Battle in East Prussia 1914. Gloomy afternoon XXI century

Let's consider the total losses of the German troops. During the first skirmishes and battles with the troops of the 1st Army, the German cavalry, with the support of infantry units on July 23-29, 1914, lost (Verzhbolovo, Shmaleninken-Eidkunen, Marunsken) up to 500 people killed, wounded and captured [ Rogvold V. Decree. op. P. 22; Collection of documents. P. 111; Vatsetis I.I. Fighting in East Prussia. P. 25], another 218 people and 2 guns were lost at Caushen by the 2nd Landwehr Brigade, and up to 1,500 people were lost by the 1st Army Corps in the battle of Stallupenen. The Battle of Gumbinnen led to the loss of the Germans (mainly the 1st and 17th Corps) 14,607 people (435 officers and 14,172 lower ranks) (the majority fell on the 17th Army Corps of A. von Mackensen, which lost 200 officers and 8,000 lower ranks. S. 93), including 1,500 prisoners, and also 12 guns and 15 machine guns. This was the result of the 1st victory of the Russian troops and the Entente in the First World War. Eyewitnesses recalled how the regiments of Mackensen's corps, formed from the Prussians, went on the offensive as if on parade - not paying attention to the murderous fire of the 27th artillery brigade. And then, in order to support their presumptuous infantry, the German artillery performed a courageous act - an entire division, helping its infantry in critical moments of the battle, stood in an open position - just 1000 steps from the Russians. As a result, the German division was destroyed - and its 12 guns became a valuable trophy of the 27th Infantry Division. The document noted how the German infantry - in a column led by officers - went on the offensive, coming under the influence of 14 Russian machine guns, which opened fire over the heads of their infantry. Machine gunners and a battery of the 3rd mortar division destroyed this column in 5 minutes, killing up to 1,500 people [Radus - Zenkovich L. Decree. op. P. 63]. Moreover, some German regiments lost all officers and non-commissioned officers and over two-thirds of the privates [Collection of documents. P. 212]. The Germans suffered heavy losses while fighting against units of the 2nd Army. During the unsuccessful battle for the Germans at Orlau with the troops of the 15th Army Corps, the German 37th Infantry Division, located on the left flank of the 20th Army Corps, was defeated [Evseev N. Decree. op. P. 103]. According to N. Evseev, the losses of German units in killed and wounded were: 1st Jaeger Battalion - 16 officers and 254 privates; 151st Infantry Regiment - 16 officers and 380 soldiers; battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment - 34 soldiers; The 147th Infantry Regiment suffered the most heavily (some of its companies lost 150 soldiers). According to far incomplete information, the 75th Infantry Brigade lost more than 300 people. From the 73rd Infantry Brigade, the Russians buried 587 people on the battlefield. The 29th Chernigov Infantry Regiment buried about 600 German soldiers and officers, picking up more than 800 wounded. In general, the losses of the Germans (20th Army Corps and 70th Landwehr Brigade) on August 10-11 at Orlau-Frankenau amounted to at least 1,000 people killed and up to 3,000 wounded (most of them fell into Russian hands) [Ibid]. On August 13, in the battle of Bischofsburg, the losses of the 69th Brigade amounted to 1000 people, the 6th Landwehr Brigade - 470 people (of which 38 officers). The total losses of the 17th Army and 1st Reserve Corps, as well as the 6th Landwehr Brigade - 4000 people [Khramov F. Decree. op. P. 38]. Killed Germans. The onslaught of the central group of Samson’s army, even according to incomplete information, cost the Germans dearly. So, on August 13, in the offensive sector of the Russian 2nd Infantry Division of the 23rd AK, the German 41st Infantry Division of the 20th AK lost 1200-1250 soldiers [regiments - 18th Infantry - 30, 148th Infantry - 600, 152 1st Infantry - 73 soldiers; 72nd Infantry Brigade - 550 soldiers. Evseev N. Decree. op. P. 158. Also see Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. Vd. 2. S. 153]. Battalion commander Yu. Buchinsky recalled how, under the fire of Russian machine gunners, the chains of German infantry rapidly thinned out [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. op. P. 19]. The losses of units of the same 41st division at Vaplitz on August 15 were great. An eyewitness recalled the terrible effect of Russian artillery fire, which left mountains of dead and wounded. He counted 300-400 wounded Germans only on the edge of the forest. A column of prisoners numbering from 600 to 700 people gathered on the highway - this was the second one (the first had 800 prisoners). All this testified to the defeat of the German brigade [Zhelondkovsky V.E. Memoirs of Colonel Zhelondkovsky about participation in the actions of the XV Corps during the operation of General Samsonov’s army // Military Collection. Belgrade. 1926. Book. 7. P. 294]. The total losses of the 41st Division at Waplitz were 2,400 soldiers and officers and 13 guns. A German source described how German troops had to break through a 2.5 km wide chute - suffering heavy losses. The 41st Division lost two-thirds of its combat strength - from those who survived the previous battles, and after Vaplitz the remnants of the division lost any combat significance. The artillerymen also suffered: the 35th and 79th artillery regiments lost 61 people. On August 15, in the Mühlen area, Unger's division launched several unsuccessful attacks, repelled by the Russian 6th Infantry Division with heavy losses for the Germans [Khramov F. Decree. op. P. 55]. The Russians captured many prisoners from Vaplitz and Mühlen [General N. N. Martos named the number of prisoners captured from Vaplitz - 18 officers and more than 1000 privates. Golovin N. N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian Front. