868. Op. 1. D. 830. L. 328v.
(69) War Department Order No. 253 of 1909
(70) Unfamiliarity of combined arms commanders with the use of modern artillery // Bulletin of the Officer Artillery School. 1912. No. 3. S. 65.
(71) Rosenshild-Paulin A.N.
Combat training of army personnel. SPb., 1907. S. 7-8.
(72) Andrei Medardovich Zayonchkovsky (1862-1926) - Russian military historian, infantry general. Member of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). During the First World War - commander of an infantry division and an army corps, commander of the Dobrudzhan army. Author of works on the history of the Crimean and First World Wars.
(73) Zayonchkovsky A. M .
World War 1914-1918 In 4 vols. M., 1938. T. 1.S. 23-24.
(74) RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 505. L. 246. -39-
By 1914, the Russian army was a very impressive fighting size. Its power, undermined by the Russo-Japanese war, gradually increased. The Russian peacetime army in 1914 had 1 million 284 thousand people in its ranks, about the same as served in the armies of potential opponents - Germany and Austria-Hungary combined (1 million 246 thousand people). The combat training of soldiers and officers of the Russian army was at the proper level. However among the senior officers There were a lot of people who did not correspond to their purpose.
The Russian army was, in principle, well provided with artillery. She had the number of guns set by the state (7.1 thousand), each of them accounted for but 1000 shots, which, however, were clearly not enough. The Russian 76-millimeter cannon was in no way inferior to the best foreign analogues. Nevertheless, the German artillery was significantly superior to the Russian. The German corps had 160 guns (including 34 howitzers), while the Russian corps had 108 (including 12 howitzers). In total, by 1914 Germany had approximately 9.4 thousand guns, and Austria-Hungary - 4.1 thousand. At the same time, Germany had 3260 heavy guns, Austria-Hungary had 1000, and Russia had only 240.
In the Russian army, engineering and technical troops did not receive proper development. True, in terms of the number of aircraft, it ranked second in the world. However there was no own aircraft building. The insufficiently developed industrial potential of the country had a negative impact on its defense capability. Russian factories did not produce aircraft engines, cars, mortars, etc.
The ruling circles of Russia made considerable efforts to restore the country's maritime power. The fleet suffered particularly severe losses during the war with Japan, when 15 squadron battleships, 11 cruisers, 22 destroyers, etc. were sunk or captured by the enemy. The Baltic and Pacific coasts were left practically without protection.
On the eve of the First World War, Russia ranked third in the world in terms of spending on the fleet, second only to England and the United States in this regard. By 1914, four major shipbuilding programs were adopted, for the implementation of which it was supposed to allocate 820 million rubles. However, they were planned to be completed mainly by 1917-1919. By the same time, it was supposed to implement the programs for the development of the ground armed forces, also adopted on the eve of the war, which provided for an increase in the size of the army by 1917 by 40% and a significant increase in the level of its technical equipment.
Thus, in 1914 the country was not yet fully prepared to participate in a large-scale armed conflict. However, the measures taken in Russia to strengthen its defense capabilities caused serious concern in the camp of potential adversaries, who wittingly or unwittingly exaggerated the results already achieved in this regard. In February 1914, Chief of the German General Staff Moltke Jr. considered it necessary to state: “... The combat readiness of Russia since the Russo-Japanese War has made absolutely exceptional progress and is now at a height never before achieved. It should be especially noted that in some ways it surpasses the combat readiness of other powers, including Germany ... "
In Soviet times, it was believed that the Russian Imperial Army entered the First World War completely unprepared, was "backward" and this resulted in heavy losses, lack of weapons and ammunition. But this is not a completely correct judgment, although the tsarist army had enough shortcomings, as in other armies.
