During October 1944, Soviet troops, during the Debrecen operation, liberated one third of the territory of Hungary and created favorable conditions for the development of an offensive in the Budapest direction. It was here, in the center and on the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, that its strongest group was located - the 53rd, 7th Guards and 46th armies (31 rifle divisions in total), 2 tank and 3 mechanized corps, as well as the Romanian 1 1st Army (2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions).

They were opposed in a strip 250 km wide by 11 enemy divisions, mostly Hungarian, from Army Group South. The main forces of the German and Hungarian troops - 31 divisions and 3 brigades - were deployed to repel attacks by the 38th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the army formations of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command made a decision: with the forces of the center and left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, continue the offensive without an operational pause, quickly defeat the enemy in the area between the Tissa and Danube rivers, and then immediately capture Budapest. Thus began, which lasted from October 29, 1944 to February 13, 1945.

Distribution of forces on the approaches to the city

The German-Hungarian command on the approaches to Budapest created a defense in depth, consisting of three defensive lines, which rested their flanks on the Danube River north and south of the city. The Budapest defense area was an integral part of the Margarita defensive line, which ran from the Drava River along the southwestern coast of lakes Balaton and Velence to the Danube bend near the city of Vac and further along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. The city itself was turned into a fortress. By the beginning of the operation, the southeastern approaches to Budapest were defended by troops of the 3rd Hungarian Army, reinforced by German tank and motorized divisions.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's plan for the operation was to deliver the main attack on Budapest from the southeast and east. This decision was predetermined by the fact that this direction was the most convenient for the advance of Soviet troops and was covered by relatively weak enemy forces.

The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 46th Army, 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps southeast of Budapest and capture it. The 7th Guards Army was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack from the area northeast of the city of Szolnok and seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Tisza River. The remaining forces of the front received the task of advancing in the direction of Miskolc in order to pin down the opposing enemy troops and prevent their transfer to the Budapest area.

Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin planned to complete the concentration of the main forces in the area of ​​the Yugoslav city of Banat and at the same time, with advanced units, to seize bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary.

The offensive begins on October 29

The offensive began on October 29. On the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 46th Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.T. Shlemin broke through the defenses on the first day and, introducing mechanized corps, began a rapid advance. On November 2, these corps were already 15 km southeast of Budapest, but they were unable to enter the city on the move. The reason was that the German command quickly transferred three tank and motorized divisions to Budapest, which, having occupied defensive lines, were able to stop the advance of Soviet troops. In the center and on the right wing of the front, Soviet troops encountered serious enemy resistance when crossing the Tisza River.

The Supreme High Command headquarters was forced to point out to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front that further attempts to attack Budapest in a narrow area with limited forces could lead to unjustified losses and expose the troops operating in this direction to a flank attack from the enemy from the northeast. On November 4, the Headquarters demanded that Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky accelerate the withdrawal of front troops to the right bank of the Tisza in order to defeat the Budapest enemy group with attacks from the north, northeast and south. In order to strengthen the troops of the center of the front, a regrouping of the 6th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General A. G. Kravchenko and the cavalry mechanized group of Lieutenant General I. A. Pliev, who had previously operated in the direction of Debrecen - Nyiregyhaza, began here.

Another attempt to enter the city

Following these instructions, the front troops resumed their offensive on November 11. It lasted 16 days. However, it was not possible to cut up and defeat the Budapest group east of the city. The second attempt to capture Budapest was unsuccessful. After the regrouping of the tank army, the troops of the center of the front went on the offensive and crossed the Tisza River by November 10. Developing the offensive, mobile troops captured the city of Hatvan on November 26, and by the end of November - the city of Eger, thereby leveling the front line, which was occupied by the left wing troops that had previously advanced to Budapest.

Thus, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front achieved significant success by the end of November. At the same time, it should be noted that the main task - to defeat the enemy group in Budapest - was not completed by the front troops. The enemy managed to create a dense defense on the immediate approaches to Budapest, transferring 12 divisions from the 4th Ukrainian Front to the Budapest direction, the offensive of which developed extremely slowly at the end of October - the first half of November. The headquarters demanded that its commander conduct an offensive with full effort in order to quickly reach the line of the Ondava River. Following this instruction, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in the second half of November, captured the cities of Humenne and Michalovce on November 26, and advanced units began crossing the Ondava River.

On December 5, 1944, the 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive. For eight days, the troops of the center and left wing tried to encircle the enemy by encircling from the north and southwest. At the same time, the mobile formations of the front reached the Ipel River bordering Czechoslovakia, together with the 7th Guards Army of Colonel General M.S. Shumilov, they reached the left bank of the Danube near the city of Vac (20 km north of Budapest) and, advancing from Vac in a southerly direction, overcame the first and second lines of the outer defense of Budapest. At the same time, the 46th Army crossed the Danube 15 km south of the city and captured a bridgehead 14 km along the front and 10–16 km in depth. But due to lack of forces and fierce enemy resistance, she was unable to reach the Hungarian capital from the southwest. Thus, the third attempt to capture Budapest was unsuccessful.

Regrouping of troops

At this time, the troops of Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin were completing their regrouping from Belgrade to Budapest. Their complete concentration in the area of ​​​​the cities of Bahia, Machac, Sombor (135–180 km south of Budapest) was completed by November 25–26. In parallel with the regrouping, the front crossed the Danube with part of its forces in the concentration area and captured an important bridgehead.

Relying on it, the 57th Army of Lieutenant General M. N. Sharokhin and the 4th Guards Army of Army General G. F. Zakharov went on the offensive on November 27, liberated the Transdanubian part of Hungary and Yugoslav territory between the Danube and Drava rivers and by 9 December reached the milestone of Lake Velence, Lake Balaton, the city of Bartsch (80 km south of Lake Balaton). This created a real opportunity to strike at the rear of the Budapest enemy group from the west. In order to prepare for such a strike, Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin ordered the front troops to gain a foothold on the achieved lines in front of the enemy defensive line “Margarita”.

The Germans defended stubbornly

The German command took all measures to prevent the capture of Budapest by Soviet troops and the withdrawal of its last ally from the war. Thanks to the OKH reserve, new formations and regrouping, it increased the composition of Army Group South from 38 to 51 divisions and brigades. Nevertheless, the enemy was inferior to the Soviet troops in strength and means. Thus, the strike group of the 3rd Ukrainian Front outnumbered the enemy in men by 3.3 times, in guns by 4.8 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 3.5 times.

Assessing the composition and distribution of German and Hungarian troops in directions, the Soviet command came to the conclusion that the enemy intended not only to retain Budapest, but also to prevent the Red Army from entering Czechoslovakia and Austria. In such a situation, on December 12, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided with the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to first of all defeat the Budapest group and capture the city of Budapest. To this end, she ordered Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky to transfer the 46th Army with reinforcements to Marshal F. I. Tolbukhin and assigned tasks to both fronts to prepare for joint actions. The essence of the plan was to use the forces of two fronts to break through the enemy’s defenses to the north and southwest of Budapest and, advancing towards each other, to encircle the enemy group, and then to capture the city with simultaneous attacks from the west and east.

The offensive, which began on December 20, developed successfully. By the end of December 26, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts united at Esztergom (35 km northwest of Budapest), completing the encirclement of the 188,000-strong enemy group (about 10 divisions and a number of units of various types of troops). Having created an external front of encirclement and pushing the enemy west of Budapest, Soviet troops simultaneously tightened the ring around the city. The enemy, blocked in the forests northwest of Budapest, was destroyed by the end of December.

Ultimatum of surrender

On December 29, the command of both fronts, in order to avoid further bloodshed and destruction of Budapest, presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops to surrender. However, the enemy command not only rejected this humane act, but also ordered the murder of the envoys captains M. Steinmetz and I. A. Ostapenko, committing a blatant act of dishonor and violation of international law on the inviolability of envoys. Then Soviet troops began to eliminate the encircled enemy. But this process turned out to be lengthy.

During January 1945, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts had to fight heavy battles to repel counterattacks of German troops, whose goal was to release their Budapest group and restore the front line along the Danube. The German command, having concentrated almost half of all tank and motorized divisions available on the Soviet-German front near Budapest, launched three strong counterattacks against the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from January 2 to 26.

When repelling the first counterattack, launched from January 2 to January 7, 1945 from the area southeast of the city of Komarno along the southern bank of the Danube, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were greatly assisted by the active actions of the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, especially the 6th th Guards Tank Army. The rapid entry of this army into the Komarno region forced the German command to abandon the plan to break through to Budapest. In addition, three rifle divisions and an anti-tank destroyer brigade were transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian Front from the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

The enemy launched the third counterattack on January 18 from the area southwest of the city of Székesfehérvár. He managed to reach the Danube, and then approach Budapest from the south at a distance of 25 km. In the fierce battles that unfolded, the troops of Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin, despite the superiority of the German troops in tanks, not only stopped their advance, but also threw them back to their original positions. A significant role in this was played by the skillful maneuver of the Soviet troops, the rapid creation of new defensive lines along the enemy’s advance paths and the offensive of the troops of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the direction of Komarno, to the rear of the enemy’s counterattack group.

In repelling enemy counterattacks, aviation from both fronts provided great assistance to ground forces. During January 1945, only the 17th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation V.A. Sudets) of the 3rd Ukrainian Front flew over 14 thousand sorties. In tense moments, the 5th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov) of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was also involved in attacks on enemy troops.

Directly in the city, the battles were fought by a specially created Budapest group of troops, headed by Lieutenant General I.M. Afonin (since January 22 - Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov). It consisted of four rifle corps from both fronts and, until January 18, the Romanian army corps. Budapest was a fortress prepared by the Nazis for long-term defense. It was surrounded by barbed wire, surrounded by all kinds of fortifications and barriers, and cut with trenches. The city had large reserves of material resources.

