Thomas Hobbes.
Leviathan, or Matter, the form and power of the state, ecclesiastical and civil
INTRODUCTION
Human art (the art with which God created and controls the world) is an imitation of nature both in many other respects and in what an artificial animal can do. For, observing that life is only the movement of members, the beginning of which is in some fundamental internal part, can we not say that all automata (mechanisms moving by means of springs and wheels, such as watches) have an artificial life ? Indeed, what is the heart if not a spring? What are nerves if not the same threads, and joints - if not the same wheels that impart movement to the whole body the way the master wanted it? However, art goes even further, imitating the rational and most excellent work of nature - man. For by art was created that great Leviathan, which is called the Republic, or State (Commonwealth, or State, in Latin - Civitas), and which is only an artificial man, although larger in size and stronger than natural man, for the protection and the protection of which it was created. In this Leviathan the supreme power, which gives life and movement to the whole body, is an artificial soul, officials and other representatives of the judicial and executive powers - artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which every joint and member is attached to the seat of sovereignty, and impelled to the performance of its duties) are the nerves which perform the same functions in the natural body; the welfare and wealth of all private members represent its strength, salus populi, the security of the people, its occupation; the advisers who instill in him everything he needs to know represent memory; justice and laws are artificial reason and will; civil peace means health, unrest means illness, and civil war means death. Finally, the treaties and agreements by which the parts of the body politic were originally created, put together, and united, are similar to that “fiat,” or “let us make man,” which was uttered by God at the act of creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider:
Firstly, the material from which it is made and its master, i.e. man.
Secondly, how and by what agreements it was created, what exactly are the rights and powers or authority of the sovereign, and what the state preserves and what destroys it. Thirdly, what is a Christian state. Finally, what is the kingdom of darkness? Regarding the first point, the saying has recently come into widespread use that wisdom is acquired by reading not books, but people. As a result, those persons who, for the most part, cannot provide any other proof of their wisdom, are glad to show what they, in their opinion, read in people, mercilessly reproaching each other behind their backs. There is, however, another proverb, which has recently ceased to be understood, and following which these persons, if they tried, could really learn to read each other. This is precisely the aphorism nosce te ipsum, read yourself. The meaning of this aphorism is not, as has now become customary, to encourage people in power to have a barbaric attitude towards people below them, or to incite people of low birth to impudent behavior towards people above them, but to teach us, that due to the similarity of the thoughts and passions of one person with the thoughts and passions of another, anyone who will look inside himself and consider what he is doing when he thinks, assumes, reasons, hopes, fears, etc., and according to what He does this based on his motives, and at the same time he will read and know what the thoughts and passions of all other people are under similar conditions. I am talking about the similarity of the passions themselves, which are the same in all people - about desire, fear, hope, etc., and not about the similarity of the objects of these passions, i.e., the things that are desired, feared, hoped for, etc. etc., for the latter differ depending on the individual structure of a person and the characteristics of his upbringing and easily elude our knowledge, so that the letters of the human soul, polluted and confused usually by pretense, lies, hypocrisy and erroneous teachings (doctrines), are legible only for that who knows our hearts. And although by observing the actions of people we can sometimes discover their intentions, yet to do this without comparison with our own intentions and without discerning all the circumstances that can change the matter is the same as deciphering without a key, and in most cases this means being deceived or due to too much credulity, or due to too much distrust, depending on whether the reader himself is a good or bad person in human hearts.
However, no matter how excellently one person reads into another on the basis of his actions, he can only do this in relation to his acquaintances, whose number is limited. The one who must govern an entire people must comprehend (to read) in himself not this or that individual person, but the human race. And although this is difficult to do, more difficult than to study any language or branch of knowledge, however, after I have stated what I read in myself in a methodical and clear form, others will only have to consider whether they do not find the same the same thing in ourselves. For objects of this kind do not admit of any other proof.
Part one. ABOUT A HUMAN
CHAPTER I. ABOUT SENSATION
As for human thoughts, I will consider them first separately, and then in their connection or mutual dependence. Taken separately, each of them is a representation or apparition of some quality or other accident of a body outside us, usually called an object. The object acts on the eyes, ears and other parts of the human body and, depending on the variety of its actions, produces various ghosts.
The beginning of all phantoms is what we call sense (for there is not a single concept in the human mind that was not originally generated, wholly or partly, in the organs of sensation). Everything else is a derivative of it.
To understand the issues treated in this book, knowledge of the natural cause of sensation is not very necessary; and I wrote about this in detail elsewhere. However, in order to develop each part of my present system, I will here summarize what was said there.