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. P. 273. In A. A. Kersnovsky, the number increases to 1400 people - indicating that this is the total number of prisoners captured by Vaplitz and Mühlen. Kersnovsky A. A. Decree. op. T. 3. P. 340. The 30th Infantry Regiment distinguished itself by capturing 11 officers and 380 soldiers (Collection of documents. P. 584) and the 5th Infantry Regiment (only the 2nd Battalion captured up to 250 people at Mulen, as well as captured the battery (1 gun was sunk in Lake Mühlen, and 3 were taken)) (Buchinsky Yu. F. Op. op. p. 29)]. Many heroes were buried at the battle site: N. Evseev writes about 427 German and 159 Russian soldiers buried at Vaplitz [Evseev N. Decree. op. P. 217]. According to other sources, in the Waplica cemetery there are 22 officers, 42 non-commissioned officers and 703 privates from the 59th Infantry Regiment alone (the total losses of this German regiment are 28 officers and 1,500 lower ranks, with many wounded being captured by Russians; among the latter - regiment commander Colonel Sontag, who soon died from his wounds). The German 152nd Infantry Regiment lost 12 officers and 514 lower ranks at Vaplitz [Bogdanovich P.N. Invasion of East Prussia in August 1914. Memoirs of an officer of the general staff of the army, General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964. P. 167]. German infantrymen advance under fire.T. So, even before the onset of the main events of Tannenberg, both (37th and 41st) divisions of the 20th Corps were so battered that they almost did not participate in the further course of the operation. In the battle at Allenstein, 2,000 Germans were captured. Moreover, when later releasing their prisoners, the Germans often shot at their compatriots, mistaking them for Russians [Evseev N. Decree. op. P. 241]. For example, the 5th Hussar Regiment did not dare to attack the Cossack convoy escorting captured Germans in Jedwabno. He waited for his infantry and artillery, and only then did the German hussars go on the offensive, capturing a Russian field hospital and 100 wounded German prisoners who were being treated there. Another 400 captured Germans were simply abandoned by the Russian convoy, and returned to their own, having previously experienced heavy shooting from their own comrades. An eyewitness cites the contents of a Russian dispatch sent by a non-commissioned officer from the village. Mühlen: 80 soldiers of different companies have gathered, there are no cartridges and officers, and 300 captured Germans are sitting in the barn [Zhelondkovsky V. E. Decree. op. P. 290]. Even when finishing off the encircled units of the central group of the 2nd Army, the Germans suffered heavy losses. Thus, in the battle near Adlershorst on August 17, units of the German 2nd Infantry Division fought heavy battles, which brought heavy losses to both sides. On the same day, a fierce battle between the German 1st Infantry Division and Russian units breaking out of the encirclement took place between Wallendorf and Muschaken. The infantry of the German 42nd regiment launched an attack on the Russian battery, but were shot. Only after powerful German artillery was brought into battle was the Russian battery suppressed and then captured, but the Russian infantry left [Evseev N. Decree. op. P. 265]. And when a kilometer southeast of the place. Malgaofen, parts of the brigade of the German 1st Infantry Division made a halt, they were attacked by Russian units, losing more than 200 people, including the brigade commander General F. Trotta. The breaking through Russian unit scattered parts of the German brigade - and the German infantrymen exchanged fire among themselves for some time. In this battle, on the German side, in addition to the general, 2 battalion commanders were killed, and the losses were very heavy. When later the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment, having discovered the movement of Russian units towards Kanwiesen, went on the attack, it was destroyed. It was in the battles near the places mentioned above. In Wallendorf, the Germans left in the hands of the units of the 13th Army Corps breaking out from encirclement the largest artillery trophy during the operation in question - 22 guns. In total, in battles with the troops of the 2nd Army in the period August 13 - 18 (that is, during the “Tannenberg” period) ) Germans (37th and 41st infantry divisions of the 20th AK (the formation was actually defeated), 2nd infantry division of the 1st AK, 3rd reserve division, Goltz's Landwehr division, 6th and 70th Landwehr brigades) near Gross-Bessau, Bischofsburg, Usdau-Soldau, Allenstein, Waplitz, Mühlen, Hohenstein, as well as during the pursuit battles (all 12 divisions liquidating the “Tannenberg” pocket) according to German data, lost 12,000 soldiers. To this figure should be added the 4,000 men lost on August 10-11 at Orlau-Frankenau. Finally, at the final stage of the operation, during the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes with the troops of the Russian 1st Army, the 8th Army lost, according to Russian data, up to 14,000, and according to German – 9,000 people. German machine gunners in battles near the Masurian Lakes. Thus, we see that the total losses of the 8th Army at the end of July–August 1914 in battles with units of the 1st Army amounted to at least 26,000 people (the largest losses were suffered at Gumbinnen - 14,607 soldiers and officers, during the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes - at least 9,000 people and at Stallupenen - 1,500 people), and in battles with the troops of the 2nd Army - at least 16,000 people (4,000 at Orlau-Frankenau and 12,000 during August 13-18 – implementing “Tannenberg”). Total - at least 42,000 people. The Reichsarchive confirms the Eighth Army's losses at 37,000. The difference between this figure and our calculations is that a large number of German soldiers and officers who were captured by Russians were then liberated by their own troops (thus, according to A. Knox, only part of the 15th Corps ended up in the “cauldron” and only 1,300 prisoners were captured in battles on August 10, 11 and 14. Knox A. Op. cit. P. 81). In total, during the operation under consideration, Russian troops captured up to 7,000 people (100 at Stallupenen, 1,500 at Gumbinnen, at least 2,000 at Orlau-Frankenau and at least 3,000 in the period August 13 - 18 - Mühlen-Waplitz, Hohenstein, Gross-Bessau, Allenstein, Uzdau -Soldau). Moreover, two-thirds of this amount falls on the share of the troops of the 2nd Army. V.I. Gurko also noted that the latter’s troops captured several thousand prisoners of war [Gurko V.I. War and Revolution in Russia. Memoirs of the commander of the Western Front 1914 - 1917. M., 2007. P. 84]. But the losses of the Germans in the battles with the 2nd Army were softened by the fact that the majority of German prisoners captured by Samson’s troops, after the death of the encircled central corps, returned to their own - and this is at least 5,000 people (captured 2,000 people at Orlau-Frankenau, 2,000 people - at Allenstein and over 1000 people - at Waplitz). For the Germans, the most costly were Gumbinnen, Tannenberg and the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. And for the 8th Army, which had lost 20% of its original strength, the transfer of fresh divisions from France was more than relevant.