Food, fuel and ammunition were delivered to the defending garrison by air. Hitler ordered to fight for the city to the last soldier. The battles for the liberation of the eastern part of the city (Pest) took place from December 27 to January 18, and the western part (Buda) - from January 20 to February 13. Many Hungarian soldiers and officers took part in the battles for the liberation of Buda, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet troops. According to the memoirs of General S. M. Shtemenko, these Hungarian volunteer soldiers “words did not diverge from deeds.” It was from their number, according to incomplete data, that about 600 people died a heroic death in the battles for the liberation of Budapest from the occupiers. The remaining Hungarian volunteers - a total of about 3,200 people - formed the basis of the Buda Volunteer Regiment.

The conditions of the assault were a severe test for the residents of Budapest. The commander of the 9th SS Corps, who was in the besieged capital of Hungary, characterizing their mood, wrote with fear in his diary on January 10: “The civilian population is in an extremely agitated state. People receive practically no food, large sections of the city are left without water, lighting... discontent is growing.”

Although the Soviet offensive developed slowly, the position of the encircled enemy became worse and worse. If at first 40–45 planes delivered the necessary supplies every day, then from January 20 the supply was disrupted by Soviet aviation. On February 13, the enemy group in Budapest, having lost up to 50 thousand killed and 138 thousand prisoners, ceased to exist.

Capture of Budapest and results

This concluded the Budapest offensive operation. During its course, Soviet troops advanced from 120 to 240 km, liberated about 45% of the territory of Hungary (and taking into account the Debrecen operation - 74%) and created the conditions for a further offensive in Czechoslovakia. With the arrival of Soviet troops at the Nesmey line, Lake Balaton, favorable conditions developed for launching subsequent attacks on the enemy in the Vienna direction.

The most important result was that the Soviet troops forced the German command to transfer a large number of formations, especially tank and motorized ones, to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, which were urgently needed to repel the Red Army’s offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction in January-February 1945.

These results were achieved at great cost. The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 320,082 people, of which 80,082 were killed, 1,766 tanks and self-propelled guns, 4,127 guns and mortars, 293 combat aircraft.

The population of the Hungarian capital, who survived not only the fascist occupation, but also 108 difficult days of the blockade, greeted the Soviet soldiers with relief, although with conflicting feelings. There was the influence of fascist propaganda, which instilled fear in the population and portrayed Soviet soldiers in the image of “red devils,” as well as rumors about Stalin’s camps and the activities of the NKVD. At the same time, the information that “among the Russian liberators there are Hungarians” who went over to their side gave people hope.

The destruction of the German group in the Hungarian capital accelerated the process of expelling the Nazi occupiers from the country, increased unrest in the Hungarian army, and the transition of its soldiers to the partisans or to the side of the Red Army. The total number of Hungarians who fought with weapons in their hands on the side of the Soviet troops against the Germans, according to Hungarian historians, was approximately 6–6.5 thousand people. But it is also true that about 11 divisions of the 1st and 3rd Hungarian armies fought together with the German troops against the Red Army. The mass surrender of their soldiers and officers began only with the completion of the liberation of Hungarian territory. For example, from March 28 to March 30 alone, 45 thousand Hungarians were captured in the areas bordering Austria. Hungary actually remained an ally of Germany until the Red Army completely captured its territory.

The offensive actions of Soviet troops in the autumn and winter of 1944–1945 in the southwestern direction led to a radical change in the entire political situation in the Balkans. To Romania and Bulgaria, which were previously withdrawn from the war, another state was added - Hungary. With the withdrawal of Hungary from the war, the bloc of fascist states completely collapsed.

The Soviet government highly appreciated the actions of the troops in the Budapest operation. On June 9, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal “For the Capture of Budapest,” which was awarded to 350 thousand people. 79 formations and units received the honorary name of Budapest.

10/29/1944 2/13/1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin) in December 1944 surrounded in Budapest almost 190 thousand group of... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

BUDAPEST OPERATION, 29.10. 1944 13.2.1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin) in December 1944 surrounded almost 190 thousand in Budapest... ... Russian history

October 29, 1944 February 13, 1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin) in December 1944 surrounded in Budapest an almost 190 thousand-strong group of... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

An offensive operation during the Great Patriotic War, carried out by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts on October 29, 1944 February 13, 1945. B. o. began in the context of the crisis of the Hitlerite coalition, when under the blows of the Soviet... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Coming. operation of the troops of the 2nd (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky) and 3rd (Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin) Ukr. fronts 29 Oct. 1944 17 Feb. 1945 in Hungary during Vel. Fatherland war. By the end of Oct. 1944 owls troops as a result... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

Budapest operation 1944-1945- BUDAPEST OPERATION 1944-1945, strategic. will come operation of the troops of the 2nd and part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian. French, held on October 29. 1944 13 Feb. 1945 with the goal of liberating Budapest and removing Hungary from the war. As a result of the Debrecen operation... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: encyclopedia

BUDAPEST OPERATION 1944-45- strategist. will come Operated by the troops of the 2nd and part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian. fronts together with the Danube military. fl her in Vel. Otech. war, carried out from 10/29/1944 to 02/13/1945 with the aim of defeating the prka group on the territory. Hungary and take it out of the war on the side... ... Military encyclopedic dictionary

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Exactly 70 years ago, on February 13, 1945, after heavy fighting, the city of Budapest was captured, and the German group that defended it was liquidated. The commander of the defense of the Hungarian capital was captured along with his headquarters. In honor of this victory, a salute was given in Moscow with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns. We talk about the events of those days with Deacon Vladimir Vasilik, associate professor at the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University.

- Father Vladimir, what preceded the military operations on the territory of Hungary?

Since the spring of 1944, the Hungarian leadership, trying to get out of the war, began secret negotiations with the West. When Hitler found out about this, he sent German troops into Hungary, supposedly “to help the Hungarians,” but in fact to occupy the country if the Hungarian government tried to leave the game.

However, the Hungarians were influenced by the Romanian events of August 1944, when Ion Antonescu was removed from power and communist-led military units and volunteer units took control of Bucharest. After which King Mihai I announced a change of power in Romania, a cessation of hostilities against the USSR and a truce with Great Britain and the USA.

On August 29, 1944, under the influence of Romanian events, the Hungarian government of General Lakotos openly declared the need to negotiate not only with the British and Americans, but also with the Soviet Union.

- How did they react to this in Berlin?

Instantly! Several more German divisions were introduced into Hungarian territory. However, Admiral Horthy, who served as ruler (regent) of the Kingdom of Hungary, continued separate negotiations, offering the United States and Great Britain a truce on the terms of preventing Soviet troops stationed at the country’s borders from entering Hungary. Having been refused, he entered into negotiations with Stalin, who demanded that he enter the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. As a result, on October 15, 1944, the Horthy government announced a truce with the USSR.

However, Admiral Horthy, unlike King Mihai of Romania, failed to bring his country out of the war. A German-backed coup d'etat took place in Budapest, and Horthy's son was kidnapped by the SS detachment led by the famous saboteur Otto Skorzeny and taken hostage. Then Skorzeny captured the admiral himself. Under the threat of shooting his son and his own destruction, a few days later the admiral transferred power to the leader of the pro-German Arrow Cross party, Ferenc Szalasi, and was taken to Germany.

After Szalasi came to power, mass actions began to exterminate hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews and Gypsies and deport them to Germany

After Szalasi came to power, mass actions began to exterminate hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews and Gypsies and deport them to Germany. The massacres in Hungary are considered one of the last episodes of the Holocaust. In the wake of violence and genocide, Szálasi called on Hungarians to resist the “Russian invasion.” Unfortunately, a considerable part of the Hungarian people responded to this call, as well as to participation in the genocide of Jews and Gypsies.

For many years, for the sake of the imaginary “friendship of peoples” and the preservation of the socialist camp, we were bashfully silent about this. Meanwhile, the fierceness of the Hungarian resistance was not inferior to the German one in the defense of East Prussia and Berlin. And Hungary, among all of Hitler’s allies, resisted the Soviet Union the longest - until March 1945 inclusive.

- What, in your opinion, caused such fierce resistance?

On the one hand, there is the long-standing Slavic-Hungarian antagonism, on the other, the complicity of many Hungarians in Nazi crimes and the fear of revenge. Indeed, on the Eastern Front, the Hungarians often behaved even worse than even the Germans. These factors, coupled with Szalasi's intense propaganda and the threat of reprisals against deserters and their families, led to fierce resistance. Yes, six thousand Hungarians fought on our side, but 22 Hungarian divisions fought against us. This is more than 300 thousand people! They began to surrender en masse to Soviet troops only in March 1945...

Hitler desperately held on to Hungary. Firstly, for political reasons, since it was his last ally. Secondly, Hungary covered the approaches to Austria. And Hitler was always more Austrian than German. The economic background also had its significance: the Hungarian oil region of Nagykanizsa was important to Hitler. Romanian oil had been lost to him since September 1944, and in Germany the Allies regularly bombed plants producing synthetic fuel. And now proven oil reserves in Nagykanizh are 22 million tons.

Besides, Budapest is the key to Vienna. But the Germans did not want to surrender Vienna under any circumstances. After all, Vienna is Hitler's hometown. A significant part of the Germans who fought in Hungary belonged to the SS. They understood that after their crimes it was difficult for them to hope for leniency. In addition, they received the Fuhrer's order and carried it out fanatically. We must not forget about the German barrier detachments, penal battalions and the order to shoot and hang deserters and repress their families in Germany. The secret is simple: a totalitarian machine of suppression.

- The battle for Hungary was particularly stubborn.

Yes, indeed, the Hungarian operation turned out to be the bloodiest, merciless, difficult and lengthy among all the operations of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. At first, the operation was entrusted to the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. Later, when our troops encountered extremely stubborn resistance, we had to use the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Front, allied Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav divisions.