The cause of sensation is an external body or object that presses on the organ corresponding to each sensation directly, as is the case with taste and touch, or indirectly, as with vision, hearing and smell. This pressure, continued inward through the nerves and other fibers and membranes of the body to the brain and heart, here produces resistance, or back pressure, or an effort of the heart to release itself. Since this effort is directed outward, it appears to us as something outside. And this seeming (seeing), or this ghost (fancy), people call sensation. In relation to the eye this is the sensation of light or a certain color, in relation to the ear - the sensation of sound, in relation to the nostrils - the sensation of smell, in relation to the tongue and palate - the sensation of taste, and for the rest of the body - the sensation of heat, cold, hardness, softness and others. qualities that we distinguish through feeling. All these so-called sensible qualities are only the various movements of matter within the object that produces them, movements by which the object presses in various ways on our organs. In the same way, in us, who are under pressure, these qualities are nothing more than various movements (for movement produces only movement). But what they seem to us in reality, just as in a dream, is a ghost. And just as pressure, friction, or bruising of the eye produces a ghost of light in us, and pressure on the ear produces noise, in the same way the bodies that we see or hear produce the same thing by their strong, although unnoticed by us, action. For if those colors or sounds were in the bodies or objects that produce them, they could not be separated from them, as we observe when reflected in a mirror or when we hear an echo; in these cases we know: the object we see is in one place, and the ghost is in another. And although at a certain distance it seems as if the image produced by our imagination is contained in a real and actual object, which generates it in us, nevertheless, the object is one thing, and the imaginary image, or ghost, is something else. Thus, sensation in all cases is in its origin only a ghost, caused (as I said) by pressure, that is, by the movement of objects outside of us, on our eyes, ears and other organs intended for this.
Introduction
Human art (the art with which God created and controls the world) is an imitation of nature both in many other respects and in what an artificial animal can do. For, observing that life is only the movement of members, the beginning of which is in some fundamental internal part, can we not say that all automata (mechanisms moving with the help of springs and wheels, such as watches) have an artificial life ? Indeed, what is the heart if not a spring? What are nerves if not the same threads, and joints - if not the same wheels that impart movement to the whole body the way the master wanted it? However, art goes even further, imitating the rational and most excellent work of nature - man. For by art was created that great Leviathan, which is called the Republic, or State (Commonwealth, or State), in Latin Civitas, and which is only an artificial man, although larger in size and stronger than natural man, for the protection and the protection of which it was created. In this Leviathan the supreme power, which gives life and movement to the whole body, is an artificial soul, officials and other representatives of the judicial and executive powers are artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which every joint and member is attached to the seat of sovereignty, and impelled to the performance of its duties) are the nerves which perform the same functions in the natural body; the welfare and wealth of all private members represent its strength, salus populi, the security of the people, its occupation; the advisers who instill in him everything he needs to know represent memory; justice and laws are artificial reason and will; civil peace is health, unrest is disease, and civil war is death. Finally, the treaties and agreements by which the parts of the body politic were originally created, put together, and united, are similar to that “fiat,” or “let us make man,” which was uttered by God at the act of creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider:
Firstly, the material from which it is made, and its master, i.e. man.
Secondly, how and by what agreements it was created, what exactly are the rights and powers or authority of the sovereign and what preserves the state and what destroys it. Thirdly, what is a Christian state? Finally, what is the kingdom of darkness? Regarding the first point, the saying has recently come into widespread use that wisdom is acquired by reading not books, but people. As a result, those persons who, for the most part, cannot provide any other proof of their wisdom, are glad to show what they, in their opinion, read in people, mercilessly reproaching each other behind their backs. There is, however, another proverb, which has recently ceased to be understood, and following which these persons, if they tried, could really learn to read each other. This is precisely the aphorism nosce te ipsum, read yourself. The meaning of this aphorism is not, as has now become customary, to encourage people in power to have a barbaric attitude towards people below them, or to incite people of low birth to impudent behavior towards people above them, but to teach us, that due to the similarity of the thoughts and passions of one person with the thoughts and passions of another, anyone who will look inside himself and consider what he is doing when he thinks, assumes, reasons, hopes, fears, etc., and according to what He does this based on his motives, and at the same time he will read and know what the thoughts and passions of all other people are under similar conditions. I am talking about the similarity of the passions themselves, which are the same in all people - desire, fear, hope, etc.
The famous Leviathan, dedicated to the study of “the matter, form and power of the state, ecclesiastical and civil,” was written by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in 1651. Work on the book was carried out during dramatic historical events: the civil war in England, which ended with the execution of Charles I in 1649 The cruelty of reality pushed Hobbes to take the path already once outlined by Machiavelli. As we remember, the latter, having rejected the Aristotelian idea of describing political life from the point of view of the goal (the Good), decided to analyze it based on its origins and beginnings - often violent and unjust. Discrediting the idea of the Good, Machiavelli convinced people to consider evil - under the guise of cunning, force, rudeness - as a natural source of order, closed in on itself.
In principle, Hobbes proceeds from the same premises. He is aware of the failure of the attempt to build a political theory on the idea of a natural or supernatural Good, which for a long time was considered the basis of political, and indeed all human action. The concepts and actions of people are incompatible with the Good, and this incompatibility is the main source of conflicts and wars. The idea of the Good turned out to be fragile and unreliable. As for the idea of evil, there is a type of it that is perceived by most people - not even by the mind, but under the influence of passion - as evil. Death is such an evil. Therefore, the new political action will be based on one passion - the fear of death. And the new order that is to be built is not the Good we strive for, but the evil we are trying to avoid.
Moreover, war for Hobbes is not an exceptional event, but a natural state of the human race. He begins the description of this natural state with a very important statement: “Nature created people equal in terms of physical and mental abilities” (Leviathan. Part I, Chapter XIII). Natural equality of ability gives rise to “equality of hope for achieving goals.” And on the way to achieving such a goal (which, as Hobbes notes, consists mainly of preserving life), people collide with each other, and thus a general war is unleashed - a war of all against all. The main causes of war, rooted in human nature, are rivalry, mistrust and the thirst for glory.