We begin to look at the 1st East Prussian operation of 1914, which became the main failure of the Russian army in 1914. This operation lasted more than a month, from August 13 (the march of the 1st Russian Army) to September 22 (the retreat of the Russian armies behind the defensive lines of Neman, Bobr and Narev) 1914. On the Russian side, 3 armies took part in the operation (1st, 2nd and 10th); on the German side - one 8th Army.

The interests of the Franco-Russian Alliance at the beginning of the 1914 campaign required Russia to strike Germany simultaneously with the French in order to prevent the Germans from taking advantage of their internal position. Therefore, the French forced the Russians to promise to move against East Prussia around the 15th day of mobilization, although the Russian military leadership did not want this. It was these obligations to the allies that became the main strategic reason for the East Prussian operation, despite the unpreparedness of the armies and the orientation of the deployment of the Russian army towards an offensive against the Austrians.

The invasion of East Prussia was just one way to prick the German Empire, and not the most painful one. The economic damage would have been much greater if Russian troops had invaded Silesia. And the political effect would be much greater if the Russian army launched an attack on Berlin. However, from a military point of view, these options were too risky, because when these options were implemented, the rear of the Russian armies was threatened by flank attacks from East Prussia and Galicia. But an offensive into East Prussia would be a less risky operation, and it would be easier to implement. The armies concentrated on their territory under the protection of fortresses and large rivers, while blocking the most dangerous directions of a possible German offensive. And the victory in East Prussia secured the right flank of the Russian front during subsequent operations.

But for all the attractiveness of East Prussia as the target of the first major operation of the Russian army, it was a “tough nut to crack” both for natural reasons and for engineering preparation. In order not to break their teeth on it, the advancing army needed a high-quality operational plan and very good technical preparation. Without them, the position of the invading armies was extremely dangerous.

The East Prussian operation was to take place in a theater bounded by the Neman River in the east; the lower reaches of the Neman and the Baltic Sea in the north; the Vistula River in the west and the Narew River and its tributary Bobr (Biebrze) in the south. These water barriers were not only the natural boundaries of the theater of operations, but also complex obstacles to the advance of troops. Therefore, the Neman and Narev were natural lines for the deployment of the Russian armies, as well as natural defensive positions that the retreating Russian troops could cling to in case of failure. For the German army, such a frontier was the lower reaches of the Vistula. In addition, the Germans could evacuate their army from East Prussia by sea through the port of Konigsberg.

Both sides reinforced these natural defensive lines with fortresses. German fortresses were located in Königsberg, as well as in the Vistula cities of Torne (Toruń), Graudenz (Grudenzhe); Danzig (Gdańsk). While these fortresses were in the hands of the Germans, the Russians could not feel calm in East Prussia, since at any moment the enemy could cross the Vistula along the bridges in these fortresses or could land an army in Konigsberg.

The First World War saw many brilliant victories and defeats. One of the significant events during the world battles was the operation of the Russian troops, carried out at the end of the summer of 1914 in East Prussia.

The German General Staff, under the leadership of von Schlieffen, developed a brilliant plan in the European theater of operations and, from the first days of the war, implemented it quite successfully. France was attacked and held out with all its might. The Allies theoretically prepared for such a development of events, but in practice in the first days of the war they did not demonstrate coordination of actions.

German troops created a strong fortified area in East Prussia and the Russian command initially did not intend to conduct active attack operations in this direction. But at the beginning of August, France and England convincingly insisted on active operations by Russian forces in this area. Thus began the East Prussian operation of 1914.

Russian military plan

The two Russian armies of the Northwestern Front hoped to inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy's Eighth Army. The armies under the command of Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf planned to outflank the Germans, cut them off from important strategic points and create all the conditions for defeat. If successful, Russian troops could begin active advances deeper into Germany.

The German army had no specific plan. She was faced with the following tasks:

  • contain the onslaught and maintain its position in East Prussia;
  • provide all possible assistance to the Austro-Hungarian troops advancing in the Vistula region;
  • preserve the occupied territories as a future springboard for the offensive.