German and Hungarian troops not only defended themselves, but also went on the offensive. At times the situation was reminiscent of our failures in 1941–1942. The commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, even had to use the defensive experience of the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk. And this was literally in the last months of the war!

Soviet troops tried to spare the city and its citizens, unlike the allies and the Germans themselves

The battle for Budapest was particularly fierce. Soviet troops tried to spare the city and its citizens, unlike the allies and the Germans themselves, who used scorched earth tactics.

As is known, on December 29, 1944, the front commanders, Marshals of the Soviet Union Malinovsky and Tolbukhin, presented an ultimatum to the Budapest garrison, inviting the Germans to surrender and promising life and treatment of prisoners in accordance with international conventions. The enemy committed a serious war crime by ordering the execution of our envoys Miklos Steinmetz and Ivan Ostapenko. Then the assault began. However, it took a whole month and a half to finally take Budapest. Pest fell on January 18, Buda on February 13. Numerous destructions and casualties among the civilian population are entirely on the conscience of the German and Hungarian command.

- But after the capture of Budapest, fighting continued on the territory of Hungary?

Yes, we must not forget about the German offensive in the area of ​​Lake Balaton in March 1945! Here the Red Army had to conduct its last major defensive operation. The Wehrmacht counteroffensive (which also included the 24th Hungarian Infantry Division) was codenamed “Spring Awakening.” During it, the Nazi leadership planned to push our troops back beyond the Danube, thereby eliminating the threat to Vienna and the southern regions of Germany. In addition, in the area of ​​Lake Balaton itself there were some of the last oil fields available to the Germans...

The enemy was still very strong, despite the terrible losses of 1943–1944. Its strength was experienced to a much lesser extent by the allies in the Ardennes, but, unlike them, we did not flee before the enemy in Hungary and did not ask anyone for help. Hitler threw considerable forces into Hungary. Suffice it to say that Sepp Dietrich’s famous “Totenkopf” tank division took part in the Balaton operation.

- You mentioned that Hungarian troops fought together with German troops against the Red Army.

Yes, the troops of Hungary, which joined the Nazi coalition back in November 1940, took part in the attack on the USSR as part of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. They took part in battles on the Eastern Front - in particular in the Battle of Stalingrad, where they suffered catastrophic losses.

But there were also Hungarians who fought on the side of the Red Army. On December 21–22, 1944, the first session of the Provisional National Assembly took place in liberated Debrecen, which formed the Provisional National Government. It consisted of Laszlo Rajk, Kalman Kis, and then Janos Kadar. In general, the government was formed on a coalition basis; in addition to the communists, it included representatives of the Social Democratic, Democratic, and National Peasant Parties.

On January 20, 1945, the new government concluded an armistice agreement with the USSR and then declared war on Germany. As a result, two divisions were created, which subsequently formed the basis of the Hungarian People's Army and came under the operational subordination of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Together with Soviet troops, they liberated Hungary from Nazism.

Thanks to the liberation by the Red Army, Hungary was saved from fascism and freed from indemnities and reparations.

- What is the attitude towards the liberation mission of the Red Army in Hungary today?

Given the global political changes, of course, there are attempts to revise history here too. However, they are somewhat less aggressive than, for example, in Poland. The attitude towards the liberation mission of the Red Army is primarily dictated by the media, which are directly dependent on the European mass media, and they tend to attribute the mission of liberators to the allies, but not to the USSR. Nevertheless, there are many people in Hungary who are grateful to Russia for the liberation from fascism, and I am sure that descendants will preserve this memory.

- What did the liberation of Hungary mean for the Orthodox Church?

The Hungarians pursued an anti-Orthodox policy and brutally dealt with Orthodox Serbs. Suffice it to mention that the Hopovo monastery on the territory of Serbia, before the departure of the Germans and Hungarians, was burned and the main temple was blown up. The liberation of Hungary by Soviet troops was welcomed by Orthodox minorities - Serbs, Romanians and Rusyns, as they hoped for a revival of Orthodox life, including. and on Hungarian soil.

- What losses did the Germans suffer during the Budapest operation and what losses did we suffer?

By the beginning of the Budapest operation, the 2nd Ukrainian Front consisted of 5 Soviet and 2 Romanian combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air army. The Soviet troops were opposed by the German Army Group South, consisting of 35 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized divisions and 3 brigades, as well as the remnants of the Hungarian army.

The irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the Budapest operation amounted to more than 80 thousand people, more than 240 thousand people were wounded. 1,766 tanks and self-propelled artillery units were lost. Enemy losses amounted to up to 50 thousand killed and 138 thousand captured.

In the Balaton defensive operation, the losses of the 3rd Ukrainian Front amounted to more than 32 thousand people, of which 8.5 thousand were irrevocable. According to Soviet data, the enemy lost over 40 thousand people, more than 300 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and assault guns, and over 200 aircraft during the counterattack.

- Last question: what is the memory of the liberation of Hungary?

These are monuments to liberating soldiers, including the executed parliamentarians Miklos Steinmetz and Ivan Ostapenko. This is the song “Enemies burned their home” (words by M. Isakovsky, music by M. Blanter). It ends like this:

The soldier got drunk, a tear rolled down,
A tear of unfulfilled hopes,
And there was a glow on his chest
Medal for the City of Budapest.

STORM OF BUDAPEST

The storming of Budapest went down in the history of World War II as one of the bloodiest battles fought by Soviet troops for an enemy settlement. This battle lasted 108 days and cost the opposing sides enormous losses. One of the reasons for such a long defense of the city was the saturation of the German-Hungarian garrison of Budapest with the elite formations of the Reich - the SS troops. But the Red Army managed to break the enemy’s resistance and cleared the capital of Hungary from the Nazis and their minions.

THE SITUATION ON THE THEATER OF DEVELOPMENT

By the end of October 1944, the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front looked like this.

2nd Ukrainian Front Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky advanced towards Hungary from the southeast. To the right, flowing around the enemy’s “Carpathian ledge” on three sides, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front of Army General I.E. Petrov, and to the south, on the territory of Yugoslavia, the 3rd Ukrainian Front of Marshal F.I. fought. Tolbukhin. Conditions were created to reach the enemy in Hungary and Northern Transylvania. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were closest to Budapest. They were given the main role in the liberation of Hungarian territory.

The German command opposed the advancing Soviet troops with Army Group South under the command of General Friesner, including the 6th and 8th German, 2nd and 3rd Hungarian armies, a total of 29 divisions and 5 brigades, and 3 divisions of Army Group F “—3,500 guns and mortars, 300 tanks and about 550 aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet.

Colonel General Friesner, who became the commander of Army Group South, formed on the basis of Army Group Southern Ukraine, at the end of October issued an order with the following content: “... the closer we get to our homeland, the more fanatical the fight must be, because Now it's all about owning your own home. Have you heard the call of the German Volkssturm? For us, battle-hardened front-line soldiers, this is a sacred duty. Whoever does not realize it, who does not give himself entirely to the struggle, wherever it may be, is unworthy of being a German and tramples on his honor. Look at each other, soldiers, and make sure that the cowardly and cowardly do not retain the right to live in our military community for the honor and freedom of our fatherland. Our army group is the furthest line against the Bolshevik onslaught from our homeland. It is required by all means to destroy the enemy in the forefield, before he has yet reached our borders and we still have freedom of movement. By doing this we will provide better assistance to our allies, who are also affected by our tasks... So let’s all get to the fight, right down to the knives!..”

However, nothing could delay the Soviet troops. By decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, they carried out a series of offensive and defensive small and large operations in the southwestern strategic direction. The first of these was the Debrecen offensive operation of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which preempted enemy counterattacks, which, after being reinforced by the Headquarters, by the beginning of October had the 7th Guards, 27th, 40th, 46th, 53rd combined arms and 5th Guards Tank Army, 18th th tank corps, cavalry mechanized groups I.A. Pliev and S.I. Gorshkov, the 5th Air Army, as well as the Romanian volunteer division named after Tudor Vladimirescu - a total of 40 rifle divisions, 3 tank, 2 mechanized and 3 cavalry corps with 10,200 guns and mortars, 750 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 1,100 aircraft. In addition, the 1st and 4th Romanian armies were subordinate to the front.

The front commander decided to deliver the main blow from the Oradea region in the direction of Debrecen and an auxiliary attack by the troops of the right wing of the front in order to capture the area of ​​Cluj, Satu Mare and Carey, assisting the 4th Ukrainian Front in carrying out the Carpathian-Uzhgorod operation. On the left wing, it was planned to defeat the enemy on the eastern bank of the Tissa River to secure the left flank of the front's main attack group.

A characteristic feature in the planning of the operation was the unusual use of tank forces. Taking into account the weak, focal defense of the enemy, the presence of an overwhelming superiority in forces and means over him, R.Ya. Malinovsky ordered the 6th Guards Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko and the horse-mechanized group I.A. Pliev to advance in the first echelon of the strike group to break through the enemy’s tactical defense zone and develop success in operational depth. According to the commander's calculations, this option of using mobile troops would lead to a powerful initial blow against the enemy, who did not have time to create a strong defense. And it really worked.

Despite strong enemy opposition in the Oradea region, the introduction of large reserves into the battle, the advance of the troops of R.Ya. Malinovsky was carried out along the entire front, and the tank army of A.G. Kravchenko, together with the groups of I.A. Pliev and S.I. Gorshkova, with a strike in converging directions, captured Debrecen, an important hub of enemy defense. By the end of the operation - October 28 - the front troops liberated the eastern and north-eastern regions of Hungary in 23 days, reached Tisza from Csop to Szolnok, advanced 130-275 km, defeated 10 enemy divisions, captured 42 thousand soldiers and officers and destroyed a large amount of enemy military equipment helped the 4th Ukrainian Front overcome the Carpathians and capture Uzhgorod and Mukachevo.