Even in ordinary, relatively peaceful conditions, a person, on the one hand, manifests aggressiveness, and on the other, there is constant fear: people always bolt the door, lock their chests even in their own home; vanity, self-love, and the desire to get the better of a neighbor and prove one’s superiority dominate. “In such a state... there is no society, and, worst of all, there is eternal fear and the constant danger of violent death, and a person’s life is lonely, hopeless, stupid and short-lived” (ibid.). Under these conditions, the concepts of morality, good, evil, sin do not make sense. Thus, Hobbes's description of the state of nature simultaneously undermines both classical ancient political theory (after all, according to Hobbes, human nature is not good) and Christian views on society, since the source of evil is not sin, but human nature.
In his anthropology, the philosopher does not look for the essence of man - he, rather, describes human existence and comes to the conclusion that the natural in man is not consistent with human nature. The natural in man is not his specific feature: like all living beings, man strives to preserve his life, and it is this force that Hobbes, using classical vocabulary, calls natural law. People are equal and have the same needs and rights, as well as the means to satisfy their needs and preserve their lives. That is, their existence in a natural state, where natural forces operate, is determined only by a rigid balance of forces.
And so, noting the absurdity of the endless chain of violence, the human mind is looking for ways to establish peace. Moreover, reason itself is generated by this need: people are forced to be reasonable in order to survive. This general rule, found by reason, “according to which a person is prohibited from doing what is detrimental to his life or what deprives him of the means to preserve it,” is called natural law by Hobbes.
Thus, in contrast to the entire tradition dating back to Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes contrasts natural law in man, i.e. freedom, which everyone is free to use in their own way to protect their lives, and natural law, which binds, compels, limits a person. To renounce a right means to lose one's freedom. The basic natural law is that “peace should be sought and followed.” Moreover, if other people consent to this, “a person must agree to renounce the right to all things to the extent necessary in the interests of peace and self-defense, and to be content with such a degree of freedom in relation to other people as he would allow from other people in relation to themselves” (Leviathan. Part I, Chapter XIV).
How can one achieve blessed peace? The only possible way here is to limit one’s own freedom, renounce some rights, and not just renounce them, but transfer the rights to another person, i.e. contract The essence of the contract is that each person renounces his unlimited right to govern himself and transfers it to another person or assembly of people who are to guarantee the maintenance of civil peace. As a result, the individual or collective rights of the sovereign are unlimited. He inherits the jus in omnia (right to everything) which every man had in the state of nature. This is how Leviathan arises - a mythological sea monster called in the biblical book of Job “the king over all the sons of pride.” Leviathan symbolizes omnipotence and omnipresence; it is a “mortal god.” Thus, the state is “a single person, who has made himself responsible for whose actions by the mutual agreement of a vast multitude of people, so that that person may use the power and means of all of them as he thinks necessary for their peace and common defense” (Leviathan Part II, Chapter XVII).
What features does the state have in the Hobbesian understanding and what is the innovative nature of such an understanding?
Firstly, the Leviathan state is an artificial product (in contrast to the natural nature of the state, say, in Aristotle, because for him, man by nature is a social animal), a product of human activity, human will, guided by individual calculation. For Hobbes this is an extremely important point; it is no coincidence that already in the introduction he says that “art created that great Leviathan, which ... is only an artificial man.”
Secondly, Hobbes especially emphasizes the unity of the state: the state is a “single person” created by many people. The basis of such unity is the concept of law, transmitted by individuals to one person or group of persons. Thus, for Hobbes, the basis of state unity is no longer the idea of the common Good, but individual right. From this point of view, the problem of representation is very interesting. Building his theory of the origin of the state, Hobbes speaks only about the transfer of law - he excludes any transfer of will, the representation of an individual will by another will. In other words, an individual, concluding a social contract, recognizes the “words and actions” of the sovereign as his own, but this does not mean that he sees the manifestation of his will in the will of the latter. The individual desires what he desires and what no one can desire for him. But if the individual and his will are the only basis of legitimacy in politics, then the political order that transforms the plurality of individuals into unity can only come from the outside - it can become the result of the actions not of the general will of the people, but of the actions of the sovereign. Any “unity of will” that binds either individuals among themselves, or individuals and the sovereign, is an attack on the will of the individual and his integrity, thanks to which he can be what he is - the source and basis of political legitimacy.
The consequence of these attitudes of Hobbes is his doctrine of the form of the Leviathan state. It is quite obvious that the thinker, following the absolutist Bodin, rejects mixed forms of government, recognizing three classical types of regime: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.
There is no difference between these forms in the degree of possession of power, since “supreme power, whether it belongs to one person, as in monarchies, or to an assembly of people, as in popular and aristocratic states, is as extensive as can be imagined.” . They differ from each other only in their “suitability or ability” to “establish peace and ensure the security of the people.” And here Hobbes' sympathies are on the side of the monarchy. With his usual methodicality, he gives six arguments in favor of monarchical government, and the main one is that only under a monarchy the personal interests of the sovereign coincide with the general interests, “for no king can be rich, nor famous, nor in security.” , if his subjects are poor, despised or too weak due to poverty or civil strife” (Leviathan. Book II, Chapter XX).