The Russo-Japanese War was lost not for military, but for political reasons. After it, colossal work was carried out to restore the fleet, reorganize forces, and eliminate shortcomings. As a result, by the First World War, in terms of its preparation, the level of technical equipment, the Russian army was second only to the German one. But we must take into account the fact that the German Empire purposefully prepared for a military solution to the question of the redistribution of spheres of influence, colonies, domination in Europe and the world. The Russian imperial army was the largest in the world. Russia, after mobilization, put up 5.3 million people.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the Russian Empire was divided into 12 military districts plus the region of the Don Cossacks. At the head of each was the commander of the troops. The conscripts were men aged 21 to 43 years. In 1906, the service life was reduced to 3 years, which made it possible to have a 1.5 million army in peacetime, moreover, two-thirds consisted of soldiers of the second and third years of service and a significant number of reservists. After three years in active service in the ground forces, a man was in the reserve of the 1st category for 7 years, and the 2nd category for 8 years.
Those who did not serve, but were healthy for military service, tk. not all conscripts were taken into the army (there was an overabundance of them, a little more than half of the conscripts were taken), they were recorded in the militia. Those enrolled in the militia were divided into two categories. The first category - in case of war, they had to replenish the army. The second category - those who were removed from military service for health reasons were enrolled there, they planned to form militia battalions (“teams”) from it during the war. In addition, it was possible to get into the army and at will, as a volunteer.
It should be noted that many peoples of the empire were exempted from military service: Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, small peoples of the North. True, there were small "foreign troops". These were irregular cavalry formations, in which, on a voluntary basis, representatives of the Islamic peoples of the Caucasus could enroll.
The service was carried by the Cossacks.
They were a special military estate, there were 10 main Cossack troops: Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Ural, Siberian, Semirechensk, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Ussuri, as well as Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk Cossacks. The Cossack troops fielded "servicemen" and "militia". "Servants" were divided into 3 categories: preparatory (20 - 21 years old); drill (21 - 33 years old), drill Cossacks carried out direct service; spare (33 - 38 years old), they were deployed in case of war to make up for losses. The main combat units of the Cossacks were regiments, hundreds and divisions (artillery). During the First World War, the Cossacks fielded 160 regiments and 176 separate hundreds, along with the Cossack infantry and artillery, more than 200 thousand people.
The main organizational unit of the Russian army was the corps, it consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. During the war, each infantry division was reinforced with a Cossack cavalry regiment. The cavalry division had 4,000 sabers and 4 regiments (dragoon, hussar, uhlan, cossack) of 6 squadrons each, as well as a machine-gun team and an artillery battalion of 12 guns.
Armed with infantry
since 1891 there has been a store-bought 7.62-mm (3-line) rifle (Mosin rifle, three-line). This rifle has been produced since 1892 at the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories, due to a lack of production capacity it was also ordered abroad - in France, the USA. In 1910, a modified rifle was adopted. After the adoption in 1908 of the "light" ("offensive") sharp-nosed bullet, the rifle was modernized, so a new curved aiming bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the trajectory of the bullet. By the time the empire entered the First World War, Mosin rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack varieties. In addition, in May 1895, by decree of the emperor, the Nagant revolver chambered for a 7.62-mm cartridge was adopted by the Russian army. By July 20, 1914, according to the report card, the Russian troops had 424,434 units of the Nagant revolver of all modifications (according to the state, 436,210 were supposed to), i.e., the army was almost completely provided with revolvers.
Also in service with the army was a 7.62 mm machine gun "Maxim". Initially, it was bought by the fleet, so in 1897-1904 about 300 machine guns were bought. Machine guns were assigned to artillery, they were placed on a heavy carriage with large wheels and a large armored shield (the mass of the entire structure turned out to be up to 250 kg). They were going to use for the defense of fortresses and pre-equipped, protected positions. In 1904, their production began at the Tula Arms Plant. The Russo-Japanese War showed their high efficiency on the battlefield, the machine guns in the troops began to be removed from heavy carriages, in order to increase maneuverability, they were put on lighter and easier to transport machines. It should be noted that machine-gun crews often threw out heavy armored shields, having established in practice that in defense, camouflage of a position is more important than a shield, and when attacking, mobility comes first. As a result of all the upgrades, the weight was reduced to 60 kg.