After the Debrecen operation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the 2nd Ukrainian Front on October 29 to go on the offensive against the Hungarian capital. It was caused by political considerations and ensured by the capabilities of the Soviet troops, which outnumbered the enemy by 2 times in infantry, 4.5 times in guns and mortars, 1.9 times in tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 2.6 times in aircraft. The significant superiority of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in forces and means was a prerequisite for the defeat of the main forces of Army Group South on the northeastern approaches to Budapest. However, Headquarters ordered a breakthrough to Budapest from the southeast with the forces of the 46th Army with two Guards mechanized corps. When developing such a decision, she proceeded from the weakness of the defense of the southeastern approaches to the capital of Hungary.

The army went on the attack on the afternoon of October 29 after a short but powerful artillery preparation, and the enemy defenses were broken through. At dawn on October 30, the Front Command brought the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps into the breakthrough. On November 2, the troops of the left wing of the front came out from the south to the approaches to Budapest. The Germans were forced from the Miskolc area, along their defense along Tisza, to transfer 3 tank and 1 mechanized divisions here to help, which did not allow the Soviet troops to break into the city on the move. Thus, the enemy significantly weakened the defense of Budapest in the northeast - on the far approaches to the city.

The Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front made every effort to complete the assigned tasks in the difficult conditions of multi-day battles, despite the fatigue of the troops, the severe stretching of their communications, and the untimely delivery of ammunition. As a result, during the half-month offensive that began on November 11, front troops advanced 100 km in a northwestern direction and approached the outer perimeter of the defense of Budapest.

Convinced from the report of the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front that an offensive on a broad front was inappropriate in the future, Headquarters ordered R.Ya. Malinovsky to create decisive superiority over the enemy in the zone of the 7th Guards Army, introducing the 6th Guards Tank Army into battle and after it the I.A. group. Pliev, as well as concentrating here at least 2 artillery divisions to break through to the north of Budapest. It was proposed to resume the offensive no later than December 2-3, 1943.

As a result of the ensuing offensive, front troops reached the Danube north and north-west of Budapest, cutting off the enemy’s escape route to the north. On the left wing of the front, the 46th Army crossed the Danube and rushed forward with the goal of bypassing Budapest from the southwest; then, encountering strong enemy resistance, it went on the defensive and on December 12 became part of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which cut off enemy communications west of Budapest.

After this, the Headquarters set the task to the 3rd Ukrainian Front from the area of ​​​​Lake Velence and the troops of R.Ya. Malinovsky from the Steps area led a counter-offensive towards Esztergom with the aim of encircling and destroying the Budapest group. This plan was fully implemented.

On December 25, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front completely blocked the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest, and began to eliminate the forces encircled there, and the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front took up defense on the outer perimeter of the encirclement. By this period, Hungary remained Germany's last ally in the European theater of operations, and the fall of Budapest could undermine the Hungarians' desire to resist at all. However, the determination to retain the last ally was not the main motive in the struggle for Hungarian territory. Control over the oil fields in the area of ​​Lake Balaton is what forced Hitler to transfer more and more new formations to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Thus, the war economy became the cause of the most violent battles of 1945.

FORCES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE WARRANT PARTIES

Having completed the encirclement of the enemy group in Budapest on December 26, 1944, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts began to liquidate it. By January 1, 1945, they occupied the following position. In the eastern part of the city - Pest - the left-flank corps of the 7th Guards Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 7th Romanian Corps operated. The remaining troops of the front occupied defenses on the left bank of the Gron River - from its mouth and further north to Turin. The 6th Guards Tank Army was in the front reserve.

The main forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were concentrated on the external front of the encirclement: the 4th Guards Army, together with the 7th Mechanized Corps, fought on the right bank of the Danube west of Esztergom and further south to Lake Balaton. The 57th Army went on the defensive south of Balaton to the Drava River at Barča. Further south to Toryants, the 1st Bulgarian Army was supposed to take up defense, replacing the Yugoslav formations operating here; The 46th Army with the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps fought with a front to the east against the Germans defending in the western part of the city - Bude. The front reserve included the 18th Tank and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps.

By January 1, 1945, on the territory of Hungary against the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front there were the 1st, 13th, 23rd tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the 203rd assault gun brigade, the 239th assault artillery brigade, the 219th assault tank battalion, the 3rd and the 4th Cavalry Brigade of the Wehrmacht, as well as at least 20 infantry, mountain and light infantry divisions. These forces were quite sufficient to conduct defensive operations on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front for 2-3 months, especially since the immediate task of the Soviet troops was to eliminate the encircled Budapest group.

However, by Hitler’s decision, in order to turn the situation in his favor, the transfer of the elite ground forces of the Reich - SS tank divisions - began to be transferred to the territory of Hungary.

The German leadership ordered the Budapest garrison to defend the city to the last soldier, coordinating its actions with the offensive of troops from outside. The official military commentator on German radio said that for Budapest "they will fight... from house to house, from street to street." The Germans were preparing to hold their positions at any cost.

In the city of Budapest itself, troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts cut off and surrounded the 9th SS Mountain Corps (IX. SS-Gebirgs-Armeekorps) under the command of Obergruppenführer and Colonel General of the SS troops von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (SS-Obergruppenf uehrer von Pf ef fer- Wildenbruch). The corps included or was operationally subordinate to it the following formations: 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer" (8.SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer"), 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division "Maria Theresa" (22. SS Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division "Maria Theresa"), 13th Wehrmacht Panzer Division (13.Panzer-Division), Wehrmacht Panzer Division "Feldherrnhalle" (Panzer-Division "Feldherrnhalle") without the 93rd Panzergrenadier Regiment. According to some reports, the encircled group also included units of the 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division “Horst Wessel” (18.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Horst Wessel”). After the encirclement, the 9th SS Mountain Corps was quickly subordinated to the 1st Hungarian Army Corps under the command of General Istvan Hindy, consisting of the 10th and 12th Infantry Divisions, units of the 1st Panzer Division and the 1st cavalry division. In total, 25 thousand German and 45 thousand Hungarian soldiers were surrounded in Budapest.

Most of the German formations were going to fight to the last bullet. The order of the commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, issued on the third day of the encirclement, read: “We have endured heavy fighting. We have tough days ahead of us. We will overpower them with a strong community of arms, camaraderie, and mutual assistance. We will be able to pin down large enemy forces in order to stop the onslaught of the East on our homeland. The Fuhrer will not forget us. Every unit, every soldier must hold out at all costs so that our ring is not broken... I am confident that every officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier of the Budapest garrison will fight fanatically, faithful to the oath. Everything for the freedom of Germany and Hungary!

However, in practice, the moral and psychological state of the soldiers of the Budapest garrison was not at all uniform. This was especially true for Hungarian soldiers. On October 15, 1943, the Hungarian ruler-regent Horthy tried to get out of the war by concluding a truce with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But on Hitler's direct orders, the Hungarian leadership was overthrown. Budapest Castle - Horthy's residence was captured by a special command led by Otto Skorzeny with the support of SS paratroopers. The capture of ministries, the most important public buildings and train stations in Budapest was carried out by units of the 22nd SS Maria Theresa Volunteer Cavalry Division. The regent, Admiral Horthy, came under the protection of SS General Pfeffer-Wildenbruch and was then taken by Skorzeny to Germany. The head of the national fascist organization, Ferenc Szalasi, was appointed the new “leader” of Hungary. After such a “castling,” some Hungarian military leaders began to make a new career, going over to the side of the Red Army. Thus, Colonel General Miklos Bela, commander of the 1st Hungarian Army, surrendered to the Soviet command, and then the Chief of the General Staff, General Veres, capitulated. On this occasion, the commander of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht issued a secret order: “Increasing cases of entire Hungarian formations going over to the side of the enemy force me to come to the conclusion... I order: when an attempt is made to transfer Hungarian soldiers or formations to the side of the enemy, a concentrated fire of all types of weapons at the treacherous hordes. Everyone should know: whoever is too cowardly to die with honor will die a shameful death! »

In general, the majority of the Hungarian units did not go over to the side of the Red Army and continued to resist the Soviet troops with arms in hand.

The 7th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer" was formed on March 12, 1944 on the basis of the 8th SS Cavalry Division and was staffed by ethnic Germans, including the 18th Cavalry Regiment with Germans from Russia. It was one of the best cavalry units in Germany, named after the medieval knight who fought on the side of the reformer Luther in the peasant wars of 1522-1525. On September 20, 1944, the division's strength reached 14,040 people: 258 officers, 1,597 junior commanders and 12,185 privates. The division consisted of three cavalry regiments: the 15th, 16th and 18th, the 8th SS motorized artillery regiment, the 8th anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 37-mm guns, the 8th engineer battalion (this unit was not in surrounded Budapest. - Note by author) and other smaller units. The division was commanded by Brigadeführer and SS Major General Joachim Rumohr.

The 21st SS Volunteer Cavalry Division "Maria Theresa", named after the Empress of Austria-Hungary, was formed in the autumn of 1944 using units of the 8th SS Kd. In particular, the 17th Cavalry Regiment was transferred to this formation from 8 SS cavalry regiments. The structure of the 22nd SS Kd was similar to the organization of the Florian Geyer cavalry division (3 cavalry regiments, fire support and support units), except that it was staffed by ethnic Hungarians (the first name of the division was “Hungary.” - Author’s note), headed by German commanders. The division was commanded by August Zeender, brigadenführer and major general of the SS troops.

Both SS cavalry divisions included tank destroyer divisions (SS-Panzer Jaeger-Abteilung 8, SS-Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 22), consisting of two batteries of Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer self-propelled guns, 14 vehicles each for the 8th Cavalry Division SS and 10 self-propelled guns - for the 22nd SS Cavalry Division. Also, in each of the cavalry divisions as part of the tank destroyer divisions, instead of the 3rd battery, there was a tank company equipped with Italian-made M15/42 tanks (consisting of 14 and 10 tanks, respectively).