Start of hostilities

On August 17, Russian troops began a completely successful offensive. They inflicted a number of significant defeats on the enemy and actively advanced across East Prussia. On August 20, a strategically important and bloody battle took place between the cities of Gumbinnen and Goldap, in which Rennenkampf’s army (in the portrait) inflicted a significant defeat on the Germans and forced them to retreat from East Prussia. At the Battle of Gubinnin, Russia won its first significant victory in the First World War, despite the numerical superiority of the enemy.

Failed offensive

Russian troops had a clear strategic advantage, but were unable to realize it. This was due to poor preparation for the operation, ill-thought-out logistics, lack of intelligence data on the enemy’s position, and inconsistency in the actions of the armies and Headquarters.

General Rennenkampf's army did not continue active offensive operations and stopped to regroup, waiting for the rear with provisions and weapons to catch up with them. Samsonov's army continued to attack and move deeper. The Germans, having learned about such inconsistency in actions, were able to mobile transfer some divisions from the west and create a powerful fist to attack the Russians. At the end of August, Samsonov continued to advance, although the front leadership ordered to stop and even retreat. Due to poor communication, the order did not reach the recipient, which was the reason for the death of the Russian troops. The front headquarters at that time did not even know the exact location of the army.

German troops successfully pulled the enemy into the cauldron and inflicted crushing flank attacks on them. The Russian troops succumbed to panic, and communication between the corps was interrupted. General Samsonov died (according to one version, he shot himself after realizing the disastrous situation). This happened on August 30th. General Klyuev took command. He made an unsuccessful attempt to save the troops, but it all ended in the capture of Russian soldiers and officers. The terrible defeat of Russian troops in East Prussia is better known as the Battle of Tannenberg. At the same time, Rennenkampf’s army was only fifty kilometers from Samsonov’s army and was unaware of the ongoing battle.

Summer-autumn 1914 - the time of battles of the Russian army in Prussia and Galicia. Now we will talk about the details of the first offensive of our army, but the general outline of those events must be recalled.

So, during the East Prussian operation, the 2nd Army of General Samsonov suffered a heavy defeat, and the 1st Rennenkampf retreated.

In what tone do they usually talk about the unsuccessful operation in Prussia? Two approaches can be distinguished: direct slinging of mud at our country and more subtle, sophisticated mockery.


First approach. The troops were thrown on the offensive without proper training, understaffed, and with poor rear organization. Ordinary soldiers, of course, are courageous, but no amount of heroism is enough to compensate for the incompetence and, especially, the betrayal of the generals. So the collapse of the Russian armies is natural. The conclusion from this is more than obvious and has been voiced many times: the Russian Empire is rotten, neither the system as a whole, nor the leadership of the army in particular were good for anything. In general, “damned tsarism.”

The second, more cunning approach is built, as it were, on patriotic positions. Its essence is as follows. The Germans pushed the French towards Paris, and Russia, faithful to its allied duty, rushed to the rescue. Germany, faced with our offensive in the east, transfers part of its forces from the western front and inflicts defeat on the Russians. Without really preparing, without completing mobilization, the Russians saved their ally with their blood. Hurray for the Russian soldier and officer! Well, what conclusion can be drawn from this? Yes, almost exactly the same as in the first case.

Judge for yourself: Russia saves France, thinks about its ally, and throws its soldiers into an unprepared attack that ends in failure. Russia is waging a war not for its own interests, but for those of others. So who are the leaders of the country after this? At best they are idiots, at worst they are traitors. And again we get “damned tsarism.” It seemed like they were going a different route, but they still ended up in the same place.

What is the objective side of the issue? The command plan of the German Empire was based on Schlieffen's ideas. While at the head of the German General Staff, he developed a strategy for a war on two fronts. It was supposed to concentrate the maximum number of troops against France and first defeat it with a quick blow, and then, turning around, attack Russia with all its might. At the same time, it was believed that Russian mobilization would proceed slowly, and our army would not have time to take advantage of the fact that the Germans were leaving a relatively insignificant barrier in the East.

But if the Schlieffen plan works, then millions of German soldiers will move towards Russia. This could not be allowed under any circumstances, and the Russian command did everything to disrupt the German blitzkrieg. In that situation, the count was literally days: after all, the enemy assumed that he would occupy Paris in 39 days of war. The Russians needed to act as quickly as possible, which explains the seemingly mediocre preparation of the operation. I would like to ask a question to those who see here signs of “mediocrity” and “damned tsarism”: what should our high command have done? Wait until full mobilization, bring up significant reserves, strengthen the rear and... find yourself face to face with the entire colossal German army transferred from West to East?

Prominent German military leader Max Hoffmann subsequently wrote that the Germans expected the appearance of two Russian armies between August 15 and 20, 1914. However, even before August 14, they received information that large Russian forces were on the move.

Having launched an offensive in Prussia, Russia saved not France, but itself, fought for its own interests, and not for others, and coped with its tasks simply brilliantly. The blitzkrieg was thwarted. The Germans were unable to put pressure on France, getting bogged down in positional battles, and thus were unable to move on to the second part of the Schlieffen plan, which provided for an all-out attack on Russia.

Nevertheless, it makes sense to understand the specific actions of our commanders, but here very strange things begin to emerge. Following Samsonov's defeat, Tsar Nicholas II ordered General Panteleev to conduct an investigation into the events. Panteleev interviewed a number of senior commanders who participated in the offensive, and in addition studied an array of relevant documents: orders and reports. Panteleev presented the results of his work in a special report to Nicholas II. The text of the note was subsequently published and is now available to anyone.