This weapon was no worse than foreign analogues, in terms of saturation with machine guns, the Russian army was not inferior to the French and German armies. The Russian infantry regiment of the 4th battalion (16th company) was armed with a machine gun team with 8 Maxim machine guns according to the state of May 6, 1910. The Germans and French had six machine guns per regiment of 12 companies. Russia met the war with good artillery of small and medium calibers, so the 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 (the basis of the field artillery of the Russian Empire) surpassed the 75-mm quick-firing French and 77-mm German guns in its combat qualities and was highly appreciated by Russian gunners. The Russian infantry division had 48 guns, the Germans had 72, the French had 36. But Russia lagged behind the Germans in heavy field artillery (like the French, British, Austrians). In Russia, the importance of mortars was not appreciated either, although there was experience of their use in the Russo-Japanese War.
At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an active development of military equipment.
In 1902, automobile troops appeared in the Russian armed forces. By the First World War, there were more than 3 thousand cars in the army (for example, there were only 83 Germans). The Germans underestimated the role of vehicles, they believed that it was necessary only for advanced, reconnaissance detachments. In 1911, the Imperial Air Force was established. By the beginning of the war, Russia had the most airplanes - 263, Germany - 232, France - 156, England - 90, Austria-Hungary - 65. Russia was the world leader in the construction and use of seaplanes (airplanes of Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich). In 1913, the aviation department of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in St. Petersburg, under the leadership of I. I. Sikorsky, built a four-engine aircraft "Ilya Muromets", the world's first passenger aircraft. After the start of the war, out of 4 Ilya Muromtsevs, they created the world's first bomber formation.
Starting from 1914, armored vehicles were actively introduced into the Russian army, and from 1915, the first samples of tanks began to be tested. The first field radio stations created by Popov and Troitsky appeared in the armed forces as early as 1900. They were used in the Russo-Japanese War, by 1914 "spark companies" were created in all corps, telephone and telegraph communications were used.
Military science developed,
the works of a number of military theorists were published: N. P. Mikhnevich - "Strategy", A. G. Elchaninov - "The conduct of modern combat", V. A. Cheremisov - "Fundamentals of modern military art", A. A. Neznamov - "Modern war". In 1912, the “Field Service Charter”, “Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Battle”, in 1914 “Manual for Infantry Operations in Battle”, “Manual for Rifle, Carbine and Revolver Shooting” were published. The offensive was considered the main type of hostilities, but much attention was also paid to defense. In the infantry attack, intervals of up to 5 steps were used (more rare battle formations than in other European armies). It allowed crawling, movement in dashes, advancement by squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire of comrades. The soldiers were required to dig in, not only in defense, but also in offensive operations. A meeting battle was studied, actions at night, Russian gunners showed a good level of training. Cavalrymen were taught to act not only on horseback, but also on foot. The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was at a high level. The Academy of the General Staff provided the highest level of knowledge.
Of course, there were disadvantages
so the issue with automatic weapons for infantry was not resolved, although promising developments existed (Fedorov, Tokarev and others worked on them). Mortars were not deployed. The preparation of the reserve was very poor, only the Cossacks had training sessions and exercises. Those who were eliminated and did not get into military service had no training at all. The situation with the officer reserve was bad. These were people who received a higher education, they received the rank of ensign with a diploma, but they had no idea about active service. The reserve also included officers who retired due to health, age, and misconduct.
In Russia, they underestimated the capabilities of heavy artillery, succumbed to the influence of French theories and German disinformation (the Germans actively scolded large-caliber guns in the pre-war period). They realized it late, before the war they adopted a new program, according to which they planned to seriously strengthen the artillery: the corps was supposed to have 156 guns, of which 24 were heavy. Russia's vulnerability was the focus on foreign manufacturers.
War Minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1909-1915) was not distinguished by high abilities. He was an intelligent administrator, but he did not differ in excessive zeal, he tried to minimize efforts - instead of developing domestic industry, he found an easier way. I chose, ordered, received a “thank you” from the manufacturer, accepted the product.