Since the nature of power is the same in all forms, the rights and duties of the state in relation to its subjects are also the same in all forms. In the most general terms, the sovereign can do everything to ensure peace and tranquility of citizens. His power is absolute and unlimited, since only such power is capable of ensuring the survival of civil society. Therefore, the sovereign must be a judge; he prescribes “rules for distinguishing between good and evil,” which Hobbes calls laws. For him, like Bodin, the right to legislate is the first distinguishing feature of sovereign power. As for the duties of the sovereign, Hobbes expresses them in one, but very succinct phrase: “The good of the people is the highest law,” because “the power of citizens is the power of the state, that is, the one who has the supreme power in the state” (On the Citizen. Ch. XIII).
Results and significance of Hobbes's political philosophy. Undoubtedly, the strong point of Hobbes's political doctrine is his individualism as the basis of political theory. Hobbes rejects naturalism of the Aristotelian type in explaining human nature, and although man in his concept still remains the creation of God, he is responsible for his actions, he is the creator of the Leviathan state, which allows him to avoid the negative consequences of the “war of all against all.” The opposition between natural law, identified with freedom, which everyone is free to use to protect his own life, and natural law, which binds and compels man, constitutes the dialectical drama on which Hobbes builds his political philosophy.
A person, according to Hobbes, is able to resolve the antinomy of freedom and coercion with the help of reason, making his choice in favor of a reasonable limitation of freedom and the preservation of life. But in order for the state to be able to provide individuals with protection of their rights and lives, it needed a free hand, giving it almost unlimited power. Thus, Hobbes is an absolutist, but, paradoxically, Hobbes is an absolutist not in spite of, but because of his individualism. He saw no other way of connecting individuals, each of whom appears as an element of power, except by introducing a political authority external to the individuals. But precisely because unlimited sovereignty is external to individuals, it leaves a free space - the space of law. A person who obeys the law is free; freedom and necessity are completely compatible. Being a purely external, artificial creation of man, the law does not change individual atoms, but only guarantees their peaceful coexistence. Thus, Hobbes lays the foundations of the modern liberal project, clothed in his paradoxical absolutist form. The resolution of this paradox constitutes the main intrigue of the entire political philosophy of the 17th-18th centuries. all the way to Rousseau.
Two treatises on government. Book 2 / / John Locke - summary and all editions
Summary: “Two Treatises on Government” is a classic work in the history of political thought, Locke’s main work, in which the philosopher, relying on natural law and the theory of the social contract, formulates the basic principles of the socio-political structure of the new society and the general concept of government. The second treatise (Book 2) is devoted to the origin, scope and goals of political power and civil society.
T. HOBBS. Leviathan, or matter, form and power of the state, ecclesiastical and civil
Hobbes T. Works: In 2 vols. M., 1991. T. 2. pp. 129-133, 144, 154-157, 163, 164, 173-176, 184, 185.
Part II. ABOUT THE STATE
Chapter XVII. On the causes, emergence and definition of the state
The purpose of the state is mainly to ensure security. The ultimate reason, purpose, or intention of men (who by nature love freedom and dominion over others) in imposing upon themselves the bonds (by which they are bound, as we see them living in a state), is the concern for self-preservation and, at the same time, for a more favorable life. In other words, when establishing a state, people are guided by the desire to get rid of the disastrous state of war, which is [...] a necessary consequence of the natural passions of people where there is no visible authority keeping them in fear and under the threat of punishment, forcing them to fulfill agreements and observe natural laws. [...]
Which is not guaranteed by natural law. In fact, natural laws (like justice, impartiality, modesty, mercy and (in general) behavior towards others as we would like them to act towards us) in themselves, without fear of any force forcing them to be observed, they contradict the natural passions that attract us to partiality, pride, revenge, etc. And agreements without a sword are just words that cannot guarantee a person’s security. That is why, despite the existence of natural laws (which every person follows when he wishes to follow them, when he can do so without any danger to himself), everyone will and can quite legally use his physical strength and dexterity in order to protect himself from all other people unless there is an established authority or authority strong enough to keep us safe. And wherever people lived in small families, they robbed each other; this was considered so consistent with natural law that the more a man could plunder, the more honor it gave him. In these matters the people observed no other laws than those of honor, namely, they abstained from cruelty, leaving the people with their lives and agricultural implements. Just as formerly small families, so now cities and kingdoms, which are large clans for their own safety, expand their possessions under all sorts of pretexts: danger, fear of conquest or help that may be provided to the conqueror. In doing so, they do their best to subdue and weaken their neighbors by brute force and secret machinations, and, since there is no other guarantee of safety, they act quite justly, and throughout the centuries their deeds are remembered with glory.
And also by connecting a small number of people or families. The unification of a small number of people also cannot serve as a guarantee of security, for the slightest addition to one side or another gives it such a great advantage in physical strength that it completely ensures victory and therefore encourages it to conquer. The amount of forces to which we can trust our safety is determined not by any number, but by the ratio of these forces to the forces of the enemy; in this case, it is enough for our safety when the surplus of forces on the enemy’s side is not so great that it could decide the outcome of the war and induce the enemy to attack.