So, according to the plan, the 1st and 2nd Russian invasion armies were ordered to cover the enemy group from two flanks. Rennenkampf advanced north of the Masurian swamps, Samsonov bypassed them from the southwest. If successful, the German troops located between the Vistula and the Masurian Lakes would be caught in a pincer attack.

Rennenkampf acted exactly as indicated by the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the front and won. In the first battle near Stallupenen on August 17, 1914, Russian units of the 1st Army forced the enemy to retreat. On August 19, the attack of Wrangel's Horse Guards decided the outcome of the second battle and again in our favor. On August 20, in the battle of Gumbinnen, 74.4 thousand German bayonets with 224 machine guns fought against 63.8 thousand Russian bayonets with 252 machine guns; 408 Russian guns against 453 German guns. The Germans are retreating again.

The German commander Prittwitz panics and decides to begin a general retreat of his entire 8th Army across the Vistula. He is immediately dismissed, and leadership passes to the famous Hindenburg-Ludendorff tandem, but the threat of complete encirclement of the entire German group becomes more than real.
Rennenkampf did his job, now everything depended on Samsonov. And at this important moment, Samsonov unexpectedly came out of subordination. For no apparent reason, he began to implement his own plan, which broke all pre-war calculations. The general decided to carry out deeper coverage of the Germans. Compared to the positions prescribed in the directive, he diverted units of the 2nd Army more than 20 km to the West.

Such an obvious violation of the order immediately led to undesirable consequences. The 2nd Army broke away greatly from the 1st Army, and free space arose between them, which allowed the Germans to maneuver and strike alternately at Rennenkampf and Samsonov.

The Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky, demanded that Samsonov stop acting without permission and act according to the previously developed plan. And what do you think? Samsonov ignored a direct order from his superiors.

Rennenkampf's army successfully advanced and drove the Germans to the West; Samsonov was supposed to slam the trap with a blow to their rear, but the 2nd Army was late, although at first it was successful. In the battle of Frankenau, Samsonov's Russian army literally defeated the Germans. Yet our commander's arbitrary improvisations ultimately spoiled the matter.

Violation of the directive led to the overextension of the 2nd Army, and its corps became isolated from each other. Here Zhilinsky had to redraw the plan of the general offensive on the fly, since new circumstances made the pre-war calculations meaningless. The problem is that these “new circumstances” themselves arose due to Samsonov’s evasion from the original directive, and Zhilinsky’s attempt to force the general to act according to the developed scheme failed. Samsonov did not listen to the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front.

Zhilinsky did not give up trying to reason with Samsonov and continued to send him orders by telegraph. What about Samsonov? He was tired of listening to criticism addressed to him, and he turned off the telegraph machine. I repeat, the connection was not disabled, Samsonov simply unilaterally stopped communicating with the Commander-in-Chief. Zhilinsky tried to contact Samsonov and sent planes and cars to the general. To no avail.

Meanwhile, the East Prussian operation was gradually approaching a turning point. The Russians won several victories, but Samsonov's hopes of making a deep envelopment of the enemy were crumbling before our eyes. The Germans were building up their group, and 13 German divisions fought against the center of Samsonov’s troops from 5 divisions.

A quick retreat could have saved the 2nd Army, but Samsonov did not want to come to terms with the obvious failure of his plan. Purely psychologically, the course of his reasoning is clear. Violating orders from superiors can be forgiven if successful. Encircle the Samsonov Germans, and “the winner is not judged,” but the 2nd Army itself found itself on the verge of encirclement. When Samsonov came to his senses, it was already almost too late. There was still a chance to retreat to Russia, but now it depended on whether one Russian infantry division could hold off the German counteroffensive, thereby covering the withdrawal of two corps.

Unfortunately, our division did not hold its position. The enemy cut off convenient escape routes, as a result of which the Russian corps (XV and XIII) took to the same roads, and their units began to mix. Control of the two buildings turned out to be difficult, and soon lost. Ultimately, two corps were surrounded, the XXIII Corps was also defeated, and most of our soldiers and officers surrendered. 10 thousand people left the German ring.

By ignoring the directive, Samsonov exposed not only himself and his subordinates, but also Rennenkampf’s 1st Army. Having gained the upper hand over Samsonov, the Germans turned their gaze to the north, intending to defeat the Russians. Hindenburg received reinforcements from the Western Front, and the Germans outnumbered ours not only in the number of guns (1,146 guns versus 724), but also in manpower. However, Rennenkampf's units put up stubborn resistance, carried out successful counterattacks, and retreated to the border in perfect order.

As for Samsonov, it is believed that he committed suicide. He, too, was surrounded, and among a small group of senior officers tried to break through to his own. His comrades escaped the German ring, but along the way they “lost” the general. A survey of those who escaped the encirclement showed that not a single officer saw Samsonov shoot himself. Moreover, no one could really explain how it happened that the general fell behind his own people and got lost in the forests. The confused and unclear testimony caused obvious bewilderment among General Panteleev, who conducted the investigation. However, no matter how hard he tried, Panteleev could not achieve a clear picture of what happened. What actually happened in the Prussian forests is now impossible to establish exactly.

Samsonov was neither mediocrity nor a coward. A participant in the Russian-Japanese War, he already showed himself to be an excellent commander. There is much evidence of his personal courage. It is hardly possible to find out for certain what made the general ignore Zhilinsky’s orders and replace the directive with his own plan of action. We can only guess, and perhaps the most likely explanation is banal.