The 18th Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division "Horst Wessel", named after a fallen Nazi stormtrooper, was formed from Hungarian Volksdeutsche in 1943. Apparently, there was some unit of this division in Budapest, and a very insignificant one at that. In addition to infantry and artillery units, the 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division had 31 StuG III assault guns. The authors of the book do not know how many of these vehicles were present in besieged Budapest.

In addition to the SS troops, there were also Wehrmacht formations and Hungarian units in besieged Budapest.

The most powerful Wehrmacht formations from the units that fell into the “cauldron” were the tank divisions: 13th Panzer Division and the Feldherrnhalle Division. The armored vehicles of these tank divisions supported the SS infantry in street battles, since the actual motorized regiments of these tank divisions either did not get into the “cauldron” at all, or fought in Budapest as separate units.

The Wehrmacht tank group, consisting of the 13th Panzer Division and the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Division, was equipped with Pz.Kpfw.V Panther tanks, Pz. IV/70(V) and 37 mm Flakpz ZSU. Both divisions, reorganized and completed in November 1944, each had 36 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" tanks in three companies, 11 Pz. IV/70(V) in a tank destroyer battery and 4 Flakpz self-propelled guns in an air defense platoon. The artillery regiments of the divisions differed from each other in terms of equipment levels. In the artillery regiment of the Feldherrnhalle tank division in the 1st 3rd artillery divisions there were six 150-mm guns of the Hummel type (Sd.Kfz.165), in the 13th tank division (13th artillery regiment) they were dominated by 150-mm self-propelled guns sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell GW 38(t) (Sd.Kfz. 138/1) and 105-mm self-propelled guns of the Vespe type (Sd.Kfz.124). Artillery ammunition transporters were also mounted on the base of the Vespe self-propelled gun without installing artillery weapons. The 13th Artillery Regiment had several Sd.Kfz.251/9 fire support armored personnel carriers equipped with a 75 mm L/24 short-barreled cannon.

The reconnaissance battalions of the tank divisions described above included Sd.Kfz.234 armored vehicles, as well as a number of reconnaissance tracked vehicles, even such exotic ones as the Sd.Kfz. 140/1 based on the Czech tank Pz.Kpfw.38 (t).

In addition to the SS troops in Budapest there were the 10th mixed Hungarian infantry division and the 12th reserve Hungarian infantry division, as well as units and subunits of the 1st Hungarian tank division, the assault artillery group "Billnitzer" (1st armored car company, 6.8 ,9,10th assault artillery batteries), anti-aircraft artillery units, as well as the Salashi militia from the Arrow Cross organization.

The 10th mixed Hungarian infantry division was formed from line regiments of corps subordination (for which it received its name. - Author's note) in mid-1943. In 1944, it included the 6th, 8th and 18th infantry regiments, the 10th, 11th, 12th and 74th artillery divisions, the 7th reconnaissance and 53rd engineering battalions.

The 12th Reserve Hungarian Infantry Division was formed from reserve regiments of corps subordination (for which it received its name - author's note) in 1943. It consisted of the 36th, 38th, 48th infantry regiments, 40th, 41st, 84th artillery divisions, 12th reconnaissance and 74th engineering battalions.

By January 1945, these divisions included about 12,000 personnel.

The 1st Tank Division of the Hungarian Army consisted of the 1st Tank Regiment, 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment, 1st, 5th, 51st Artillery Divisions, 51st Anti-Tank Division, 1st Reconnaissance and 1st Engineer Battalions.

The 1st Cavalry (Hussar) Hungarian Division consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th Cavalry Regiments, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st, 3rd, 55th Artillery Battalions, 1st Reconnaissance and 4th Engineer Battalions.

In the 1st Hungarian Tank Division, as part of a three-battalion tank regiment in September 1944, there were 61 Turan I tanks and 63 Turan II tanks (Turan I, Turan II). In total, the battalion was equipped with 39 medium tanks, the rest of the vehicles were command vehicles. The air defense division of the 1st Tank Division had 39 40-mm Nimrod self-propelled guns. The division's reconnaissance battalion included a company (14) of "Chabo" (Csaba) armored vehicles. However, by December 1944, only about half the number of tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the 1st Tank Division.

In the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division in the 1st Armored Cavalry Battalion of four companies, according to the staff, there should have been 84 Turan and Toldi tanks, 23 Chabo armored vehicles and 4 Nimrod ZSUs. The exact number of tanks and self-propelled guns remaining in the encircled Budapest at the beginning of January 1945 is unknown to the authors of the book.

Separate divisions of assault guns (30 tanks and self-propelled guns) were equipped with 105-mm self-propelled guns of the Zrinyi type or 75-mm self-propelled guns of the Hetzer type (9 vehicles in each battery) and medium tanks Turan I (3 vehicles per division , which were used by battery commanders). It should be noted that, according to Hungarian data, the Budapest garrison included the “Billnitzer” assault artillery group: a company of 14 armored vehicles and 4 batteries of self-propelled guns “Zrinyi” and “Hetzer”. According to other sources, including Soviet intelligence reports, the 20th and 24th separate assault artillery divisions fought in Budapest. The 20th division was armed

Self-propelled guns "Zrinyi" (10-12 vehicles) and "Hetzer" (up to 15 vehicles), 24th division - only "Zrinyi". Apparently, in both cases we were talking about the same assault artillery group, which was formed in Budapest on the basis of the batteries of the 20th and 24th separate assault artillery divisions. The strength of this formation fluctuated between 40 tanks and self-propelled guns.6

In addition to the tank formations themselves, the infantry divisions defending in Budapest included a platoon of Chabo armored vehicles (4 vehicles). In the battles for Budapest, the Hungarians used Italian-made CV3/35(37.M) wedges from the training unit of the National Defense Academy. Also, very exotic cars were seen on the streets of the city, like the captured English-made MK II Matilda tank, but the authors have not yet been able to determine their nationality (German or Hungarian - Author's note).7

PROGRESS OF THE STORM OF THE CITY (DECEMBER 26, 1944 - FEBRUARY 13, 1945)

Before the start of the operation, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was at the front observation post in Tissafeldvar. They brought him a city plan with all the details: boulevards in 3 rings, which were intersected by streets radiating from the center, factories and factories located in the southern half of the left bank part of the city; government and military institutions and foreign missions; train stations and numerous markets; parks, palaces, cultural and artistic monuments; a suite of bridges (there were 7 of them along the 15-km stretch of the Danube through the city, including 2 railway ones), which were famous for their beauty. In Buda, on the mountainous terrain, towering above the entire left bank part of the city, villas with the Bacon Forest were visible.

There were a lot of quarters in Pest. Topographers counted about 5 thousand. According to intelligence data, the basis of the defense of the left bank of Budapest was resistance nodes of several blocks and strongholds in them of one or more buildings. Semi-circular defensive lines rested their flanks on the Danube. The cut-off positions ran along radial streets.

In front of the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was the outer city perimeter of Pest, built along the lines of Dunakesi, Gedelle, Ishaseg, Ille, Rakociliget, Szigetszentmiklos. In front of the center and the right wing of the front, the enemy defended the eastern part of the city, then the right bank of the Gron River to Turin. The 6th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in the rear of the front. The main forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front formed the external, and its 46th Army with the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps formed the internal fronts of encircling the enemy in the western part of Budapest.

After studying the situation at the checkpoint, Malinovsky took off by plane to examine Budapest and the surrounding area, to better study the terrain and the front line of his troops and the enemy. The commander carefully looked at the endless expanses with black forests, cities without a single light and blue rivers. Along the front edge, moving away and approaching it, and in some places crossing it, stretched dark narrow ribbons of rolling railways and highways. The lights of the rifle-machine-gun fire flashed on and off. There were fewer flares. And here is a panorama of Budapest. The commander saw the cathedrals, glittering with gilded domes and spiers, which towered over the sleepless city...

For the German political leadership, the encirclement of Budapest meant not only the loss of a large military group. After the destruction of German oil refineries in Denmark and fuel depots in Germany by Allied aircraft, the German military industry was severely limited in the use of oil fields, one of which was located in the area of ​​Lake Balaton. In addition, after the capture of the capital of Hungary, the Soviet troops liberated as a result of this operation would certainly have been sent on the offensive in Central Hungary. Thus, the fall of Budapest opened up a direct path for the Red Army to Vienna and the southern regions of Germany.

After making the political decision to launch an operation to assist the besieged garrison, the German command developed a series of relief counterattacks codenamed “Konrad”.

According to the “Conrad I” plan, the main blow to the Soviet troops was delivered by the 4th SS Panzer Corps (IV.SS-Panzerkorps) as part of the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” (3.SS Panzer-Division “Totenkopf”) and 5th SS Division "Wiking" (5.SS-Panzer-Division "Wiking"), which shortly before were transferred to Hungary from near Warsaw. According to Soviet intelligence, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" had approximately 110 tanks: 90 medium and heavy, as well as 20 SU. On January 2, 1945, according to Soviet estimates, the 5th SS TD consisted of 100 tanks.

The corps was commanded by SS Lieutenant General Herbert Gille. German soldiers called him “the black general.”

The 3rd Panzer Division “Totenkopf” (“Totenkopf.” - Author’s note) was one of the best formations of the SS troops and was mainly staffed by German volunteers. Organized by states in 1944, it consisted of two motorized infantry regiments (5th motorized infantry regiment "Thule" and 6th motorized infantry regiment "Theodor Eicke"), 3rd SS Panzer Regiment, 3rd Reconnaissance Armored Battalion, 3rd 1st self-propelled artillery regiment, 3rd field artillery battery, 3rd anti-aircraft battalion, 3rd rocket artillery battalion, 3rd tank destroyer battalion, 3rd engineer battalion and 3rd communications battalion. The total strength of the division, already battered in the battles during the defense of Warsaw, did not exceed 9,500 people.