Forgotten pages of the Great War
Russian army during the First World War
Russian infantry
On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Imperial Army numbered 1,350,000 people, after mobilization the number reached 5,338,000 people, armed with 6,848 light and 240 heavy guns, 4,157 machine guns, 263 aircraft, over 4,000 vehicles. For the first time in the history of Russia, it was necessary to hold a solid front 900 kilometers long and up to 750 kilometers deep and deploy an army of more than five million people. The war showed many innovations: dogfights, chemical weapons, the first tanks, and "trench warfare" that rendered the Russian cavalry useless. However, the most important thing was that the war clearly demonstrated all the advantages of the industrialized powers. The Russian Empire, with its relatively undeveloped industry compared to Western Europe, experienced a shortage of weapons, primarily the so-called "shell hunger".
In 1914, only 7 million 5 thousand shells were prepared for the entire war. Their stocks in warehouses ended after 4-5 months of hostilities, while the Russian industry produced only 656 thousand shells for the whole of 1914 (that is, covering the needs of the army in one month). Already on the 53rd day of mobilization, September 8, 1914, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich addressed the emperor directly: “For about two weeks there has been a shortage of artillery cartridges, which I stated with a request to expedite delivery. Now Adjutant General Ivanov is reporting that he must suspend operations in Przemysl and on the entire front until the cartridges in local parks are brought to at least a hundred per gun. Now there are only twenty-five. This compels me to ask Your Majesty to order the delivery of cartridges to be speeded up. Characteristic were the answers of the War Ministry, headed by Sukhomlinov, that "the troops shoot too much."
During 1915-1916, the severity of the shell crisis was reduced due to an increase in domestic production and imports; in 1915, Russia produced 11,238 million shells, and imported 1,317 million. In July 1915, the empire proceeds to mobilize the rear, forming a Special Conference for the defense of the country. Until that time, the government traditionally tries to place military orders, if possible, at military factories, not trusting private ones. At the beginning of 1916, the Meeting nationalized the two largest factories in Petrograd - Putilovsky and Obukhovsky. At the beginning of 1917, the shell crisis was completely overcome, and the artillery even had an excessive number of shells (3 thousand for a light gun and 3,500 for a heavy one, with 1 thousand at the beginning of the war).
Fedorov automatic rifle
At the end of mobilization in 1914, there were only 4.6 million rifles in the army, while the size of the army itself was 5.3 million. The needs of the front amounted to 100-150 thousand rifles per month, with only 27 thousand produced in 1914. The situation was corrected thanks to mobilization of civilian enterprises and imports. Modernized machine guns of the Maxim system and Mosin rifles of the 1910 model, new guns of 76-152 mm calibers, and Fedorov assault rifles were put into service.
The relative underdevelopment of railways (in 1913, the total duration of railways in Russia is six times inferior to the United States) greatly interfered with the rapid transfer of troops, the organization of supplies for the army and large cities. The use of railways primarily for the needs of the front significantly worsened the supply of Petrograd with bread, and became one of the reasons for the February Revolution of 1917 (with the outbreak of war, the army took a third of all rolling stock).
Due to the long distances, according to German experts at the beginning of the war, the Russian conscript had to overcome an average of 900-1000 km to their destination, while in Western Europe this figure averaged 200-300 km. At the same time, in Germany there were 10.1 km of railways per 100 km² of territory, in France - 8.8, in Russia - 1.1; in addition, three-quarters of Russian railways were single-track.
According to the calculations of the German Schlieffen Plan, Russia will mobilize, taking into account these difficulties, in 110 days, while Germany - in just 15 days. These calculations were well known to Russia itself and to the French allies; France agreed to finance the modernization of the Russian railway connection with the front. In addition, in 1912, Russia adopted the Great Military Program, which was supposed to reduce the mobilization period to 18 days. By the beginning of the war, much of this had not yet been implemented.
Murmansk railway
With the outbreak of war, Germany blocked the Baltic Sea, and Turkey - the Black Sea straits. The main ports for the import of ammunition and strategic raw materials were Arkhangelsk, which freezes from November to March, and non-freezing Murmansk, which in 1914 did not yet have a railway connection with the central regions. The third most important port, Vladivostok, was too remote. The result was that the warehouses of these three ports by 1917 were stuck with a significant amount of military imports. One of the measures taken by the Conference on the Defense of the Country was the conversion of the Arkhangelsk-Vologda narrow-gauge railway to a regular one, which made it possible to increase transportation three times. The construction of a railway to Murmansk was also started, but it was completed only by January 1917.