Not by a multitude of people, each of whom is guided by his own judgment. Let there be any number of people, but if everyone is guided in their actions only by private judgments and aspirations, they cannot expect protection and protection either from a common enemy or from injustices inflicted on each other. For, being disagreeing in opinions regarding the best use and application of their forces, they do not help, but hinder each other and by mutual opposition reduce their forces to zero, as a result of which they are not only easily subdued by a smaller, but more united enemy, but also in the absence of a common enemies are waging war against each other for their private interests. Indeed, if we could suppose that the great mass of people agree to observe justice and other natural laws in the absence of a common authority to keep them in fear, then we could with the same reason assume the same thing about the whole human race, and then there would not exist, nor would there be any need for, civil government or state, for then there would be a world without subjection.
Something repeats itself every now and then. For the security that men would wish to extend throughout their lives, it is not sufficient that they should be governed and directed by a single will for a period of time, such as during a single battle or war. For although they achieve victory against a foreign enemy thanks to their unanimous efforts, then, when there is no longer a common enemy, or when one party considers an enemy someone whom the other considers a friend, they, due to the difference of their interests, must of necessity become disunited and again be plunged into internecine war. [...]
Origin states (Commonwealth). Definition of state. Such a general power, which would be capable of protecting people from the invasion of strangers and from injustices inflicted on each other, and thus providing them with that security in which they could feed from the labor of their hands and from the fruits of the earth and live in contentment, can be erected only in one way, namely, by concentrating all power and strength in one person or in an assembly of people, which, by a majority of votes, could bring together all the wills of the citizens into a single will. In other words, in order to establish general power, it is necessary that people appoint one person or assembly of people to be their representatives; so that each person considers himself a trustee in relation to everything that the bearer of the common face will do himself or force others to do in order to preserve the common peace and security, and recognize himself as responsible for this; so that everyone subordinates his will and judgment to the will and judgment of the bearer of the common person. This is more than agreement or unanimity. It is a real unity embodied in one person by an agreement made by each man with every Other in such a way as if each man had said to the other: I I authorize this person or this assembly of persons and transfer to him my right to govern myself, on the condition that you in the same way transfer your right to him and authorize all his actions. If this has happened, then the multitude of people thus united in one person is called state, in Latin - civitas. Such is the birth of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more respectfully) of that mortal god to whom we, under the dominion of the immortal God, owe our peace and our protection. For by virtue of the powers vested in him by every individual in the state, the said man or assembly of persons enjoys such great concentrated power and authority within him that the fear inspired by that power and authority makes that person or that assembly of persons capable of directing the will of all men to inner peace and to mutual assistance against external enemies. In this person or collection of persons lies the essence of the state, which needs the following definition: the state is a single person, for whose actions a great multitude of people have made themselves responsible by mutual agreement among themselves, so that that person may use the power and means of all of them as he shall think necessary for their peace and common defense.
What is a sovereign and a subject? The one who bears this face is called sovereign and they say about him that he has supreme power and everyone else is subjects.
There are two ways to achieve supreme power. One is physical force, for example, when someone forces his children to submit to his power under the threat of destroying them in case of refusal, or when, through war, they subjugate their enemies to their will, granting them life on this condition. The second is the voluntary agreement of people to submit to a person or assembly of people in the hope that this person or this assembly will be able to protect them against all others. Such a state can be called a political state, or a state based on establishing and a state founded in the first way is a state based on acquisition. [...]
Chapter XIX
About the different types of states based on the establishment,
and about the succession of supreme power
There can be only three different forms of state. The distinction of states lies in the distinction of the sovereign, or the person who is the representative of each and every one of the mass of people. And since the supreme power can belong either to one person or to an assembly of a large number of people, and either everyone, or only certain people different from the rest, can have the right to participate in this assembly, it is clear from here that there can be only three types of state. For the representative must be either one person or a larger number of people, and this is a collection of either all or only parts. If the representative is one person, then the state represents monarchy; if it's a meeting of everyone who wants to participate, then it's democracy, or democracy; and if the supreme power belongs to an assembly of only a part of the townspeople, then this aristocracy. There cannot be other types of state, for either one, or many, or all have the supreme power (the indivisibility of which I have shown) entirely. [...]
Chapter XX
On paternal and despotic power
State based on acquisition. State, based oh on acquisition, There is a state in which the supreme position is acquired by force. And supreme power is acquired by force when people - each individually or all together - by a majority vote, out of fear of death or captivity, accept responsibility for all the actions of the person or assembly in whose power their life and freedom are.
How does it differ from a state based on establishment. This form of dominion, or sovereignty, differs from sovereignty by establishment only in this, that the people who choose their sovereign do so from fear of one another, and not from fear of him whom they invest with sovereignty; in this case, they give themselves over to the one they fear. In both cases the motivating factor is fear, which should be noted by those who consider any contracts concluded out of fear of death or violence to be invalid. If this opinion were true, then no one in any state would be obliged to obey. It is true that in states once established or acquired, promises made under the influence of fear of death or violence are not contracts, and have no binding force, if what is promised is contrary to the laws; but such promises are not binding, not because they are made under the influence of fear, but because the promisee has no right to what he promises. Likewise, if the promisee can legally fulfill his promise and does not do so, he is released from this obligation not by the invalidity of the contract, but by the decision of the sovereign. In all other cases, anyone who legally promises something commits iniquity if he breaks his promise. But if the sovereign, who is the agent, releases the promisor from his obligation, then the latter, as the principal, may consider himself free.