The 3rd SS Viking Panzer Division was staffed by volunteers from the northern “Aryan” peoples: Danes, Norwegians, Dutch, Flemings and for some reason even Finns. The strength of the division at the beginning of 1945 did not exceed 10,500 people. The formation was commanded by SS Standartenführer Johannes Mühlenkamp. Structurally, the Viking tank division consisted of the following units:

8th SS Motorized Infantry Regiment "Germany", 10th Motorized Infantry Regiment "Westland", 5th SS Panzer Regiment, 5th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, 5th Field Artillery Battalion, 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, 5th 1st rocket artillery division, tank destroyer division, communications battalion.

In addition to regular formations, from the beginning of 1945, the 5th Panzer Division included the 1st battalion of the 23rd SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment "Norge" (SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 22 "Norge") and the 1st battalion 24 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Danmark" (SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 24 "Danmark"), separated from the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland". Citizens of Norway, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and the Germans themselves served in these battalions.

For a counterattack southeast of Komarno, in addition to the 4th SS Panzer Corps, the 6th Wehrmacht Panzer Division (45PzKpfw.V, 7SAURg.1U/70(U) on 01/2/1945) and the 3rd Yatank Division ( 25 Pz.Kpfw.V, 7 self-propelled guns Pz.IV/70 (A) on January 2, 1945), part of the 23rd Wehrmacht Panzer Division (32 Pz Kpfw.V, 5 Pz Kpfw.IV, 8 Jagdpanzer IV self-propelled guns on 2.01 1945) and the 130th Tank Regiment of the Wehrmacht (34 Pz.Kpfw.V on 2.01.1945), the 271st Infantry Division and the 23rd Infantry Division of the Hungarians.

On the night of January 2, 1945, after a short but powerful artillery barrage, German troops went on the offensive, delivering the main attack on Biczke, Budapest. At the same time, having crossed the Danube in the Schutte area, units of the 96th Infantry Division began advancing along the right bank to Esztergom. At the same time, German troops, surrounded in Budapest, went on the offensive towards the relief group. The SS men were not going to surrender, shortly before the start of the offensive - on December 29, 1945 - they killed the envoys of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, who arrived from the Soviet command with offers of surrender. After this act of vandalism, which violated all the rules of warfare, it was decided to mercilessly destroy the German-Hungarian group and take the city itself by storm.

However, at that time (early January 1945), Soviet troops had no time to storm the city. On the right flank of the defense of the 4th Guards Army, the Soviet front was broken through on January 2, and German troops began to advance towards Budapest.

On a narrow section of the front 10 km wide in the area of ​​Dunaalmash, Tata, German troops, when breaking through the defenses of the Red Army, had up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns in battle formations.

On January 3, 1945, having brought the main forces of the tank group into battle, German troops in groups of tanks of 15-40 units continued their offensive in the direction of Bischke. The main forces of the 4th SS Corps, supported by Wehrmacht units (3rd SS Panzer Division, 5th SS Panzer Division, 6th Wehrmacht Panzer Division) advanced on the right flank of the breakthrough, trying to capture Bischke at any cost. By the end of the second day of the offensive, the advanced forces of the SS tank forces in the amount of 40 tanks reached the line: Tata, Nagyshap, Vaina, Tarjan, Vertesseles.

The 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, which, according to Soviet intelligence reports, had only 19 tanks on January 2, 1945 (10 Pz.Kpfw.V and 9 Pz.Kpfw.IV), together with part of the forces of the 23rd Panzer Division, was concentrated in the north west of Székesfehérvár and launched an auxiliary attack in the direction of Bichke with subsequent access to Budapest.

German tanks were rapidly advancing. The infantry, which moved behind the tanks on armored personnel carriers, was unable to secure the terrain for itself, since its numbers were insufficient for these purposes.

The absence of infantry units of the German troops on the first day of the offensive was explained by the fact that the German command did not wait for the arrival of the 711th Infantry Division from Holland, but decided to complete the task of connecting with the Budapest group only with tank forces.

The 2nd Hungarian Tank Division, which did not directly participate in Operation Conrad and was in reserve, included more than 40 tanks of the Turan 1/11 type, the Nimrod self-propelled gun and 2 German-made heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf.E "Tiger I".

Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the 4th SS Panzer Corps rushed to Budapest. The most fierce fighting took place in the area of ​​the pass in the Gereche Mountains near the village of Agoshtyan. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to capture it and break into the valley. However, Soviet aviation dominated the battlefield, so German tanks and armored personnel carriers moving towards the surrounded Hungarian capital were subjected to continuous bombing. The German aviation forces were only sufficient to provide the 9th SS Mountain Corps with the necessary minimum of ammunition and food, which were dropped by parachute.

Having determined the direction of the main attack of the German command, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front sent army and front reserves, as well as troops withdrawn from unattacked sectors of the front, to the breakthrough site. Units of the 18th Tank, 1st and 2nd Guards Mechanized and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps took part in repelling the counterattack of the German troops.

The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, having on January 1, 1945, consisting of 35 T-34s, 3 IS-2s and 11 SU-85s, after the December offensive operation to encircle German troops in the city of Budapest, was concentrated in the area of ​​Pilisvorosvár, Pilissanto , Pilischaba, where he was preparing a defensive line with the task of preventing the enemy from escaping from the encirclement. In addition, the corps had an additional task - to be ready to launch a counterattack in the event of an enemy breakthrough from the Tata region in the direction of Bichke, Esztergom to Budapest in order to free the encircled German group.

The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, which arrived at the beginning of January 1945 from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, completed its concentration in the area of ​​Perkata, Shabadenhaza, Sharashd, Khantosh by January 3rd. Part of the vehicles of the mechanized brigades, rear units, fuel and lubricants and ammunition remained on the left bank of the Danube River in the area of ​​the Salxzentmorton, Kunszentmiklos unloading station due to the lack of a bridge. The operating ferry crossing in the Dunapentele area did not provide a smooth crossing due to heavy ice drift.

In the concentration area of ​​the 1st Mechanized Corps there were 184 M4A2 tanks and 62 SU-100 self-propelled guns.

The 6th Mechanized Corps, having reached the Shered, Moha, Sharkerestesh line on December 24, 1944, went on the defensive and continued to hold its defensive line, strengthening the defense of the rifle units, having on the move 65 T-34, 15 IS-2, 10 SU- 85, 14 SU-76.

In the last days of December 1942, the 18th Tank Corps, having reached the Dunaalmash-Tavaros line, surrendered its sectors to rifle units from December 30 to 31, 1944, leaving only the 170th Tank Brigade in the Dunaalmash area. The rest of the corps concentrated in the Zhambek, Bichke, Man area, forming a front reserve, where it began building a defensive line, while simultaneously having the task of being ready to launch counterattacks in the directions of Esztergom, Schutte, Dunaalmash, Tata. On January 1, 1945, the 18th Tank Corps consisted of 114 T-34 tanks, 19 ISU-122 self-propelled guns and 13 SU-85.

Thus, by the beginning of the German offensive on January 2, 1945, the Red Army units in the defense sector of the 4th Guards and 46th Army had 375 tanks of all brands, 201.8 self-propelled guns of all brands

The first to encounter German troops was the 170th Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps. On January 1, 1945, it consisted of 11 T-34s and 11 SU-85s and took up defensive positions in the Dunaalmash direction. The tanks of the 4th SS Panzer Corps, numbering 47 units, moving along the main highways, did not have a specific battle formation and marched in a column. Ahead, at a distance of 2-3 km from the main mass, were moving 7 heavy tanks "Tiger I" from the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (this formation had one company of heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf.E in consisting of 10 vehicles. - Note by author).

It was a reconnaissance patrol that covered the main column of tanks with its powerful armor and fire.

When approaching the village of Taryan, the Tigers began a firefight with tanks and self-propelled guns of the 170th Tank Brigade. The rest of the combat vehicles of the German tank group did not get involved in the battle and turned the entire column towards Heret, leaving 5 heavy Tiger I tanks and 3 armored personnel carriers to cover their flank.

However, the Soviet units remaining in the rear, unlike in previous years of the war, acted in an extremely organized manner. Having been bypassed by enemy tanks, on the second and third days of the German offensive, in groups of 200-300 people, they went to the area of ​​​​the Saar station, the settlements of Chabdi and Zhambek. On January 4, the 170th Tank Brigade emerged from the encirclement to the south in full force, having lost only a few vehicles on the march.

On January 5, 1945, heavy tank battles took place in the areas of Dorog, Somor, north of Zhambek, Man, and north of Chabdi. In groups of 20-40 tanks, German troops repeatedly attacked our positions, but were unsuccessful.

Having failed to break through on Bichke, the German command began to plan Operation Konrad I. According to the documents, the main task in this operation was assigned to the 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division. With the support of the 711th Infantry Division, it was supposed to advance on Budapest along forest roads, where the German command was counting on weak resistance from Soviet troops. On January 10, 1945, the 5th SS Viking Panzer Division had 44 Pz.Kpfw.IV medium tanks and 43 Pz.Kpfw.V Panther heavy tanks. Separate groups of tanks (up to 25 units) and small groups of infantry managed to infiltrate Pirishtsentlelek. At the same time, a group of 12 tanks broke into the Pilisszentkerest area. January 12 was the date of the greatest success of German troops in this operation. The German tanks failed to advance further - some of them were destroyed, and the rest retreated to their original position.