With the outbreak of war, the government conscripted a significant number of reservists into the army, who were kept behind the lines for the duration of their training. It was a serious mistake that, in order to save money, three-quarters of the reservists were placed in cities, in the location of the units, the replenishment of which they were supposed to be. In 1916, a draft was held for the older age category, who had long considered themselves not subject to mobilization, and took it extremely painfully. In Petrograd and its suburbs alone, up to 340,000 soldiers of spare parts and subunits were stationed. They were located in overcrowded barracks, next to the civilian population, embittered by the hardships of wartime. In Petrograd, 160 thousand soldiers lived in barracks designed for 20 thousand. At the same time, there were only 3.5 thousand police officers and several companies of Cossacks in Petrograd.
Already in February 1914, the former Minister of the Interior, P. N. Durnovo, submitted an analytical note to the emperor, in which he stated, “in case of failure, the possibility of which, when fighting such an adversary as Germany, cannot be foreseen, the social revolution in its most extreme manifestations ours is inevitable. As already indicated, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A furious campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary uprisings will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can stir up and group broad sections of the population: first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values and property. The defeated army, besides having lost its most reliable cadre during the war, and being seized for the most part by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will prove too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intellectual parties, deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people, will be unable to restrain the divergent popular waves raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen.
Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Adjutant General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov (sitting) with his son and front headquarters officers
By the winter of 1916-1917, the supply paralysis of Moscow and Petrograd reached its apogee: they received only a third of the necessary bread, and Petrograd, in addition, only half of the required fuel. In 1916, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stürmer proposed a project to evacuate 80,000 soldiers and 20,000 refugees from Petrograd, but this project was never implemented.
By the beginning of the First World War, the composition of the corps had changed. Instead of three, it began to include only two infantry divisions, and the Cossack cavalry regiment began to be created in wartime not with each infantry division, but with the corps.
In the winter of 1915/16, General Gurko reorganized the armed forces on the same principle as Germany and then France the year before. Only the Germans and the French had 3 regiments in the divisions, and the Russians had 4 each, but the regiments themselves were transferred from 4 to 3 battalions, and the cavalry from 6 to 4 squadrons. This made it possible to reduce the accumulation of fighters at the forefront and reduce their losses. And the striking power of the divisions was preserved, since they had the same amount of artillery, and the number of machine-gun companies and their composition increased, machine guns in the formations became 3 times more.
From the memoirs of A. Brusilov: “This time, my front was given relatively significant means to attack the enemy: the so-called TAON - the main artillery reserve of the supreme commander, consisting of heavy artillery of various calibers, and two army corps of the same reserve were supposed to arrive in early spring . I was quite sure that with the same thorough preparations that had been made the previous year, and the considerable funds that had been allotted, we could not fail to have a good success in 1917 as well. The troops, as I said above, were in a strong mood, and one could hope for them, with the exception of the 7th Siberian Corps, which arrived at my front in the autumn from the Riga region and was in a wavering mood. Some disorganization was introduced by the unsuccessful measure of the formation of third divisions in corps without artillery and the difficulty in forming wagon trains for these divisions due to the lack of horses, and partly forage. The condition of the horse stock in general was also doubtful, since extremely little oats and hay were delivered from the rear, and there was no way to get anything on the spot, since everything had already been eaten. Of course, we could break through the first fortified line of the enemy, but further advance to the west, with the lack and weakness of the horse composition, became doubtful, which I reported and urgently asked to quickly help this disaster. But in Headquarters, where Alekseev had already returned (Gurko again accepted the Special Army), as well as in St. Petersburg, it was obviously not up to the front. Great events were being prepared that overturned the whole way of Russian life and destroyed the army that was at the front. During the February Revolution, the day before the abdication of the last Russian Emperor Nicholas II, the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1, abolishing the principle of one-man command in the army and establishing soldiers' committees in military units and on courts. This accelerated the moral decay of the army, reduced its combat effectiveness and contributed to the growth of desertion.