The rights of the supreme power are the same in both cases. However, the rights and consequences of the supreme power are the same in both cases. The power of a sovereign who has acquired supreme power by force cannot be transferred to another without his consent; such a sovereign cannot be deprived of power, cannot be accused of injustice by any of his subjects, cannot be punished by his subjects. He is the judge of what is necessary to maintain peace; he decides the issue of teachings; he is the sole legislator and supreme judge in all disputes; he determines the time and occasion for declaring war and concluding peace; he has the right to elect officials, councilors, military leaders and all other officials and executives, as well as to establish rewards, punishments, honors and ranks. The basis for these rights and their consequences are the same considerations which we advanced in the previous chapter in favor of analogous rights and consequences of sovereign power based on establishment.
How to achieve paternal dominance. Dominance can be acquired in two ways: by birth and by conquest. The right of dominion by birth is the right of a parent over his children, and such power is called paternal. But this right is not derived from the fact of birth in the sense that a parent has dominion over his children on the basis that he gave birth to them, but it is derived from the consent of the children, clearly expressed or sufficiently revealed in one way or another. For as regards birth, God has appointed a helper for man, and there are always two who are equally parents. If dominion over children were determined by the act of birth, then it would have to belong to both equally and the children would have to be subordinated equally to both, which is impossible, for no one can obey two masters. And if some attributed this right only to man as the superior sex, then they were mistaken. For there is not always such a difference in strength and prudence between man and woman that this right can be established without war. In states this dispute is decided by civil law, and in most cases (if not always) this decision is in favor of the father, since most states were founded by fathers, not mothers, of families. However, now we are talking about a pure, natural state, where there are no laws about marriage, no laws regarding the education of children, but only natural laws and the natural inclination of the sexes towards each other and towards children. In this state, the issue of power over children is either regulated by an agreement among themselves, or not regulated at all. If they enter into an agreement to this effect, then the right goes to the person indicated in the agreement. We know from history that the Amazons entered into agreements with men from neighboring countries, whose assistance they resorted to in order to produce offspring, mastiffs op, according to which male offspring were to be sent to their fathers, and female offspring were left to their mothers. Thus, power over female offspring belonged to their mother.
Or based on upbringing. In the absence of a contract, authority over the children must belong to the mother. Indeed, in a pure state of nature, where there are no laws of marriage, it is impossible to know who is the father unless there is a corresponding declaration from the mother; therefore the right of dominion over children depends on her will and is therefore hers rights ohm Moreover, since we see that the child is at first in the power of the mother, so that she can either feed him or give him something, if she feeds him, he owes his life to his mother and therefore owes obedience to her more than to anyone to another, and therefore, she has dominion over him. If a mother gives up her child, and another finds him and feeds him, then dominance belongs to the one who feeds him, for the child is obliged to obey the one who saved his life. In fact, since the preservation of life is the goal for which one person becomes the subject of another, it seems that every person promises obedience to the one in whose power it is to save or destroy him.
Or based on the transfer of citizenship from one parent to another. If the mother is a subject of the father, the child is in the power of the father, and if the father is a subject of the mother (as happens when a queen marries one of her subjects), then the child is a subject of the mother.
If a man and a woman, who are monarchs of different kingdoms, have a child, and determine by treaty who should have dominion over him, that right is acquired by the treaty. In the absence of a treaty, the question is decided by the place of residence of the child, for the sovereign of each country has dominion over everyone living in it.
He who rules over children also rules over these children's children and over the children of these children's children. For he who dominates the person of a person rules over everything that that person has, without which dominance is an empty title without any real meaning. [...]
Chapter XXI
On the freedom of subjects
What is freedom? Liberty means the absence of resistance (by resistance I mean an external obstacle to movement), and this concept can be applied to irrational creatures and inanimate objects no less than to intelligent beings. For if anything is so bound or surrounded that it can move only within a certain space limited by the resistance of some external body, then we say that this thing has no freedom to move further. In the same way, of living beings, while they are shut up or restrained by walls or chains, and of water which is held back by banks or vessels, and which would otherwise be spread over a larger space, we generally say that they have no freedom to move as they moved. without these external obstacles. But if the obstacle to movement lies in the very structure of the thing, for example, when a stone is at rest or when a person is bedridden by illness, then we usually say that this thing is deprived not of freedom, but of the ability to move.
What does it mean to be a free person. According to this proper and generally accepted sense of the word, a free person is one who is not prevented from doing what he wants, since he is able to do it according to his physical and mental abilities. But if the word "freedom" is applied to things that are not bodies, then this is an abuse of the word, for that which does not have the ability to move cannot encounter obstacles. Therefore, when, for example, they say that the road is free, they mean the freedom not of the road, but of those people who move along it unhindered. And when we say “free gift,” we mean not the freedom of the gift, but the freedom of the giver, who is not forced to make this gift by any law or contract. Just like when we we speak freely then this is not freedom of voice or pronunciation, but of a person whom no law obliges to speak differently than he says. Finally, from the use of the words “free will” one can draw a conclusion not about the freedom of will, desire or inclination, but only about the freedom of a person, which consists in the fact that he does not encounter obstacles to doing what his will, desire or inclination. [...]