At the same time, on January 7, 1945, having stopped attacks from the area west of Dorog, a group of the 1st, 3rd and 23rd Wehrmacht tank divisions launched a strike in the direction of Zamol. In total, up to 100 Wehrmacht tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the attack. The advance of the German troops was preceded by a short artillery barrage, then the enemy began his attack. The equipment of the German group moved in a deployed formation, consisting of a unit of 10-15 vehicles, half of which were heavy tanks. They moved in groups of 3-4 units ahead of the battle formation at a distance of 800-1000 meters from the main forces. There were also groups of heavy tanks of 2-3 units on the flanks. Self-propelled guns moved behind the tanks at a distance of 500-800 meters.

As a result of the first day of the new offensive, German troops managed to push back Soviet units and occupy Zamol. However, this was where their success ended; the German group came across tanks of the 7th Mechanized Corps, buried in the ground. Having lost 42 tanks from their fire on January 7, 1945, German troops stopped the offensive.

During this period, intense fighting also took place in the defense sector of the 7th Guards Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. To strengthen the German group advancing on Budapest from January 4 to 5, 1945, the 6th Panzer Division, which occupied the defense in the area from Kamenica to the Danube River, was removed from its defense sector and transferred to the Tata area. The liberated area was occupied by Kampfgruppe Hafner, elements of the 306th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, the remnants of the Hungarian parachute division "St. Laszlo" and the remnants of the separate machine gun battalion "Saxonia".

The 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht (on January 2, 1945, which had 17 Pz.Kpfw.V Panther tanks, 4 Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and 8 Jagdpanzer IV self-propelled guns) was in the second echelon of defense.

Scheme of combat operations of Soviet, German and Hungarian troops in the Budapest area from December 26, 1944 to February 13, 1945

The battle formations of the defending infantry divisions included self-propelled guns of the tank destroyer and anti-aircraft divisions of the 8th Panzer Division.

In an effort to prevent further transfer of German troops to the Budapest direction, units of the 7th Guards Army on January 6, 1945 went on the offensive from the Parcany area, broke through the enemy defenses in the Kam, Darmot, Parcany sector and by the end of the day pushed the enemy back 20 kilometers. Units of the 8th Panzer Division, suddenly attacked by Soviet troops, failed to provide serious resistance. German counterattacks carried out on the same day were unsuccessful.

On the second day of fighting, the German command brought into battle its reserves from the 8th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer Division, 211th Infantry Division, as well as the Hungarian parachute division Szent Laszlo. The Hungarian parachute division "Saint Laszlo", named after the medieval king Ladislas I, was formed on November 20, 1944 on the basis of the 1st Parachute Battalion. In addition to the paratroopers themselves, the division included the 1st and 2nd elite training infantry regiments, the 1st and 2nd training tank regiments, the 1st and 2nd reconnaissance battalions, 2 river defense battalions (sailors), and an anti-aircraft division . This division included tanks, but, despite the loud names of the existing two training tanks, the number of tanks in them did not exceed two dozen. These were mainly Turan I tanks and Nimrod self-propelled guns.

On January 11, 1945, up to an infantry regiment, as well as 50 German and Hungarian tanks, supported by self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers, attacked Soviet defenses on a narrow section of the front in the area southeast of Nowy Zamki. They managed to break into the battle formations of the Red Army units and capture the settlements of Nova Dyala, St. Peter, and Dyada station. Before the infantry battalion with 10-12 tanks broke through to the town of Madar.

In the following days, German and Hungarian troops managed to recapture several more settlements, but, encountering fierce resistance from Soviet troops, by January 16, 1945, they also went on the defensive in this area.

The German command again began to regroup its troops...

When the surrounded garrison of Budapest desperately radioed for help on January 13, Hitler ordered a new counterattack to liberate the city. This operation was called "Conrad III".

On January 14, 1945, the German command began transferring the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" and the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" from the area north of Biczke to the area southwest of Székesfehérvár in order to organize a new offensive on the city of Budapest. North and west of Bischke, the 6th Panzer Division moved to the defense on a broad front. Units of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, defending in the area of ​​the city of Mor, were replaced by the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division and the 4th Wehrmacht Cavalry Brigade, later reorganized into a division.

The German tank group concentrated for the counteroffensive consisted of the 4th SS Panzer Corps (3rd, 5th SS Panzer Divisions), 1st, 3rd and 23rd Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 303rd Assault Gun Brigade and 509th Separate Battalion heavy tanks.

On January 10, 1945, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" had 38 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV, 49 heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.V and 5 ZSU Flakpz IV. The 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division had 44 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 43 Pz Kpfw.V and 2 Flakpz IV on the same date. The 1st Panzer Division had 18 StuG III, 33 Pz Kpfw.IV and 59 Pz.Kpfw.V, and the 3rd Division had 12 StuG III, 43 Pz Kpfw. IV, 15 Jagdpanzer IV, 44 Pz.Kpfw.V.

On January 10, 1945, the 22nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht had 2 Pz.Kpfw.III, 17 StuGIII, 38 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 8 Jagdpanzer IV and 33 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther”.

Before the start of the offensive, on January 15, 1945, the 303rd Army Assault Artillery Brigade (Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 303) had 25 StuG III self-propelled guns.

The 509th separate battalion of heavy tanks (schwere Heeres-Panzer-Abteilung 509) on January 15, 1945 consisted of 45 heavy tanks Pz.Kpfv.VI Ausf.B "Royal Tiger" and 8 ZSU Flakpz IV.

It should be noted that the regrouping of the SS tank divisions was carried out secretly and skillfully.

The tank regiments of these divisions, moving from the Zhambek-Bichke area, for the purpose of disinformation, followed strictly north, creating the impression that they were leaving in the direction of Komarno and further to the central sectors of the front.

The personnel, including corps headquarters officers, were not informed about the true intentions of their command.

On January 12, 1945, a new German offensive began. Within 24 hours, having brought up to 110 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 3rd and 5th SS Panzer Divisions into battle on a narrow sector of the front, the enemy broke through the Soviet defense line in the Polgard sector with a powerful blow. On the move, knocking down minor barriers of the Red Army, bypassing the centers of resistance, German troops reached the Sharkerestur area by the end of the day. On January 19, SS units captured Dunapentele.

The German command made a breakthrough with a tank group consisting mainly of heavy tanks supported by a small number of infantry mounted on armored personnel carriers and accompanying the tanks in direct contact.

The 16th Tank Corps, transferred on the night of January 19, 1945 from the Bia area to the Sharkerestur, Sharashd area with the task of stopping the enemy’s advance in the northeast direction, immediately entered into battle with enemy tanks. The 110th Tank Brigade defended in the Aba area, the 181st Tank Brigade in the Sharkerestur area, separate units of the 110th Tank Brigade and the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Jakabsallash area.

The 170th Tank Brigade, having only 7 T-34 and 9 SU-85 tanks, thanks to skillful maneuver and well-organized reconnaissance, reached the Maria area and straddled a road intersection 5 km southwest of Herzelgfalv, which significantly complicated the position of the tank enemy forces consisting of 40 combat units, which broke through in Dunapentele, as German tanks advanced towards Budapest in the direction of Scharbogard, Herzegfalva.

This maneuver of the 170th Tank Brigade changed the entire course of the battle.

German troops from the SS tank divisions were forced to deploy the bulk of their forces (up to 30 tanks) strictly north with the task of capturing the settlements of Perkata Sharashd in order to cut off and destroy the 170th tank brigade in its defense area.

The Scharbogard-Hercegfalva road itself was carefully blocked by German units. The command tanks of the 18th Tank Corps of the Red Army, which tried to break into the defense area of ​​the 170th Tank Brigade for communications, were shot.

Units of the German troops that broke through the Soviet defenses found themselves shackled by the triangle of resistance of the 18th Panzer Corps (Sharkerestur, Sharashd, Maria) and were forced to concentrate all their attention on this sector, abandoning the extremely tempting southern direction, where there were practically no Soviet troops. Fearing that the Soviet troops of the 18th Tank Corps would receive a crushing blow to the rear when moving south, the enemy suspended the offensive.

During these battles, the German command began to use new tactics that were not previously typical of German tank forces. First of all, these were night attacks. So, over the course of two nights in January 1945, SS tanks in groups of 3 to 15 vehicles continuously attacked Sharkerestur, Sharashd, Yakabsallash and some other points with the task of demoralizing the Soviet defense and capturing resistance nodes at night.

In addition to night fighting, the enemy was constantly maneuvering. They maneuvered both large groups of tanks of 25-40 vehicles, as well as individual tanks. On January 19, 1945, up to 25 enemy tanks, having encountered fire resistance from tanks of the 110th brigade in the area west of Aba, without getting involved in battle, abruptly changed course, moved away from Aba, went south of Sharkerestur to the Sylfa area and approached Yakabsallash, where, having met fire from Soviet troops , changed course again and turned south towards Herzegfalva.

Throughout the entire German offensive, small groups of tanks, without engaging in battle, appeared in various areas: Perkata, Hantosh, Sylfa, Herzegfalva and others. The main goal of such tactics is to create the impression that the direction is highly saturated with its troops, while in reality only a tank group, slightly accompanied by infantry in armored personnel carriers, reached the Danube River in the Dunapentele area. Due to the insufficient number of the group, German troops could not secure the territory they had traversed. They were forced to leave in the largest populated areas garrisons of 3-5 tanks with 2-8 armored personnel carriers, which, in turn, contained up to a platoon of infantry.

Very often, German heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.VI and Pz.Kpfw.V resorted to “baiting” our tanks. 1-2 enemy tanks approached the positions of the Soviet troops at a distance of 2-2.5 km and began to maneuver in plain sight, without trying to camouflage themselves. When our tanks revealed themselves from a shooting position or when approaching, then, as a rule, Soviet combat vehicles were set on fire by the enemy from a distance of 1.8-2 km, while our T-34 tanks from the mentioned distance were not able to conduct fire combat with heavy enemy tanks.