Russian infantry on the march
So much ammunition was prepared for the upcoming offensive that even with a complete shutdown of all Russian factories, it would be enough for 3 months of continuous battle. However, one can recall that the weapons and ammunition accumulated for this campaign were then enough for the entire civilian campaign, and there were still surpluses that in 1921 the Bolsheviks gave to Kemal Pasha in Turkey.
In 1917, preparations were being made for the introduction of a new form of clothing into the army, more comfortable and at the same time made in the Russian national spirit, which was supposed to further raise patriotic moods. This uniform was made according to the sketches of the famous artist Vasnetsov - instead of caps, the soldiers were provided with pointed cloth hats - “heroes” (the very ones that would later be called “Budenovka”), beautiful overcoats with “talks” reminiscent of archery caftans. For officers, light and practical leather jackets were sewn (those in which commissars and security officers will soon flaunt).
By October 1917, the size of the army reached 10 million people, although only about 20% of its total strength was at the front. During the war, 19 million people were mobilized - almost half of the men of military age. The war became the hardest test for the army. By the time of the exit from the war, Russia's losses in killed exceeded three million people.
Literature:
Military history "Voenizdat" M.: 2006.
Russian Army in World War I Moscow: 1974.
“I will only say a few words about the organization of our army and its technical equipment, for it is clear that in the 20th century, the courage of the troops alone, without the availability of sufficient modern military equipment, could not achieve success on a large scale.
The infantry was well armed with an appropriate rifle, but it had too few machine guns, only 8 per regiment, then the minimum was necessary to have at least 8 machine guns for each battalion, and for a division ... 160 machine guns; the division had only 32 machine guns. Of course, there were no bomb-throwers, mortars and hand grenades, but at the beginning of the war, none of the armies had them in a field war. The limited supply of firearms was horrendous, the biggest misfortune...
As for the organization of the infantry, I thought - and this was justified in practice - that the 4-battalion regiment and, consequently, the 16-battalion regiment, were too bulky for convenient control. It is quite expedient to use them in combat - it is extremely difficult ... As for artillery, there were major defects in its organization, and in this respect we lagged far behind our enemies<...>
It must be admitted that most of the higher artillery commanders, through no fault of their own, did not know how to control artillery masses in battle and could not derive from them the benefit that the infantry had the right to expect.<...>
By themselves, the cavalry and Cossack divisions were strong enough for independent actions of the strategic cavalry, but they lacked any rifle unit associated with the division on which it could rely. In general, we had too many cavalry, especially after the field war turned into positional.
The air forces at the beginning of the campaign were placed in our army below all criticism. There were few planes, most of them were rather weak, of outdated design. Meanwhile, they were extremely necessary both for long-range and short-range reconnaissance, and for correcting artillery fire, about which neither our artillery nor the pilots had any idea. In peacetime, we did not bother with the possibility of manufacturing aircraft at home, in Russia, and therefore, throughout the entire campaign, we suffered significantly from a lack of them. The famous "Ilya Muromets", on whom so many hopes were placed, did not justify themselves. At that time we had only a few airships, bought at a high price abroad. These were obsolete, weak airships that could not and did not bring us any benefit. In general, it must be admitted that, compared with our enemies, we were technically significantly backward, and, of course, the lack of technical means could only be made up for by an extra shedding of blood, which had its very bad consequences.<...>
We set out with a satisfactorily trained army. The corps of officers suffered from many shortcomings, and by the beginning of the war we could not boast of a truly selective commanding staff ... "
Brusilov Alexey Alekseevich (1853-1926) - Russian military leader, cavalry general. Participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. in the Caucasian theater of operations. In the 80s of the XIX century. in military teaching. In 1912 he was appointed commander of the Warsaw Military District.
During the First World War, he distinguished himself during the Galician operation of 1914. From March 1916 he led the troops of the Southwestern Front, in the summer of 1916 he carried out a successful offensive operation ("Brusilovsky breakthrough"). In May 1917 he was appointed Supreme Commander, then military adviser to the Provisional Government.
In 1920 he joined the Red Army.” He was the chairman of the Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of all the military forces of the republic, then the inspector of the entire cavalry. Since 1924, he was at the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR for especially important assignments.
The text is given in an extract from the book by A.A. Brusilov "My memories", written in the early 1920s.