Chapter XXII
About subject groups of people, political and private
Different types of groups of people. Having outlined my view of the origin, forms and power of states, I intend to speak in the near future about their parts. And first of all I will speak of groups of people who are comparable to similar parts, or muscles, of the natural body. Under group by people I mean a certain number of people united by a common interest or a common cause. One of these groups of people is called ordered, other - disordered. Ordered are those in which one person or a collection of people act as representatives of the entire group. All other groups are called disordered.
Some of the ordered groups absolute And independent, being subject only to their representatives. Only states are like that, as I have already spoken about in the previous five chapters. Others are dependent, i.e. subject to some supreme authority, subjects which includes each member of these groups and their representatives.
Of the subject groups, some are political, others - private. Political (otherwise called political bodies and legal entities) are those groups of people who are formed on the basis of powers given to them by the supreme power of the state. Private are those that are established by the subjects themselves or formed on the basis of powers given by a foreign power. For everything that is formed in the state on the basis of powers given by a foreign supreme power cannot have a public legal character, but only a private character.
Some of the private groups legal other illegal. Those allowed by the state are legal, all others illegal. Disorganized are those groups that, having no representation, are just an aggregation of people. If it is not prohibited by the state and does not have bad purposes (such as gatherings of people at bazaars, at public spectacles, or for some other innocent reason), then it is legal. If the intentions are bad or (in the case of a significant number of people) unknown, then it is illegal.
In all political bodies the power of representatives limited. In political bodies, the power of representatives is always limited, and its boundaries are prescribed by the supreme power, for unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. And in every state the sovereign is the absolute representative of all subjects. Therefore, anyone else can be a representative of a part of these subjects only to the extent that this is permitted by the sovereign. But to allow the political body of the subjects to have absolute representation of all its interests and aspirations would mean ceding the corresponding part of the power of the state and dividing the supreme power, which would be contrary to the goals of establishing peace among the subjects and their protection. Such an intention cannot be assumed from the sovereign in any act of grant, unless the sovereign at the same time clearly and definitely releases the specified part of the subjects from their citizenship. For the utterance of the sovereign is not a sign of his will, when another utterance is a sign of the contrary. This statement is rather a sign of error and misunderstanding to which the entire human race is too susceptible.
Knowledge of the limits of the power given to the representatives of the political body can be gleaned from two sources. The first is the charter given by the sovereign, the second is the law of the state.
From the letter.Indeed, although no charter is required in the establishment and acquisition of a state, for states are independent and the power of the representative of the state has no other limits than those established by unwritten natural laws, yet in subject bodies so many varied restrictions are required in relation to the range of their tasks , place and time, that they cannot be remembered without a written letter and cannot be known without such a granted letter, which could be read by those who are in charge of it, and which at the same time would be sealed or certified by a seal or other usual signs of the highest approval.
And from laws.And since such boundaries are not always easy and even not always possible to establish in a charter, then ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must determine what a representative can legally do in all those cases about which the charter is silent.
If the representative is one person, then his illegal actions are his own. And therefore, if one representative of the body politic does anything in his capacity as a representative, which is not permitted by either charter or law, then it is his own act, and not by the act of the whole body or of any other member besides it. For beyond the boundaries outlined by charters or laws, he does not represent anyone other than his own person. But what he does in accordance with the charters and laws is the act of every member of the body politic, for for every act of the sovereign every subject is responsible, since the sovereign is the unlimited agent of his subjects, and the act of one who does not deviate from the charter of the sovereign, is the act of the sovereign, and therefore the responsibility for it falls on every member of the body.
If the representative is the assembly, then its actions are the actions only of those who authorized them. If the representative is a general meeting, then any resolution of this assembly that is contrary to charters or laws is an act of this assembly, or a political body, as well as an act of each member of this assembly who, with his vote, contributed to the adoption of the resolution, but it is not an act of such a member of the assembly who, while present at the meeting, voted against or was absent unless he voted behind through a trusted person. A resolution is an act of the assembly, for it is adopted by a majority of votes, and, if this resolution is criminal, the assembly may be subject to punishment corresponding to its artificial nature. It may, for example, be dissolved, or deprived of its charter (which for such artificial and fictitious bodies is the death penalty), or (if the assembly has a common capital) subject to a fine. For the body politic cannot, by its very nature, be subjected to physical punishment. Members of the meeting who did not cast their votes behind, not guilty, because the assembly cannot represent anyone in matters not permitted by its charter, and, therefore, the resolution of the assembly cannot be imputed to them. [...]
Secret intrigues.If the supreme power belongs to a large assembly and several members of this assembly, without having the authority to do so, persuade part of the assembly to seize the leadership of the rest into their own hands, then this is sedition and a criminal conspiracy, for this is malicious corruption of the assembly in their own personal interests. But if the one whose private matter is discussed and decided in the assembly tries to win over as many of its members as possible in his favor, then he does not commit any crime, for in this case he is not part of the assembly. And even if he wins the members of the assembly in his favor by bribery, this is still not a crime (unless it is prohibited by a certain law). For sometimes (such are the morals of people) it is impossible to achieve justice without bribery, and each person can consider his case to be right until it has been heard and decided in court.