Guided by this advantage, German heavy tanks were able to use maneuver on the battlefield without fear of suffering losses from the fire of our tanks, while Soviet tank crews needed to be especially careful in maneuvering, especially for T-34 tanks and SU-76 self-propelled guns. However, due to a number of factors (weather, which hampered aviation operations; the surprise of the offensive; the technical advantages of German armored vehicles), operations near Budapest were exclusively tank battles, which were responsible for the large losses of Soviet tanks.

The enemy was advancing towards the Hungarian capital, and the German newspaper “News of the Budapest Cauldron,” published in the encircled city, reported on January 21: “According to the latest reports received, the advance of troops going to the rescue of Budapest, after a regrouping caused by strategic and climatic reasons, is again proceeding successfully. As can be seen from all the incoming reports, in this case we are talking about an operation of a particularly large scale...”

After 2 days, the messages became even more optimistic: “Soon we will be liberated!”

But, despite the difficult situation of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the German offensive was stopped. By January 27, 1945, thanks to the involvement of the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, especially aviation, it was possible to restore the previous position of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with access to lakes Be Lenze and Balaton.

However, due to enemy counterattacks, the fight for Budapest dragged on, and on January 18, the Headquarters entrusted the liquidation of the encircled group to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, reassigning the 46th Combined Arms Army to it.

The enemy in Pest was stormed by the created R.Ya. Malinovsky Budapest group of forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front as part of the 30th Rifle Corps of General G.S. Lazko, 7th Romanian Army Corps, 18th Guards Rifle Corps under General I.M. Afonin and 9 artillery brigades. At first, it operated with part of the forces subordinate to the 7th Guards Army, and with the second part, that is, the I.M. Corps. Afonina, - subordinate to the front. On January 11, R.Ya. himself began to lead the group. Malinovsky from the command post of the front headquarters in Heves (32 km south of Eger), where he moved after the encirclement of the Budapest group.

Assault groups were launched - from a platoon to an infantry company with demolitionists, self-propelled guns, tanks, guns and mortars. There were many groups. Each acted in its own direction from building (strong point) to building, from block (node ​​of resistance) to block, equipped with plans for orientation.

The enemy defended himself desperately. SS units and Hungarian units staffed by members of the Arrow Cross organization fought especially fiercely. Supply to the encircled group was initially carried out by air: every day 40-45 German aircraft delivered the necessary supplies to the city. An attempt was made to use gliders for this purpose and to find the possibility of organizing supplies along the Danube. However, after January 20, due to the dominance of Soviet aviation, the supply of air to the encircled group almost ceased, and the German command was never able to deliver cargo along the Danube. In the diary of military operations of the Wehrmacht High Command during these days, the following entry appeared: “The situation in Budapest is very serious... According to available information, the supply situation has become terrible. Everything is at stake."

So the noose tightened tighter and tighter. The time came when enemy planes could no longer drop ammunition and food to the besieged: they were shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners, and often their containers fell into the location of the troops storming the city.

Overcoming stubborn resistance, Soviet troops on January 17, 1945 dismembered the German-Hungarian defense in Pest into 3 parts. The enemy began to hastily retreat, blowing up bridges across the Danube behind them. With a swift rush, the advanced units of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the Danube. On January 18, enemy troops in Pest began to surrender. In the battles for the eastern part of the capital, the German-Hungarian group lost almost 36 thousand killed and up to 20 thousand soldiers and officers captured. About 300 tanks and assault guns, 1,044 guns and mortars, as well as many other types of weapons and military equipment were knocked out and captured. The last German and Hungarian units capitulated in Pest on January 25, 1945.

Despite the setbacks, German troops continued to rush towards the Hungarian capital. On January 25, 1945, the commander of the 6th Wehrmacht Field Army, General Balck, called Gille to the telegraph machine and demanded a report on the situation.

Gille: The Fourth Panzer Corps continues offensive operations in the same direction, having one tank division in reserve to develop success in solving the main task. The enemy puts up stubborn resistance and counterattacks in places. At this time, the corps is experiencing a serious shortage of people and tanks.

Balck: Is the task clear to you?

Gille: Everything is clear to me.

Balck: You must cope with this task. Now this is critical. We have to make our way here! This decides everything, otherwise we will die.

Gille: "Totenkopf" on the eve of entering into battle. The situation in Budapest requires accelerated action.

Balck said that the Fuhrer was thinking about this, that it was necessary to act in accordance with the decision made, and asked: “How much of the way is left?”

Gille: According to our calculations, fourteen kilometers.

Balck: The decisive thing is that we get through here now. I am doing everything that the Fuehrer demands, everything so that we can finish this matter here first.

Gille: If we have tanks and soldiers, we will do everything.

Balck: That's what we should do! We will bring this drama to a happy ending! The main thing is to defeat these forces first. Then we will achieve everything else.

Gille: But we are getting weaker.

Balck: No one becomes more beautiful from a brawl.11

Hoping for the success of the Totenkopf division, the “black general” conveyed to those surrounded: “Be prepared for a breakthrough. Breakthrough time will be given additionally.”

Meanwhile, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front began to destroy the enemy in the western part of the city - Bude. The Budapest group of troops was transferred to the right bank of the Danube and reinforced by two rifle corps of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (the 7th Romanian corps, as having failed to justify itself in street battles, was transferred to another section of the front).

Due to the injury of General I.M. Afonin, the commander of the 53rd Army, General I.M., began to command the group. Managarov, who had experience in fighting for large cities. The headquarters of the group of troops was equipped on the basis of the headquarters of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps near Budakeszi, a western suburb of Buda. Here was the narrowest place between the outer and inner fronts of the encirclement. The Germans were rushing here from the outside so that, having captured the heights with the headquarters of the Soviet troops, they could strike on the internal front and rescue the encircled. Therefore, the command was not confident that the headquarters would not be attacked from the rear, from Bischke.

On instructions from the front command, N.S. made his way to the hottest part of huge Budapest. Fomin with a group of officers and together with I.M. Managarov organized artillery support for the battle. He took control of the artillery of several corps operating on the west bank and troops stationed in Pest to coordinate fire against the enemy in Buda.

Here, in Budakesi, through dangerous crossings and bypassing the suburbs, a front commander with a group of generals and officers arrived to speed up the defeat of the enemy in this part of the city. Seeing the machine guns displayed for self-defense, Malinovsky remarked: “It’s like you’re under siege here.” The commander exposed himself to great risk by going into this narrow corridor: no one could guarantee that the Germans would not break through it.

The Soviet offensive in Buda began on January 20, 1943. Increasing efforts as units were transferred from Pest, the Budapest Group of Forces moved forward. By the beginning of February, the group’s formations occupied only 114 of Buda’s 608 blocks.

Despite the bloody fighting, the morale of the encircled Budapest garrison remained at a fairly high level throughout January 1945, since liberation seemed possible. After the failure of all Conrad operations, hopes for deliverance began to dry up. At the beginning of February 1945, instead of ammunition and food, the Reich began sending orders for rewards. Thus, the commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps, Obergruppenführer von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, the commander of the 8th SS Cavalry Division “Florian Geyer”, SS-Brigadefuehrer Joachim Rumohr, the commander of the 22nd SS Cavalry Division, SS-Brigadefuehrer August Zehn- der (SS-Brigadefuehrer August Zehender), as well as Captain Hellmut Bunge from the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Division, received the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross for valor in battle.

In the first ten days of February, Soviet troops continued to fight for the capture of Buda. During 10 days of fighting, they cleared another 109 city blocks from the enemy and captured more than 26 thousand people.

On February 10, 1945, ammunition began to run out, and the group of surrounded German-Hungarian troops in the Buda area was divided into two parts. Soviet troops advanced to the Erzsebet Bridge. At noon on February 11, a meeting of all officers up to and including the rank of major was held. The chief of staff of the 9th SS Mountain Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Usdau Linendau, announced that a final breakout attempt would be made. According to this plan, 3 columns were formed with the task of breaking through to their troops located 20 km west of Budapest.

The operation began at 22.00 on February 11, 1945. At 23.40, the commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps transmitted his last radiogram: “The last cartridges have been shot. We have a choice between surrender and the death of the garrison. We decided to break through with the forces of the remaining combat-ready German and Hungarian fascist divisions (staffed by members of the Hungarian fascist organization “Crossed Arrows.” - Author’s note). We are going to make a breakthrough on the night of February 12th. Please meet us between the settlements of Chomor and Marianhalm. If we fail to break through at the indicated place, we will go through the Pilis Mountains. In this case, please meet me in the northwest, near the village of Pilissentlelek. Two green rockets - your troops. At present our forces before the breakthrough include about 23,900 German soldiers, of whom 3,600 are wounded, and 20,000 Hungarians, of whom about 2,000 are wounded.”

Leaving the seriously wounded in hospitals in Budapest, the German-Hungarian group went to break through the Soviet positions. About 14,000 combat-ready soldiers escaped from the city, but only 2,000 of them managed to advance to their troops in the next few days. German and Hungarian soldiers broke out of encirclement in small groups. The largest of them - 300 people from the Wehrmacht tank division Feldherrnhalle - broke through to their troops on February 13, 1945, 30 km west of Budapest. In total, 785 people came to the location of the German troops.

On February 13, 1945, by 10.00, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front completed the assault on the city. The Hungarian capital lay in ruins. 35 thousand German and Hungarian soldiers were killed in the battles for the city, and the same number were captured. Some 65,000 civilians also died. According to Soviet data, 188,000 soldiers and officers of the enemy armies were killed and captured in the battles for Budapest. Among the dead: Major General Gerhard Schmidhuber, commander of the 13th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, the well-known commanders of the SS cavalry divisions, Brigadefuehrers Rumor and Zeender... Surrendered: commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, commander 1st Hungarian Army Corps Istvan Hindi...

I.B. Moshchansky

From the book “Fortified Cities”