Vanity. The latent rivalry with Rennenkampf led Samsonov to disaster. He wanted a resounding victory, deep coverage of the Germans, with the total defeat of the enemy, but everything turned out differently.

Rennenkampf was not a traitor, as he was sometimes called in journalism and fiction on military topics. He strictly followed the order, achieved a number of victories, and with honor led his troops out from under the attack of a strong enemy. He is accused of saying that Rennenkampf did not want to save Samsonov. These ridiculous arguments do not take into account the obvious: the army is built on subordination. Rennenkampf did not receive an order to release Samsonov. Moreover, if you believe General Kurlov, Rennenkampf turned to the supreme authorities with a request to give him permission to come to the aid of Samsonov, but this was denied to him.

Assessing the results of the East Prussian operation, it must be said that although Germany achieved a tactical victory, it suffered a strategic defeat. The Russian offensive disrupted the blitzkrieg, the transfer of German troops from the French front to the Russian did not allow Germany to defeat France, and this meant the collapse of the entire strategic idea of ​​the German command.

Germany had a chance of winning the war only if it could defeat its opponents one by one: crush France, and then take on Russia. This was not possible due to the rapid advance of Russian troops into Prussia. The Western Front became the main one and pinned down the main forces of Germany, which saved millions of lives on the Eastern Front. Russia was saving not France, but itself, and the East Prussian operation is an example of strategic success against the backdrop of tactical defeat. The German victory turned out to be Pyrrhic, and it was not cheap for the German army.