Civil strife.If a private person V the state maintains more servants than are required for the management of his fortune and for the legitimate cause for which he employs them, then this is a conspiracy and a crime. For, enjoying the protection of the state, the subject does not need to be protected by his own force. And since among peoples who were not completely civilized, numerous families lived in constant hostility and attacked each other with the help of their own servants, it is clear from this that they committed crimes or that they did not have a state.
Conspiracies.Both conspiracies in favor of relatives and conspiracies in favor of the dominance of one or another religion (for example, conspiracies of papists, Protestants, etc.) or conspiracies of classes (for example, conspiracies of patricians and plebeians in Ancient Rome and aristocratic and democratic parties in Ancient Greece ) are illegal, for all such conspiracies are contrary to the interests of the peace and safety of the people and snatch the sword from the hands of the sovereign.
A gathering of people is a disorderly group of people, the legality or illegality of which depends on the reason for the gathering and on the number of those gathered. If the reason is legal and clear, the gathering is legal. Such, for example, is the usual gathering of people in church or at public spectacles, if the number of those assembled does not exceed the usual limits, for if the number of those assembled is too large, the occasion is unclear, and, consequently, anyone who cannot give a detailed and clear account of the motives his presence in the crowd must be considered to have an unlawful and seditious purpose. It may be considered quite lawful for a thousand people to formulate a common petition, which should be presented to a judge or official, but if a thousand people go to present it, then it is already a rebellious assembly, for one or two people are enough for this purpose. However, in such cases, the assembly becomes illegal not due to any established number of those gathered, but due to such a number of them that the authorities are not able to tame or transfer to the hands of justice. [...]
Printed by: Political Science: Reader / Comp. prof. M.A. Vasilik, associate professor M.S. Vershinin. - M.: Gardariki, 2000. 843 p. (Red font in square brackets indicates start text on next page of the printed original of this publication)
Lived in France for a long time during the civil war and independent republic, who was in close relations with the court of King Charles II, under the influence of Bacon’s thoughts, began to study the political and religious issues of his era. Of his numerous treatises on government (see the article Political views and teachings of Hobbes), the most important is “Leviathan, or Matter, the form and power of the state, ecclesiastical and civil.”
The then British socialists - levelers- called private property the source of all evil. In contrast, Hobbes argued that the community of property would cause the disintegration of society, the greatest of all possible evils, and that for the security of property and a fair trial on issues concerning it, a strong dominance of power, its unification in the hands of one person, is necessary. He posed the question of what kind of structure a state needs to have in order to suppress the monster of rebellion that seeks to devour it, and answered that the monster can only be destroyed or tamed by the monster, the dragon Leviathan. Therefore, the state and its head must have unlimited power. The head of the state must be omnipotent in it, must be a mortal god; the law of nature requires it.
This justification for absolutism was very popular with conservatives, and after the Stuart restoration, Hobbes received a pension. But his philosophical point of view is not at all the same as that of the monarchists and Anglicans. Like Bacon, Thomas Hobbes considers the material world to be a primitive fact. But in Leviathan it is stated that, according to the law of nature, the war of all against all prevails among men; Therefore, it is necessary, with the help of reason, to limit the action of man’s natural drives in order to preserve property and to found, by universal agreement, by contract, a state society in which the drives of nature would be subject to the moral law. Thus, the state is based on the mutual fear of people and on their desire for self-preservation, on the struggle for life. In Hobbes's argument there is no trace of the divine aura with which the royalists and their theologians adorned royal power. The monarch is not the conductor of the will of God, the highest moral principle on earth. His power is based on natural legal principles, which Hobbes understands in his own way.
The sovereign is given his authority by treaty, continues Leviathan, and in order for the treaty concluded to ensure peace and order to be durable, on the basis of this treaty, an authority must be established that combines all the power and all the rights of society, reigns unconditionally, demanding complete obedience . This power is the sovereign, the representative of the state, uniting all who were separated in the state of nature; this is the connection of everyone - society, people. The people and society, the people and the sovereign are identical concepts. People are only subjects of the state. It alone dominates, it alone is free. Everyone must obey him, do what the law requires; people have freedom only in what is not prohibited by laws. The power of the state is unlimited; to divide or limit it means to deny it and revive the ills of the state of nature. According to Leviathan, only monarchical absolutism corresponds to the purpose of state power, because only it ensures the existence of the state.
Thus, Hobbes derives the absolute power of the sovereign from law of nature. He sharply refutes Aristotle and other ancient thinkers who considered the moral law to be the basis of the state, refutes the medieval theory that demanded the separation of church and state, and arms himself against new concepts of constitutional order, in which the affairs of the state are governed by representatives of the people. The Leviathan theory is fundamentally different from the religio-political system of the royalists. He completely subordinates the church to the secular sovereign. Thomas Hobbes ignores the Holy Scriptures, derives religion from a feeling of fear or curiosity, says that it serves as a political tool to strengthen the power of the sovereign, that the church, with its worship and dogma, is simply the executor of the will of the sovereign, that the concepts of good and bad are not established conscience, but by civil law.