Combat schedule of the sides

Russian army

  • 1st Army - Commander Rennenkampf, Pavel Karlovich, Chief of Staff Mileant, Gavriil Georgievich, Quartermaster General Bayov, Konstantin Konstantinovich
    • II AK - Chief Sheideman, Sergei Mikhailovich
      • 26th Infantry Division - Chief Poretsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
      • 43rd Infantry Division - Chief Slyusarenko, Vladimir Alekseevich
      • 76th Infantry Division - Chief Iosefovich, Felix Dominikovich
      • 72nd Infantry Division (from August 27) - chief Orlov, Dmitry Dmitrievich
      • Don 31st Cossack Regiment (6 hundreds)
    • III AK - chief Epanchin, Nikolai Alekseevich, chief of staff Chagin, Vladimir Alexandrovich
      • 25th Infantry Division - Chief Bulgakov, Pavel Ilyich
      • 27th Infantry Division - Chief Adaridi, August-Karl-Mikhail Mikhailovich
      • Don 34th Cossack Regiment
      • Don 19th Separate Cossack Hundred
    • IV AK - chief Aliyev, Eris Khan Sultan Giray, chief of staff Desino, Konstantin Nikolaevich
      • 30th Infantry Division - Chief Kolyankovsky, Eduard Arkadevich
      • 40th Infantry Division - Chief Korotkevich, Nikolai Nikolaevich
      • 57th Infantry Division - Chief Bezradetsky, Dmitry Nikolaevich
      • Don 44th Cossack Regiment
      • Don 26th Separate Cossack Hundred
    • XX AK - chief Smirnov, Vladimir Vasilyevich (general), chief of staff Shemyakin, Konstantin Yakovlevich
      • 28th Infantry Division - Chief Lashkevich, Nikolai Alekseevich
      • 29th Infantry Division - Chief Rosenschild von Paulin, Anatoly Nikolaevich
      • 54th Infantry Division (from September 9) - chief Erogin, Mikhail Grigorievich
      • Don 46th Cossack Regiment
      • Don 25th Separate Cossack Hundred
      • 73rd Artillery Brigade of the 73rd Infantry Division
    • XXVI AK (from September) - chief Gerngross, Alexander Alekseevich
      • 53rd Infantry Division - Chief Fedorov, Semyon Ivanovich
      • 56th Infantry Division - Chief Boldyrev, Nikolai Ksenofontovich
    • Army cavalry
      • 1st Guards Cavalry Division - Chief Kaznakov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
      • 2nd Guards Cavalry Division - Chief Rauch, Georgy Ottonovich
      • 1st Cavalry Division - Chief Gurko, Vasily Iosifovich
      • 2nd Cavalry Division - Chief of Nakhichevan, Khan Hussein
      • 3rd Cavalry Division - Chief Bellegarde, Vladimir Karlovich
    • 5th Infantry Brigade - commander Schrader, Pyotr Dmitrievich
    • 1st separate cavalry brigade - commander Oranovsky, Nikolai Aloizievich
  • 2nd Army - commander Samsonov, Alexander Vasilyevich, beginning. headquarters Postovsky, Pyotr Ivanovich (from August 19), Quartermaster General Filimonov, Nikolai Grigorievich)
    • I AK - chief Artamonov, Leonid Konstantinovich (replaced on August 27 by A.V. Dushkevich), chief of staff Lovtsov, Sergei Petrovich
      • 22nd Infantry Division - Chief Dushkevich, Alexander Alexandrovich.
        • Vyborg 85th Infantry Regiment - commander Freiman, Karl Vladimirovich
      • 24th Infantry Division - Chief Reshchikov, Nikolai Petrovich
        • Irkutsk 93rd Infantry Regiment - commander Kopytinsky, Yulian Yulianovich
        • Krasnoyarsk 95th Infantry Regiment - commander Lokhvitsky, Nikolai Alexandrovich
      • Don 35th Cossack Regiment
    • VI AK - chief Blagoveshchensky, Alexander Alexandrovich), chief of staff Nekrashevich, Georgy Mikhailovich
      • 4th Infantry Division - Chief Komarov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
        • Belozersky 13th Infantry Regiment - commander Dzheneev, Dmitry Dmitrievich
        • Olonetsky 14th Infantry Regiment - commander Shevelev, Vladimir Georgievich
        • Shlisselburg 15th Infantry Regiment - Commander Arapov, Nikolai Ivanovich
        • Ladoga Regiment - commander Mikulin, Alexander Vladimirovich
      • 16th Infantry Division - Chief Richter, Guido Kazimirovich
        • Suzdal 62nd Infantry Regiment - commander Golitsynsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
        • Kazan 64th Infantry Regiment - commander Ivanov, Alexander Mikhailovich
      • Don 22nd Cossack Regiment
    • XIII AK - chief Klyuev, Nikolai Alekseevich), chief of staff Pestich, Evgeniy Filimonovich
      • 1st Infantry Division - Chief Ugryumov, Andrey Alexandrovich
        • Nevsky 1st Infantry Regiment - commander Pervushin, Mikhail Grigorievich
        • Sofia 2nd Infantry Regiment - commander Grigorov, Alexander Mikhailovich
        • Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment - commander Zagneev, Nikolai Grigorievich
      • 36th Infantry Division - Chief Prezhentsov, Alexander Bogdanovich
        • Zvenigorod 142nd Infantry Regiment - commander Venetsky, Georgy Nikolaevich
        • Dorogobuzh 143rd Infantry Regiment - commander Kabanov, Vladimir Vasilievich
        • Kashirsky 144th Infantry Regiment - commander Kakhovsky, Boris Vsevolodovich
      • Border Guard Detachment (4 hundreds)
      • Don 40th Cossack Regiment (from August 29)
    • XV AK - chief Martos, Nikolai Nikolaevich, chief of staff Machugovsky, Nikolai Ivanovich
      • 6th Infantry Division - Chief Torklus, Fedor-Emilius-Karl Ivanovich
        • Nizhny Novgorod 22nd Infantry Regiment - commander Meipariani, Zakhary Alexandrovich
        • Nizovsky 23rd Infantry Regiment - commander Danilov, Dmitry Evgrafovich
        • Simbirsk 24th Infantry Regiment - Sokolovsky, Andrey Frantsevich
      • 8th Infantry Division - Chief Fitingof, Evgeniy Emilievich
        • Chernigov 29th Infantry Regiment - commander Alekseev, Alexander Pavlovich
        • Poltava 30th Infantry Regiment - commander Gavrilitsa, Mikhail Ivanovich
        • Aleksopolsky 31st Infantry Regiment - commander Lebedev, Alexander Ivanovich
        • Kremenchug 32nd Infantry Regiment - commander Ratko, Vasily Alexandrovich
      • Orenburg 2nd Cossack Regiment (4 hundreds)
    • XXIII AK - chief Kondratovich, Kiprian Antonovich, chief of staff Nordheim, Wilhelm-Karl Kasperovich
      • 3rd Guards Infantry Division - Chief Sirelius, Leonid Otto Ottovich
        • Lithuanian Life Guards Regiment - commander Schildbach, Konstantin Konstantinovich
        • Kexholm Life Guards Regiment - commander Malinovsky, Alexander Mikhailovich
        • Volyn Life Guards Regiment - commander Gerua, Alexander Vladimirovich
      • 2nd Infantry Division - Chief Mingin, Joseph Feliksovich
        • Kaluga 5th Infantry Regiment - commander Zinoviev, Nikolai Petrovich
        • Libavsky 6th Infantry Regiment - commander Globachev, Nikolai Ivanovich
        • Revel 7th Infantry Regiment - commander Manulevich-Meydano-Uglu, Mikhail Alexandrovich
        • Estonian 8th Infantry Regiment - commander Raupach, German Maximilianovich
    • 1st Rifle Brigade - commander Vasiliev, Vladimir Mikhailovich
    • 2nd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade
    • Army cavalry
      • 4th Cavalry Division - Chief Tolpygo, Anton Aleksandrovich
      • 6th Cavalry Division - Chief of Roop, Vladimir Khristoforovich
        • Glukhovsky 6th Dragoon Regiment
      • 15th Cavalry Division - Chief Lyubomirov, Pavel Petrovich

It should also be noted that due to very contradictory orders from headquarters and the North-Western Front, the structure of the 2nd Army was constantly changing, moreover, there was uncertainty in the subordination of individual formations. So, for example, from August 21, Artamonov’s I AK was subordinated to the 2nd Army by order of Headquarters, but this order was not transmitted by the headquarters of the North-Western Front.

German army

8th Army (commander Colonel General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, since August 23, 1914 command replaced by: Commander Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of Staff Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General Hoffmann)

  • 1st AK (commander Hermann von Francois)
    • 1st Infantry Division
    • 2nd Infantry Division.
  • 1st Reserve AK (commander von Belov)
    • 1st Reserve Infantry Division
    • 36th Reserve Infantry Division
  • 17th AK (commander August von Mackensen)
    • 35th Infantry Division
    • 36th Infantry Division
  • 20 AK (commander General Scholz)
    • 37th Infantry Division
    • 41st Infantry Division
  • 3rd reserve division
  • 1 Ladder Division
  • 6th Ladver Brigade
  • 70th Ladver Brigade
  • 1st Cavalry Division

Planning and preparation of the operation

The remnants of the 2nd Army retreated across the Narew River.

Retreat of the 1st Russian Army from East Prussia

At that time, the Battle of Galicia was ongoing on the southern front of the Warsaw salient, and Austria-Hungary demanded that Germany move the 8th Army south and, through Poland, hit the rear of the Russian armies advancing in Galicia.

However, the German General Staff considered such an operation too risky and chose to liberate East Prussia, and on August 31 ordered the 8th Army to attack against the 1st Russian Army, which had reached Königsberg.

Having received 2.5 corps from the Western Front on September 4, Ludendorff regrouped the 8th Army: covering himself from the south against Scheidemann’s 2nd Russian Army with one and a half divisions (20,000 bayonets), he deployed seven corps and two cavalry divisions, 230,000 bayonets and sabers with 1080 guns. They were opposed by five corps and five cavalry divisions of the 1st Russian Army of Rennenkampf, 110,000 bayonets and sabers with 900 guns.

The main forces of Rennenkampf, aimed at com. Front Zhilinsky for the siege of Königsberg, concentrated on the northern flank, and the Germans decided to attack the southern flank, where there was only one 2nd corps and cavalry. The plan was to break through the front here, go to the rear of the 1st Army, push it back to the sea and the swamps of the Lower Neman and destroy it there. Ludendorff sent three corps and two cavalry divisions through the lake defile to Letzen, bypassing the Russian southern flank, and four corps - north of the lakes.

On the Narew, the Russian Headquarters replenished the 2nd Army with two fresh corps. Southeast of the Masurian Lakes, in the zone between the 2nd and 1st armies, the 10th Army was formed.

On September 7-9, the German outflanking column unhindered passed through the lake defile and threw back parts of the 2nd Corps, going to the rear of the 1st Russian Army. Rennenkampf urgently transferred two infantry and three cavalry divisions and the 20th Corps from the north to the southern flank from the center, and stopping the German advance, began to withdraw the entire army to the east. When the encircling column of the German 8th Army resumed its attack north on September 10, the threat of encirclement by Russian troops had already passed.

On September 9, the 2nd Russian Army struck from the south of East Prussia, allegedly destroyed a week ago, according to all Ludendorff’s reports, and forced the Germans to turn part of their forces against it.

The retreat of the 1st Army was covered mainly by the 2nd and 20th Corps, which held back the superior German forces in rearguard battles. By September 14, the 1st Army retreated to the Middle Neman, losing about 15 thousand people (killed, wounded and captured) and 180 guns (more than 30 thousand people during the entire operation). German troops lost about 10 thousand people (25 thousand people during the entire operation). Although the 1st Army withdrew, the German plan to encircle and destroy it failed, thanks to Rennenkampf's timely decision to retreat and the tenacity of the rearguard corps. The army was simply squeezed out of East Prussia.

Results of the operation

According to the directive of the North-Western Front of September 16, the 1st Army took up defense on the Neman, and the 2nd on the Narew, that is, in the same place where they were located before the start of the operation. The total losses of the front (killed, wounded and prisoners) amounted to more than 80 thousand people and about 500 guns. On September 16, General Zhilinsky was dismissed from the post of commander of the North-Western Front, and General N.V. Ruzsky was appointed in his place.

German losses amounted to 3,847 killed, 6,965 missing, 20,376 wounded, 23,168 sick.

The German 8th Army repulsed the advance of superior forces of two Russian armies into East Prussia, defeated the 2nd Army and drove the 1st Army out of East Prussia, which became a notable operational success for Germany in a secondary theater of operations. The significance of the German victory in the East Prussian operation lies in the temporary refusal of the Russian Headquarters to advance from the Warsaw salient through Poznan to Berlin.

At the same time, the fighting in East Prussia distracted the German 8th Army from attacking the northern front of the Warsaw salient while the Battle of Galicia was taking place on its southern front, allowing the Russian army to defeat the Austro-Hungarian forces.

The transfer of two corps and a cavalry division (120 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western Front to East Prussia seriously weakened the German army before the Battle of the Marne, which resulted in its defeat. Marshall Foch concluded:

If France was not wiped off the face of Europe, then we owe this primarily to Russia, since the Russian army, with its active intervention, diverted part of the forces to itself and thereby allowed us to win a victory on the Marne.

Germany's tactical success in East Prussia, due to the transfer of troops from the Western Front, turned into a strategic defeat due to the failure of the operation against France. Germany was forced to fight a protracted war on two fronts, which it had no chance of winning.

Notes

Literature

Specially dedicated to the East Prussian operation

  • Colonel Buchinsky Yu. F. Tannenberg disaster. Diary of a participant in the battles in East Prussia in August 1914, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 5th infantry. Kaluga Emperor Wilhelm I regiment. - 1st. - Sofia, Bulgaria, 1939. - P. 52.
  • Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The beginning of the war and the operation in the East. Prussia. Prague, 1926
  • Vatsetis I. I. Combat operations in East Prussia in July, August and early September 1914 - M., 1923.
  • Evseev N. August battle of the 2nd Russian army in East Prussia (Tannenberg) in 1914 M. 1936
  • East Prussian operation. Collection of documents of the world imperialist war on the Russian front (1914-1917) M., 1939.
  • Bogdanovich P. N. Invasion of East Prussia in August 1914; Memoirs of an officer of the General Staff of the Army, General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964.